Lead Opinion
*915This case arises out of the infamous government-created environmental disaster commonly known as the Flint Water Crisis. As a cost-saving measure until a new water authority was to become operational, public officials switched the City of Flint municipal water supply from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) to the Flint River to be processed by an outdated and previously mothballed water treatment plant. With the approval of State of Michigan regulators and a professional engineering firm, on April 25, 2014, the City began dispensing drinking water to its customers without adding chemicals to counter the river water's known corrosivity.
The harmful effects were as swift as they were severe. Within days, residents complained of foul smelling and tasting water. Within weeks, some residents' hair began to fall out and their skin developed rashes. And within a year, there were positive tests for E. coli, a spike in deaths from Legionnaires' disease, and reports of dangerously high blood-lead levels in Flint children. All of this resulted because the river water was 19 times more corrosive than the water pumped from Lake Huron by the DWSD, and because, without corrosion-control treatment, lead leached out of the lead-based service lines at alarming rates and found its way to the homes of Flint's residents. The crisis was predictable, and preventable. See generally Mason v. Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam, P.C. ,
I.
Plaintiffs Shari Guertin, her minor child E.B., and Diogenes Muse-Cleveland claim personal injuries and damages from drinking and bathing in the lead-contaminated water. Plaintiffs' complaint asserted various claims against numerous state, city, and private-actor defendants. In response to motions to dismiss, the district court granted in part and denied in part the motions. In its written order, the court dismissed many of the original claims and original defendants. Plaintiffs have not filed a cross appeal. The defendants who were not dismissed now appeal and are collectively referred to as "defendants" throughout this opinion. The plaintiffs' sole remaining claim is that defendants violated their right to bodily integrity as guaranteed by the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They bring this claim pursuant to
II.
On this appeal, we decide two substantial issues of public importance. First, viewing each defendant individually, did the district court err in denying defendants' motions to dismiss based upon qualified immunity? Specifically, did plaintiffs plead a plausible Fourteenth Amendment *916Due Process violation of their right to bodily integrity and was such a constitutional right clearly established when the defendants acted? We join the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, In re Flint Water Cases ,
The second issue is whether the City of Flint is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiffs' suit because the takeover by the State of Michigan of the City of Flint pursuant to Michigan's "Emergency Manager" law transformed the City into an arm of the state. It is not, and we therefore affirm the district court's same holding.
III.
We possess jurisdiction under
IV.
Qualified immunity shields public officials "from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability." Harlow v. Fitzgerald ,
*917Ashcroft v. al-Kidd ,
The assertion of qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage pulls a court in two, competing directions. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has repeatedly "stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation." Pearson v. Callahan ,
V.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST . amend. XIV, § 1. Flowing directly from the protections enshrined in the Magna Carta, see, e.g. , Lewellen v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty. ,
There are procedural and substantive due process components. See *918Range v. Douglas ,
The Supreme Court "has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended." Collins ,
A.
Plaintiffs' complaint deals with the scope of the right to bodily integrity, an indispensable right recognized at common law as the "right to be free from ... unjustified intrusions on personal security" and "encompass[ing] freedom from bodily restraint and punishment." Ingraham ,
This common law right is first among equals. As the Supreme Court has said: "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford ,
*919Schmerber v. California ,
"[T]his right is fundamental where 'the magnitude of the liberty deprivation that the abuse inflicts upon the victim strips the very essence of personhood.' " Kallstrom v. City of Columbus ,
Bodily integrity cases "usually arise in the context of government-imposed punishment or physical restraint," but that is far from a categorical rule. Kallstrom ,
A few examples illustrate the breadth of this tenet. Consider Washington v. Harper , which addressed the State of Washington's involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to an inmate without a judicial hearing.
The Supreme Court's seminal "right to die" case, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health , provides further explication. At issue in Cruzan was whether the parents of an individual in a persistent vegetative state could insist that a hospital withdraw life-sustaining care based on her right to bodily integrity.
