Sharon Powell v. Jennifer Snook
25 F.4th 912
11th Cir.2022Background
- Just before midnight on June 7, 2016, Henry County dispatch sent officers to 736 Swan Lake based on a 911 report of screams and gunshots; dispatch later thought the report referred to 690 Swan Lake (the Powells’ home).
- Officers (in uniform) approached the Powells’ dark house via a long driveway; Snook carried a rifle and positioned near the front walkway; other officers covered the back and front.
- David Powell, awakened by barking dogs, opened the garage (garage light came on), walked onto the driveway with a pistol in his right hand, then stopped and faced the walkway where Snook was standing.
- After about nine seconds walking and then virtually instantaneously (Sharon Powell estimated about one second) after David began to raise the pistol, Snook fired three shots; David died the next day.
- Sharon Powell sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force, arguing Snook violated the Fourth Amendment by not warning before firing; the district court granted Snook qualified immunity and this interlocutory appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Snook violated the Fourth Amendment by using deadly force without first warning Powell | Powell: Garner and related precedent require a warning, if feasible, before deadly force; Snook had time to warn | Snook: Qualified immunity; facts (armed suspect raising gun) justified immediate force; no clearly established duty to warn here | Court: No clearly established law required a warning in these facts; qualified immunity affirmed |
| Whether existing precedent is materially similar enough to give Snook fair notice a warning was required | Powell: Cites Garner, Lundgren, Perez, White as clearly establishing warning requirement | Snook: Those cases involved unarmed or materially different facts; White supports immunity where facts differ | Court: Precedents not materially similar; do not give fair warning that a warning was required here |
| Whether the “obvious clarity” exception negates the need for prior case law | Powell: Argues this is an obvious-clarity case — warning required as a general principle | Snook: Obvious-clarity is a narrow exception; these facts are not so obvious | Court: Exception does not apply; no obvious clarity that a warning was required |
| Whether a warning was feasible in the seconds before shooting | Powell: Snook had up to ~17.8/9 seconds (garage + walk) or at least 1 second when gun was raised to warn | Snook: Split-second judgment; warning might escalate danger or cost officer’s life | Court: Warning during the critical moments was not required or feasible under clearly established law |
Key Cases Cited
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (Supreme Court rule on use of deadly force and requirement to warn when feasible)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (SCOTUS: no obvious Garner violation where officer shot armed occupant without warning; supports qualified immunity in differing facts)
- Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816 (11th Cir. 2010) (officer fired without warning at armed suspect; immunity affirmed)
- Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843 (11th Cir. 2010) (warnings are not an inflexible requirement in every deadly-force situation)
- Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2018) (allowance for split-second judgments in tense, uncertain conditions; immunity affirmed)
- Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2016) (contrasting fact pattern: unarmed, subdued suspect—supports limits on deadly force in different circumstances)
- Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600 (11th Cir. 1987) (contrasting fact pattern: nonthreatening suspect shot; not materially similar)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (reasonableness inquiry is fact-specific; Garner not a rigid on/off trigger)