Shari Guertin v. State of Mich.
912 F.3d 907
6th Cir.2019Background
- In 2014 Flint switched its water source from Detroit (DWSD) to the Flint River as a cost-saving interim measure; the City used an outdated treatment plant and did not apply corrosion-control treatment.
- Over months residents experienced foul water, health harms, Legionnaires' deaths, and elevated blood-lead levels; plaintiffs allege the contamination was foreseeable and preventable.
- Plaintiffs (Guertin, her child E.B., and Muse-Cleveland) brought § 1983 claims for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due-process right to bodily integrity against numerous state and city officials and agencies; district court dismissed some claims and denied qualified immunity for others.
- On interlocutory appeal the Sixth Circuit reviewed (1) whether plaintiffs plausibly alleged a due-process bodily-integrity violation and whether the right was clearly established (qualified immunity), and (2) whether the City of Flint enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity because it was under state emergency management.
- The court held plaintiffs plausibly alleged a substantive due-process violation (shocks-the-conscience / bodily integrity) as to seven individual defendants (Flint officials Earley, Ambrose, Croft; MDEQ officials Busch, Shekter‑Smith, Prysby, Wurfel) and that the right was clearly established as to those defendants; it reversed denial of qualified immunity for five others (Wyant, Lyon, Wells, Peeler, Scott). The court also held Flint is not an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs pleaded a substantive due-process violation (right to bodily integrity) | Government actors knowingly/ intentionally caused citizens to ingest life‑threatening contaminants without consent and then concealed risks | Actions were regulatory/policy mistakes, not conscience‑shocking intentional invasions; many relied on expert advice and MDEQ interpretations | Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a violation as to Earley, Ambrose, Croft, Busch, Shekter‑Smith, Prysby, Wurfel; allegations against Wyant, Lyon, Wells, Peeler, Scott were mere negligence and dismissed |
| Whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity (was right clearly established?) | Longstanding bodily‑integrity precedent (Harper, Rochin, Cruzan, etc.) gave fair warning that knowingly introducing a toxin and affirmatively assuring safety would violate due process | No precedent with similar facts; officials reasonably relied on experts and regulations; novel context warrants immunity | Right was clearly established for the seven defendants listed above; qualified immunity denied for them (others granted) |
| Whether Flint (municipality) has Eleventh Amendment immunity because under state emergency manager | Flint argued State takeover transformed city into an arm of the state, so immunity applies | Plaintiffs and state argued statutory scheme preserved municipal status; state not liable for judgments against Flint | Flint failed to show it was an arm of the state; Eleventh Amendment immunity denied |
| Standard for resolving qualified immunity on Rule 12(b)(6) motion | Plaintiffs: at pleading stage courts must accept allegations and allow discovery when allegations plausibly show deliberate indifference | Defendants: immunity should resolve early; some legal errors protect officials even at pleading stage | Court reiterated that dismissal on qualified immunity at pleading stage is generally disfavored but allowed where complaint fails plausibly to allege a constitutional violation for particular defendants |
Key Cases Cited
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (qualified immunity doctrine protects officials from suit absent clearly established law)
- Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (qualified‑immunity "fair warning" and breathing room principles)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (sequencing of steps in qualified‑immunity analysis; context for pleading stage)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading standards — plausibility at Rule 12(b)(6))
- Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (benchmark "shocks the conscience" bodily‑integrity precedent)
- Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (liberty interest against involuntary administration of drugs — bodily integrity/informed‑consent doctrine)
- Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (bodily integrity and the right to refuse lifesaving treatment; common‑law roots)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 ("shocks the conscience" framework for substantive due process)