This nonconsensual intrusion vis-à-vis government interest line of cases has played out time and time again in the lower courts. See, e.g. , United States v. Brandon ,
In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation is a good example. Funded by the Department of Defense, government officials at the University of Cincinnati subjected cancer patients to radiation doses consistent with those expected to be inflicted upon military personnel during a nuclear war. 874 F.Supp. at 802-04. The patients were in "reasonably good clinical condition," and were "primarily indigent, poorly educated, and of lower than average intelligence." Id. at 803. At no time did the government actors disclose the risks associated with the massive radiation doses or obtain consent to irradiate the patients at those levels for those purposes-they instead told the patients that the radiation was treatment for their cancer. Id. at 803-04. Summarizing the caselaw just mentioned, the Cincinnati Radiation court easily concluded that "[t]he right to be free of state-sponsored invasion of a person's bodily integrity is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process." Id. at 810-11. The involuntary and misleading nature of the intrusions was key. The patients could not "be said to exercise that degree of free will that is essential to the notion of voluntariness" because:
[t]he choice Plaintiffs would have been forced to make was one of life or death. If the Constitution protects personal autonomy in making certain types of important decisions, the decision whether to participate in the Human Radiation Experiments was one that each individual Plaintiff was entitled to make freely and with full knowledge of the purpose and attendant circumstances involved. Without actually seizing the Plaintiffs and forcing them to submit to these experiments, the ... agents of the state[ ] accomplished the same feat through canard and deception[.]
Id. at 812 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Also key was the risk of harm-the plaintiffs received "total and partial body radiation, which caused burns, vomiting, diarrhea and bone marrow failure, and resulted in death or severe shortening of life." Id. at 814.
We find the Cincinnati Radiation matter especially analogous. In both instances, individuals engaged in voluntary actions that they believed would sustain life, and instead received substances detrimental to their health. In both instances, government officials engaged in conduct designed to deceive the scope of the bodily invasion. And in both instances, grievous harm occurred. Based on the facts and principles set forth in the above cases, we therefore agree with the district court that "a government actor violates individuals' right to bodily integrity by knowingly and intentionally introducing life-threatening substances into individuals without their consent, especially when such substances have zero therapeutic benefit."
Finally, we note what plaintiffs' claim does not entail. There is, of course, " 'no fundamental right to water service.' " In re City of Detroit ,
B.
Upon a showing of a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, a plaintiff must show how the government's discretionary conduct that deprived that interest was constitutionally repugnant. See Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v. Kentucky ,
*923"[T]he measure of what is conscience shocking is no calibrated yard stick," nor is it "subject to mechanical application." Lewis ,
To aid this inquiry, we are to place the alleged heinous conduct on a spectrum, "[t]he bookends [of which] present the easier cases."
This "middle state[ ] of culpability 'may or may not be shocking depending on the context,' " Range ,
Lewis delineates this dichotomy. The issue there was "whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender." Id. at 836,
"The critical question in determining the appropriate standard of culpability is whether the circumstances allowed the state actors time to fully consider the potential consequences of their conduct." Ewolski v. City of Brunswick ,
After Lewis , "the key variable is whether actual deliberation is practical, not whether the claimant was in state custody." Ewolski ,
[A] something that we have variously described as callous disregard for the risk of injury, or action in an arbitrary manner that shocks the conscience or that indicates an intent to injure. That additional element-be it termed callous disregard or intent to injure-ensures that only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.
