Sharma v. Taylor
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137281
| E.D. Va. | 2014Background
- Sharma, an Indian national, is married to a U.S. citizen and has been a lawful permanent resident since 1980.
- In 1995 Sharma was arrested for theft of over $200 from a department store, pled guilty to concealment of merchandise, and was sentenced to 12 months in jail with all time suspended.
- In 2000 Sharma applied for naturalization; in 2001 USCIS denied on the ground that the 1995 conviction constituted an aggravated felony precluding good moral character.
- In 2012 the Governor of Virginia granted a sentence commutation reducing Sharma’s 12-month sentence to 364 days nunc pro tunc to the 1995 sentencing date.
- On January 22, 2013 Sharma filed a new naturalization application; USCIS denied on June 3, 2013, applying 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(c)(2)(i) to require a three-year waiting period after the commutation; the denial was affirmed on appeal.
- The district court granted Respondents’ summary judgment, concluding USCIS’s interpretation of § 316.10(c)(2) entitled to deference and denying Sharma’s petition for naturalization.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 316.10(c)(2) applies to sentence commutations as well as pardons. | Sharma argues the regulation applies only to full pardons and excludes commutations. | USCIS contends the regulation covers commutations and pardons, and is entitled to deference. | Yes; USCIS’s interpretation is entitled to deference and applies to commutations. |
| Whether the nunc pro tunc label erases the aggravated felony status and makes Sharma eligible immediately. | Sharma contends nunc pro tunc commutation retroactively erases the aggravated felony, allowing immediate good moral character. | Respondents argue federal immigration law disregards the nunc pro tunc state label; clemency date controls. | No; nunc pro tunc does not control; clemency date governs under § 316.10(c)(2)(i); immediate eligibility is not granted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (agency interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation)
- Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012) (deference may be inappropriate when the agency’s interpretation conflicts with fair judgment or prior interpretations)
- Decker v. Northwest Env. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013) (agency interpretation need not be the only reading to prevail; not required to be compelled by statute)
- Shalala v. Guernsey, 512 U.S. 507 (1994) (deference to agency interpretations; ultimate controlling weight unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with regulation)
- Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) (ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation with controlling weight unless plainly erroneous)