Shawna Hess v. Carol Abels, 714 F.3d 1048

Background

Hess was terminated by the City after refusing a urine drug test at a state trooper’s request.
Trooper Chastain observed suspected meth in Hess’s proximity and requested the test, which Hess declined.
Lawson (supervisor) and Ables (personnel director) discussed the basis for termination after the test request.
Maynard (mayor) did not intervene; district court granted summary judgment on qualified immunity.
Court reviews de novo the district court’s summary judgment, assuming Hess’s claim was solely for the drug-test refusal.
Court affirmatively held that, on Feb. 23, 2010, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed Hess’s claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Hess’s Fourth Amendment retaliation claim against the City employees is cognizable.	Hess asserts discharge for exercising Fourth Amendment rights.	No clearly established law against termination for refusing a state-trooper drug test; no direct violation by defendants.	Qualified immunity; no clearly established Fourth Amendment violation proven.
Whether Maynard could be liable for a failure to intervene and Hess’s Fourth Amendment rights.	Maynard’s failure to intervene violated Hess’s rights.	No duty to intervene established outside excessive force context.	Maynard entitled to qualified immunity; no clearly established duty to intervene.
Whether Ables and Lawson can be liable for a Fourth Amendment retaliatory discharge.	Lesher supports clearly established law against coerced relinquishment of rights.	Lesher does not clearly establish violation here due to trooper-not-employer coercion and lack of explicit threats.	Not clearly established; qualified immunity for Ables and Lawson.
Whether Hess’s § 1983 claim against the City employees in official capacity remains viable against Monell liability.	Policy or custom could support municipal liability.	No final policymaker authority shown for termination decision; official-capacity claims fail.	Dismissed; no final policymaker authority shown.
Whether Hess’s ACRA claims survive in light of § 1983 disposition.	ACRA may provide broader/narrower rights.	ACRA claims subsumed by § 1983 rulings.	ACRA claims dismissed as duplicative of § 1983 claims.

Key Cases Cited

Lesher v. Reed, 12 F.3d 148 (8th Cir. 1994) (cannot coercively force relinquishment of rights; but distinguishable facts here)
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (urine tests as searches under Fourth Amendment)
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (fair warning required for clearly established law)
Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 2012) (no duty to intervene outside excessive force context; qualified immunity)
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (local government liability requires final policymaker authority)
Brown v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (monetary liability requires policy or deliberate indifference by final policymaker)
Crooks v. Lynch, 557 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2009) (reputation claim requires public statement; not shown here)
Neal v. St. Louis Cnty. Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 217 F.3d 955 (2000) (conscience-shocking standard for due process claims)
Skeets v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 1213 (8th Cir. 1987) (at-will employees have no property interest in continued employment)