Schroder v. City of Fort Thomas ,
We have identified a multitude of considerations when evaluating an official's alleged arbitrariness in the constitutional sense, including the time for deliberation, the nature of the relationship between the government and the plaintiff, and whether a legitimate government purpose motivated the official's act. Hunt ,
Extensive time to deliberate. There is no doubt that the lead-contamination inflicted upon the people of Flint was a predictable harm striking at the core of plaintiffs' bodily integrity, and this known risk cannot be excused on the basis of split-second decision making. All of the alleged decisions by defendants leading up to and during the crisis took place over a series of days, weeks, months, and years, and did not arise out of time-is-of-the-essence necessity. Their "unhurried judgments" were replete with opportunities for "repeated reflection, largely uncomplicated by the pulls of competing obligations," and thus militate in plaintiffs' favor. Lewis , 523 at 853 ; see also Ewolski ,
Involuntary relationship. In addition to the time to deliberate, the relationship between the City of Flint and its residents matters. At the outset, we acknowledge we deal here not with the typical line of voluntary/involuntary relationships that normally occur in our caselaw. Instead, two factors weigh toward an involuntary relationship. First, Flint's transmission of drinking water to its residents is mandatory on both ends-Flint's Charter and Code of Ordinances mandate that the city supply water to its residents, see, e.g. , Flint City Charter § 4-203(A), Flint Code of Ord. § 46-7, and as the City expressly argued below, "residents are legally required to take and pay for the water, unless they use an approved spring or well." See Flint Code of Ord. §§ 46-50(b), 46-51, 46-52. Second, various defendants' assurances of the water's potability hid the risks, turning residents' voluntary consumption *926of a substance vital to subsistence into an involuntary and unknowing act of self-contamination. As the district court aptly reasoned, "[m]isleading Flint's residents as to the water's safety-so that they would continue to drink the water and Flint could continue to draw water from the Flint River-is no different than the forced, involuntary invasions of bodily integrity that the Supreme Court has deemed unconstitutional." (Citations omitted).
No legitimate government purpose. The decision to temporarily switch Flint's water source was an economic one and there is no doubt that reducing cost is a legitimate government purpose. See, e.g. , Garrett v. Lyng ,
There is no allegation defendants intended to harm Flint residents. Accordingly, the question is whether defendants acted with "[d]eliberate indifference in the constitutional sense," Range ,
C.
Flint defendants (Earley, Ambrose, and Croft ). We begin with one of the two sets of defendants who were instrumental in creating the crisis-defendants Croft, Emergency Manager Earley, and Emergency Manager Ambrose. These individuals were among the chief architects of Flint's decision to switch water sources and then use a plant they knew was not ready to safely process the water, especially in light of the Flint River's known environmental issues and the problems associated with lead exposure. Earley, *927for example, "forced the transition through" despite knowing how important it was that "the treatment plant be ready to treat Flint River water" and that "[t]he treatment plant was not ready." Similarly, Croft permitted the water's flow despite knowing "that the City's water treatment plant was unprepared to adequately provide safe drinking water to Flint's residents." The Flint defendants also made numerous statements to the public proclaiming that the water was safe to drink. Defendant Ambrose's decisions to twice turn down opportunities to reconnect to the DWSD after he knew of the significant problems with the water were especially egregious. These and other asserted actions plausibly allege deliberate indifference and "plain[ ] incompeten[ce]" not warranting qualified immunity. al-Kidd ,
The dissent concludes that Ambrose and Earley were merely "rel[ying] on expert advice" and therefore their actions could not demonstrate a callous disregard for plaintiffs. However, this conclusion ignores Wesley 's guidance not to resolve such issues at the motion-to-dismiss stage. It also ignores our obligation to accept plaintiffs' allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences from those allegations. One can place a benign construction on the factual allegations and draw inferences so that the facts amount to a negligent mismanagement of priorities and risks; but the allegations also support a reasonable inference that Earley prioritized a drive to cut costs with deliberate and reckless indifference to the likely results, and Ambrose refused to reconnect to Detroit water despite knowing the substantial risk to Flint residents' health.
For now, we conclude that plaintiffs' complaint plausibly alleges a constitutional violation as to these defendants.
D.
MDEQ Defendants (Busch, Shekter-Smith, Prysby, Wurfel, and Wyant) . The MDEQ defendants were the other set of individuals front and center during the crisis. The allegations against defendants Busch, Shekter-Smith, Prysby, and Wurfel are numerous and substantial. These MDEQ defendants played a pivotal role in authorizing Flint to use its ill-prepared water treatment plant to distribute drinking water from a river they knew was rife with public-health-compromising complications. Furthermore, when faced with the consequences of their actions, they falsely assured the public that the water was safe and attempted to refute assertions to the contrary. A few poignant examples further illustrate their culpability:
• Less than two weeks before the switch to Flint water, the Flint water treatment plant's water quality supervisor wrote to Prysby and Busch that he had inadequate staff and resources to properly monitor the water. As a result, he informed Prysby and Busch, "I do not anticipate giving the OK to begin sending water out anytime soon. If water is distributed from this plant in the next couple of weeks, it will be against my direction." Busch and Prysby did not act on this warning. Instead, a few days later, Busch drafted a talking point for a Flint community meeting that highlighted that MDEQ was *928"satisfied with the City's ability to treat water from the Flint River."
