Shaun Roberts v. Eric H. Holder, Jr., 745 F.3d 928

Roberts is a Bahamian citizen who entered the United States as a nonimmigrant and later adjusted to lawful permanent resident, residing in Minnesota without leaving since entry.
He has two relevant criminal convictions: 1989 second-degree burglary in Minnesota and 2000 third-degree assault (aiding and abetting) under Minnesota law.
DHS served a Notice to Appear in 2011 charging Roberts with two removability bases: post‑admission crimes involving moral turpitude and a post‑admission aggravated felony; he sought cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, and a § 1182(h) waiver.
The IJ ordered removal, holding that third-degree assault under Minnesota law is a crime of violence and an aggravated felony, rendering Roberts ineligible for cancellation and for § 1182(h) relief.
The BIA affirmed, agreeing that third-degree assault is a categorical crime of violence under § 16(b), and therefore an aggravated felony preventing cancellation and a § 1182(h) waiver; the court later addressed adjustment of status and the waiver issue.
Roberts contends (i) his Minnesota conviction is not an aggravated felony, and (ii) even if it is, § 1182(h) does not bar adjustment because he sought status adjustment rather than admission.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is third-degree assault an aggravated felony?	Roberts argues it is not an aggravated felony.	The government (IJ/BIA) treats it as a crime of violence under § 16(a)/(b), making it an aggravated felony.	Yes; third-degree assault qualifies as a crime of violence and an aggravated felony.
Does § 1182(h) bar relief for post‑admission aggravated felonies when adjusting status?	§ 1182(h) does not apply to him because he was not admitted as an LPR at port of entry; post‑admission adjustment should not trigger the bar.	§ 1182(h) bars waivers for aliens previously admitted as LPR who have been convicted of an aggravated felony since admission.	§ 1182(h) is ambiguous and the BIA's reasonable construction applies; the court defers to the BIA in the absence of a clear textual meaning.
Was Chevron deference appropriate to the BIA's construction of § 1182(h)?	The statute is unambiguous; the BIA's construction should not be given deference if it misreads the text.	Because the text is ambiguous, Chevron deference to the BIA's construction is proper.	Court defers to the BIA's reasonable construction under Chevron.

United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2008) (interchangeability of 'crime of violence' and 'violent felony' concepts)
Olmstead v. Holder, 588 F.3d 556 (8th Cir. 2009) (jurisdiction to review questions of law about aggravated felonies)
Salean, 583 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 2009) (fourth-degree assault fits ACCA § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) framework)
Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 2008) (interpretation of aggravated felony definitions in § 1101(a)(43)(F))
Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2012) (reading of § 1182(h) as precluding some post‑admission felonies)
Lanier v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 631 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2011) (construction of § 1182(h) bar for aggravated felonies after LPR status)
Hanif v. Attorney General of U.S., 694 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2012) (equal protection considerations in immigration statute interpretations)
Gonzalez v. Duenas- Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (S. Ct. 2007) (aider-and-abettor liability overlap with principal offense)
In re Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (Supreme Court) (Chevron deference framework for agency interpretations)
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (S. Ct. 2005) (statutory ambiguity and agency deference when interpreting statutes)