Shary Pruski v. Joshua Garcia, 594 S.W.3d 322

On Dec. 5, 2015, Joshua Garcia struck a bull owned by Shary Pruski on State Highway 123 in Wilson County; Garcia was injured and the bull died after the bull escaped a fenced pasture.
Wilson County had adopted a local stock law under Chapter 143 of the Texas Agriculture Code.
Garcia sued Pruski for negligence and for violating Chapter 143: (a) §143.102 (prohibits knowingly permitting livestock to roam on highway right-of-way) and (b) §143.074 (stock-law ban on allowing animals to run at large in counties with a stock law).
The trial court granted summary judgment for Pruski. The court of appeals affirmed as to §143.102 (no fact issue on knowing permit) but held Garcia raised a fact issue under §143.074, allowing civil liability without a knowing mental state.
The Texas Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether §143.102 or §143.074 governs liability for highway collisions in counties with stock laws and whether the ‘‘knowingly’’ mental-state requirement applies.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Which statutory standard governs livestock-owner liability for collisions on state highways in a county that has adopted a stock law?	Garcia: County stock law (§143.074) applies and can impose liability without a ‘‘knowing’’ mental state.	Pruski: §143.102 governs highway accidents and §143.107 resolves conflicts in favor of subchapter E (§143.101–.108), so the ‘‘knowingly’’ requirement applies.	The Court held §143.102 exclusively governs highway collisions in counties with stock laws; liability requires proof the owner ‘‘knowingly’’ permitted the animal to be on the highway.
Must courts adopt criminal statutes as civil-liability standards here?	Garcia assumed violation of the statutes supports civil claims.	Pruski noted courts need not automatically turn penal statutes into civil standards.	The Court assumed (without deciding) both statutes could supply civil standards for purposes of the case but resolved the dispute under §143.107, so only §143.102 applies.

Clarendon Land, Inv. & Agency Co. v. McClelland, 23 S.W. 576 (Tex. 1893) (explains Texas free‑range tradition and historical meaning of "run at large").
Gibbs v. Jackson, 990 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. 1999) (reaffirmed Texas free‑range rule and discussed statutory departures).
Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433 (Tex. 2009) (statutory interpretation principle: apply statutes as written).
Combs v. Roark Amusement & Vending, L.P., 422 S.W.3d 632 (Tex. 2013) (when statutory language is unambiguous, courts must follow it).
BankDirect Capital Fin., LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC, 519 S.W.3d 76 (Tex. 2017) (text is primary interpretive guide).
Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. 1979) (criminal statutes do not automatically become civil standards).
Smith v. Merritt, 940 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1997) (courts may accept or reject penal statutes as civil standards).
Howsley v. Gilliam, 517 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1975) (power to adopt/reject criminal standards for civil liability rests with civil courts).
Rose v. Ben C. Hebert Heirs, 305 S.W.3d 874 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010) (interpreting "permit" under stock law as more than simple negligence).
Weaver v. Brink, 613 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. App.—Waco 1981) (courts have relied on Chapter 143 provisions to impose civil liability for stray livestock).