• After General Motors very publicly stopped using Flint River water at its engine plant for fear of corrosion, Prysby made sure the department's approach was to spin this symptom as not related to public health instead of investigating the underlying problem. He "stressed the importance of not branding Flint's water as 'corrosive' from a public health standpoint simply because it does not meet a manufacturing facility's limit for production."
• On February 27, 2015, Busch lied when he told "the EPA on behalf of MDEQ that the Flint Water Treatment Plant had an optimized corrosion control program." However, Busch knew "[b]y no later than April 2015, but likely much earlier ... that no corrosion control was being used in Flint following the switch to the Flint River as the water source." (Emphasis added).
• In the midst of the crisis and with full knowledge that Flint's water distribution system was corroded and presented significant health issues, Shekter-Smith callously excused Flint's lack of drinking water compliance as "circumstances happen." And after the EPA pressed MDEQ officials for MDEQ's failure to optimize corrosion controls in July 2015, she requested the EPA nonetheless cover her department's decision by "indicat[ing] in writing ... [its] concurrence that the city is in compliance with the lead and copper rule ...." Doing so, she wrote, "would help distinguish between [MDEQ's] goals to address important public health issues separately from the compliance requirements of the actual rule which we believe have been and continue to be met in the city of Flint." In other words, "technical compliance" trumped addressing an urgent and catastrophic public health disaster.
• On numerous occasions, defendant Wurfel, the public face of the crisis, announced the water was safe to drink, and demeaned, belittled, and aggressively dampened attempts by the scientific community to challenge the government's assertions that Flint did not have a problem with its drinking water. And he suggested that concern regarding the water was at best a short-term problem-that by the time the City had completed its lead-testing, the City would already be drawing from a different water source altogether.
As with the Flint defendants, these MDEQ defendants created the Flint Water environmental disaster and then intentionally attempted to cover-up their grievous decision. Their actions shock our conscience. It is alleged that these defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs' constitutional right to bodily integrity and at a minimum were plainly incompetent.
To the extent these defendants made "honest mistakes in judgment"-in law or fact-in interpreting and applying the Lead and Copper Rule, see, e.g. , Pearson ,
By the same token, we reject Wurfel's reliance upon two Second Circuit cases involving statements by public officials about the air-quality in lower Manhattan in the days following the September 11 terrorist attacks, see Lombardi v. Whitman ,
The dissent again asks us to view plaintiffs' allegations in a light favorable to defendants, arguing that Shekter-Smith, Busch, and Prysby simply "misinterpreted the [EPA's] Lead and Copper Rule" and provided "misguided advice rooted in mistaken interpretations of the law." But plaintiffs' allegations, which we must accept, are that Busch, Shekter-Smith, and Prysby authorized use of Flint River water with knowledge of its contaminants and then deceived others to hide the fact of contamination. Moreover, it is improper to conclude at this stage that Shekter-Smith, Busch, and Prysby merely misinterpreted the Lead and Copper Rule because plaintiffs allege that the EPA informed them that they were not complying with EPA requirements, providing them with a memorandum that "identified the problem, the cause of that problem, and the specific reason the state missed it." In response, "Defendants ignored and dismissed" the memorandum. Although the dissent claims that plaintiffs' factual allegations do not support that Wurfel's statements were knowing lies, that is a reasonable inference from plaintiffs' factual allegations.
We cannot say the same with respect to defendant Director Wyant based on the allegations in the complaint. At most, plaintiffs claim Wyant was aware of some of the issues arising with the water supply post-switch and admitted his department's "colossal failure" after the City reconnected to DWSD. Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege Wyant personally made decisions regarding the water-source switch, nor do they allege he personally engaged in any other conduct that we find conscience-shocking. In short, while the conduct of individuals within his department was constitutionally abhorrent, we may only hold Wyant accountable for his own conduct, not the misconduct of his subordinates. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal ,
E.
