976 F.3d 63
1st Cir.2020Background
- In the 1990s Anthony Shea committed armed attempted bank robbery and related offenses; he was convicted in federal court and sentenced under the then-mandatory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as a Career Offender, receiving a dramatically increased Guideline range (plus a consecutive § 924(c) term).
- The Career Offender designation relied in part on § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s "residual clause," which defined a "crime of violence" by reference to an abstract, ordinary-case risk standard.
- After Johnson v. United States struck the ACCA residual clause as void for vagueness and Welch made that rule retroactive, Shea filed a § 2255 motion arguing Johnson also voided the pre-Booker Guidelines’ residual clause and therefore his Career Offender enhancement (and separately challenging his § 924(c) conviction).
- The district court dismissed Shea’s § 2255 petition as untimely, holding § 2255(f)(3) did not reopen the one-year window because reasonable jurists could debate whether Johnson compelled relief beyond ACCA.
- On appeal the First Circuit held that Johnson does reopen § 2255(f)(3) for Johnson-based attacks on the pre-Booker Guidelines’ residual clause when the mandatory Guideline in fact "fixed" the defendant’s sentence (i.e., no departure was available), so Shea’s challenge is timely; the court remanded the § 924(c) issue and the Guidelines-merits issues to the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2255(f)(3) reopened the one-year limitations window for Johnson-based challenges to the pre-Booker Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause | Shea: Johnson announced a vagueness rule that applies to any law (including pre-Booker Guidelines) that "fixes" sentences; his petition (filed within one year of Johnson) is timely because the Career Offender clause fixed his range and relied on the residual clause | Government: Johnson only recognized a right as to the ACCA; applying it to pre-Booker Guidelines would require creating a new rule beyond Johnson, so § 2255(f)(3) does not restart the clock | Court: Timely. Johnson dictates relief where the mandatory Guideline actually fixed the permissible sentencing range (no downward departure available); Shea’s Johnson-based Guidelines claim is within § 2255(f)(3)’s one-year window and must be remanded for merits review |
| Whether Shea’s § 924(c) conviction (armed attempted bank robbery) is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)’s force clause | Shea: § 2113(a)/(d) as applied may not qualify under the force clause; Davis (striking § 924(c)’s residual clause) makes his § 924(c) challenge timely | Government: Concedes timeliness in light of Davis and asks remand for district court to resolve whether the offense qualifies under the force clause | Court: Parties agree timeliness; court remands the § 924(c) issue to the district court to decide on the merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (ACCA residual clause is unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Johnson’s rule is retroactive on collateral review)
- Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (pre-Booker Guidelines were mandatory and had the force and effect of law)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (advisory Guidelines are not subject to vagueness attacks because they do not "fix" permissible sentences)
- Davis v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (§ 924(c)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (facts that increase the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury)
- Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) (facts that increase the legally prescribed range of penalties are elements of an offense)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (limits retroactive application of new rules on collateral review)
- Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013) (defines when a case announces a "new rule")
- Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992) (application of an existing constitutional principle to a different scheme does not necessarily announce a new rule)
- Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (pre-Booker Guidelines treated as authoritative rules)
- Moore v. United States, 871 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2017) (First Circuit previously held a Johnson-based pre-Booker Guidelines challenge could be timely; discussed interplay of Johnson and Booker)
