Sharps and Jordan v. United States, 246 A.3d 1141

Background

COVID-19 public-health emergency disrupted Superior Court operations and suspended in-person jury trials beginning March 2020.
D.C. Code § 11-947 authorizes the Superior Court Chief Judge (S.C.C.J.) to toll or delay "deadlines" in emergencies and expressly states the scope "extends to all laws and rules affecting criminal . . . proceedings," but excludes suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
The S.C.C.J., with the Joint Committee’s consent and required reporting to Congress, issued successive deadline-tolling orders during 2020–21 that explicitly tolled the 100-day pretrial detention clock in D.C. Code § 23-1322(h).
Gregory Sharps and Landrell Jordan were detained under § 23-1322(b) and have been held past the statutory 100-day limit due to those tolling orders; each moved for release and the trial courts denied relief.
They appealed, arguing (1) § 11-947 does not authorize extending § 23-1322 detention limits, and (2) if it does, the statute is facially and/or as-applied unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause; the government defended the tolling authority and constitutionality.
The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the denials: it held § 11-947 applies to § 23-1322 deadlines, the 100-day provision is a "time deadline," and the emergency tolling is not facially unconstitutional; as-applied claims were rejected on the record.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 11-947 authorizes tolling the 100-day pretrial detention limit in § 23-1322(h)	§ 11-947 does not mention § 23-1322 or detention; Congress would have said so if it intended to allow extended pretrial detention	§ 11-947's plain language authorizes tolling of "deadlines" affecting criminal pretrial proceedings, so it applies to § 23-1322(h)	Held: § 11-947 unambiguously authorizes tolling of § 23-1322 deadlines in an emergency; no implied exemption applies
Whether the 100-day limit in § 23-1322(h) is a "time deadline" subject to tolling	The 100-day limit is a substantive cap on detention, not a deadline to be tolled	The 100-day mark is a cutoff by which the court must act (try the defendant or release), so it is a deadline	Held: the 100-day provision is a "time deadline" within § 11-947's scope
Facial substantive due process challenge to tolling pretrial detention	Emergency tolling permits prolonged detention without "stringent time limitations," rendering the detention punitive and facially unconstitutional	Pretrial preventive detention can be regulatory; Speedy Trial/continuance exceptions and safeguards avoid facial invalidity	Held: facial challenge fails—tolling under § 11-947 is regulatory, not punitive; not facially unconstitutional
As-applied substantive and procedural due process challenges	Continued, lengthy detention (years) may be punitive in particular cases; procedural protections are inadequate	Government notes legitimate regulatory goals, the pandemic-caused delay, and that habeas/individual challenges remain available; trial-court factual findings show dangerousness	Held: as-applied substantive challenge rejected on records (length, government responsibility, and danger factors); procedural due process claims not adjudicated because not properly preserved below

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding federal preventive detention scheme as regulatory where safeguards exist)
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (invalidating law permitting potentially indefinite confinement as punitive)
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (construing detention statute to avoid indefinite detention beyond a reasonable time)
Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010) (defining "deadline" as a legally enforceable latest time by which something must be done)
McPherson v. United States, 692 A.2d 1342 (D.C. 1997) (upholding facial validity of D.C. statute that lacked a fixed pretrial time limit)
Ferguson v. United States, 977 A.2d 993 (D.C. 2009) (referring to the 100-day trial limit as a "100-day trial deadline")