MDHHS Executives (Lyon and Wells) . In the complaint before us, plaintiffs' allegations against Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) Director Lyon and Chief Medical Executive Wells are minimal. The complaint sets forth no facts connecting Lyon *930and Wells to the switch to the Flint River or the decision not to treat the water, and there is no allegation that they took any action causing plaintiffs to consume the lead-contaminated water. Instead, plaintiffs claim generally that Lyon and Wells failed to "protect and notify the public" of the problems with Flint's water shortly before Flint switched back to DWSD. However, the Due Process Clause is a limitation only on government action. See DeShaney ,
We are thus left with allegations of at most questionable actions by Lyon and Wells. The sole allegation against Lyon is that he attempted to "discredit" a study by Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, a pediatrician at Hurley Medical Center in Flint, showing significant increases of blood lead levels in children post-water-source switch.
MDHHS Director Nick Lyon continues trying to discredit Dr. Hanna-Attisha's study despite his own department's knowledge that it shows a real problem. In an e-mail, he stated: "I need an analysis of the Virginia Tech/Hurley data and their conclusions. I would like to make a strong statement with a demonstration of proof that the lead blood levels seen are not out of the ordinary and are attributable to seasonal fluctuations. Geralyn is working on this for me but she needs someone in public health who can work directly with her on immediate concerns/questions."
And the two main factual allegations against Wells are equally sparse:
• On September 29, 2015, Wells received an email from an MDHHS employee asking, "Is it possible to get the same type of data for just children under the age of six? So basically, the city of Flint kids ages six and under with the same type of approach as the attached chart you gave us last week?" Another employee responded that "[i]t's bad enough to have a data war with outside entities, we absolutely cannot engage in competing data analyses within the Department, or, heaven forbid, in public releases." Dr. Wells replied "Agree." Plaintiffs claim this "show[ed] MDHHS continuing efforts to mislead the public, protect itself, and discredit Dr. Hanna-Attisha."
• In response to an email from Dr. Hanna-Attisha showing the tripling of blood lead levels, Wells "responded that the state was working to replicate Hanna-Attisha's analysis, and inquired about Dr. Hanna-Attisha's plans to take the information public." According to plaintiffs, this shows that "[w]hile discouraging her department to look further into Dr. Hanna-Attisha's findings and misleading Dr. Hanna-Attisha, Defendant Wells remained focused on a single task; saving face at the expense of Flint's residents."
At most, plaintiffs have alleged Lyon and Wells were unjustifiably skeptical of Dr. Hanna-Attisha's study and were hoping to assemble evidence to disprove it. This falls well-short of conscience-shocking conduct *931and therefore the district court erred in denying their motions to dismiss.
F.
MDHHS Employees (Peeler and Scott). That leaves us with two MDHHS employees, Nancy Peeler and Robert Scott, who jointly worked on projects within MDHHS designed to eliminate lead exposure. As with Lyon and Wells, the allegations against Peeler and Scott relate not to the switch of water sources, but to how they processed-or rather did not process-data relating to lead exposure more than a year later.
In general, plaintiffs allege Peeler and Scott "participated in, directed, and/or oversaw the department's efforts to hide information to save face, and actively sought to obstruct and discredit the efforts of outside researchers. Even when [their] own department had data that verified outside evidence of a lead contamination problem, [they] continued trying to generate evidence to the contrary." Scott "also served a key role in withholding and/or delaying disclosure of data that outside researchers needed to protect the people of Flint." In support of these general allegations, plaintiffs point to the following:
• Beginning in July 2015, Peeler learned there was "an uptick in children with elevated blood lead levels in Flint in July, August, and September 2014," but attributed it to "seasonal variation" instead of the water-source switch.
• On September 11, 2015, Robert Scott e-mailed a copy of a grant proposal by a Virginia Tech professor, Marc Edwards, that "described a 'perfect storm' of 'out of control' corrosion of city water pipes leading to 'severe chemical/biological health risks for Flint residents' " to Peeler and others. Scott stated, "When you have a few minutes, you might want to take a look at it. Sounds like there might be more to this than what we learned previously. Yikes!"
