58 F.4th 252
6th Cir.2023Background
- Sheila Mikel, a Tennessee resident, fostered two children ("AK" and "SK") and described the relationship as "pre-adoptive." Omni Visions supervised the placement under a contract with the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (DCS).
- After Mikel filed adoption papers in December 2017, Omni removed the girls alleging emotional abuse and closed Mikel’s foster home; Mikel denies the abuse and challenges the removals as lacking notice and a hearing.
- Mikel sued Omni, DCS, and the Commissioner (suing the Commissioner in official and impliedly in individual capacity), seeking damages, attorney’s fees, declaratory relief, and two injunctions (limiting future removals and barring assistance in any adoption of AK and SK) under § 1983 and state law.
- The district court dismissed claims against DCS and the then-Commissioner for want of jurisdiction and held Mikel failed to state a § 1983 claim against Omni; it also declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims. Mikel appealed.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed: it held DCS protected by sovereign immunity; Ex parte Young permits prospective relief against the current Commissioner in principle, but Mikel lacked standing for injunctive/declaratory relief; only the damage claim against Omni remained but failed on the merits because no constitutional or state-law liberty interest was shown.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sovereign immunity / official-capacity relief | Mikel sought prospective relief against the Commissioner for ongoing § 1983 violations; sovereign immunity should not bar that relief. | DCS is immune and not a "person" under § 1983; official-capacity money claims barred by sovereign immunity. | DCS is barred by sovereign immunity and not a § 1983 "person." Ex parte Young allows prospective relief against the state official in principle, so official-capacity injunctive claims are not categorically barred. |
| Standing for damages/fees vs injunctive/declaratory relief | Loss of custody is concrete injury supporting damages, fees, injunctions, and declarations. | Injunctive/declaratory relief would not redress Mikel’s custody loss; no imminent future injury; declaratory relief speculative. | Mikel has standing to seek damages and fees against Omni but lacks standing to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief against Omni or the Commissioner. |
| § 1983 — constitutional liberty interest in foster relationship | Mikel’s pre-adoptive foster relationship conferred a liberty interest in maintaining custody. | Foster placements are temporary, statutory/contractual arrangements that do not create a constitutional liberty interest. | No Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest found; Renfro controls — foster relationship here did not create a protected liberty interest, so § 1983 due process claim fails. |
| State-law-created liberty interest (Tennessee law) | Tennessee statutes and DCS rules (notice/hearing, adoption preference) create substantive limits on discretion and thus a state-created liberty interest. | Statutes and policies impose procedural rights only; violation of state rules alone does not create a federal due-process claim. | Tennessee law did not place the sort of substantive limits needed to create a protected state-created liberty interest; state-law violations alone do not supply § 1983 relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (authorizes prospective injunctive relief against state officials for ongoing federal violations)
- Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state entities are not "persons" under § 1983)
- Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (limits on awarding retroactive monetary relief from state treasury)
- Renfro v. Cuyahoga County Dep’t of Human Servs., 884 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1989) (foster relationships do not create a constitutional liberty interest)
- Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury, causation, redressability)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (procedural violations unaccompanied by concrete harm are insufficient for Article III standing)
- Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (2013) (custody deprivation constitutes concrete injury)
- Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792 (2021) (nominal damages can satisfy redressability)
- Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (Congress did not abrogate state sovereign immunity by enacting § 1983)
- Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002) (Ex parte Young applies only to prospective relief for ongoing violations)