• Following Dr. Hanna-Attisha's study, Scott "tried to recreate [her] numbers," saw "a difference"-"but not as much difference" as found by Dr. Hanna-Attisha-in children's lead-levels pre-and post-switch, but told Peeler that he was "sure this one is not for the public."
• Scott, Peeler, and another MDHHS colleague corresponded about a Detroit Free Press story on Dr. Hanna-Attisha's study. Scott wrote, "The best I could say is something like this: 'While the trend for Michigan as a whole has shown a steady decrease in lead poisoning year by year, smaller areas such as the city of Flint have their bumps from year to year while still trending downward overall.' " Peeler chimed in that her "secret hope is that we can work in the fact that this pattern is similar to the recent past." In plaintiffs' view, this correspondence shows Peeler and Scott "intentionally withheld information that they had a duty to disclose to the public, and actively sought to hide the lead poisoning epidemic that they had previously failed to discover."
• Scott drafted an apology email to Prof. Edwards explaining why he failed to respond to multiple requests for state data. His unsent email to Edwards explained that he "worked with you earlier this month to get data to you relatively quickly but did not manage to complete the process before I went on annual leave for several days. I neglected to inform you that I'd be away, and I apologize for not informing you.' " Scott did not send the email to Edwards after Peeler told him to "apologize less," "despite," in plaintiffs' words, "the *932fact that Scott admitted to going on vacation and leaving an unimportant task unfinished as a public health crisis unfolded."
In total, plaintiffs' allegations against Scott and Peeler are: (1) after Dr. Hanna-Attisha released her study on September 24, 2015, Scott tried to "recreate" the study, found a smaller difference in children's lead levels than Dr. Hanna-Attisha's study, and concluded his results were "not for the public"; (2) Scott did not timely provide researchers with requested data; (3) Peeler and Scott knew that elevated lead levels could have been due to corrosion in the city water pipes; and (4) both sought to attribute it to regular fluctuations. In our view, these allegations do not rise to the level of "callous disregard"; plaintiffs do not factually link Scott's and Peeler's inaction to causing Flint residents to consume (or continue to consume) lead-tainted water. Nor do plaintiffs identify a source of law for the proposition that an individual violates the right to bodily integrity just because he failed to "blow the whistle." Plaintiffs have therefore not plausibly alleged Scott and Peeler engaged in conscience-shocking conduct.
In sum, the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs adequately alleged that defendants Wyant, Lyon, Wells, Peeler, and Scott violated plaintiffs' substantive due process right to bodily integrity, but correctly held plaintiffs plausibly alleged such a violation against defendants Earley, Ambrose, Croft, Busch, Shekter-Smith, Prysby, and Wurfel.
VI.
A right is "clearly established" when its "contours ... [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton ,
Plaintiffs must generally identify a case with a fact pattern similar enough to have given "fair and clear warning to officers" about what the law requires. White v. Pauly , --- U.S. ----,
*933Baynes v. Cleland ,
Given the unique circumstances of this case, defendants argue we should defer to the "breathing room" qualified immunity provides and hold that the invasion of plaintiffs' right to bodily integrity via life-threatening substances with no therapeutic benefit introduced into individuals without their consent was not clearly established before the officials engaged in their respective conduct. The dissent likewise suggests that "plaintiffs must be able to 'identify a case with a similar fact pattern' to this one 'that would have given 'fair and clear warning to officers' about what the law requires.' " (Quoting Arrington-Bey ,
The lack of a comparable government-created public health disaster precedent does not grant defendants a qualified immunity shield. Rather, it showcases the grievousness of their alleged conduct: "The easiest cases don't even arise," United States v. Lanier ,
Knowing the Flint River water was unsafe for public use, distributing it without taking steps to counter its problems, and assuring the public in the meantime that it was safe "is conduct that would alert a reasonable person to the likelihood of personal liability." Scicluna v. Wells ,
Furthermore, the long line of Supreme Court cases discussed above- Harper , Cruzan , Rochin , Winston , to name a few-all *934build on each other from one foundation: an individual's right to bodily integrity is sacred, founded upon informed consent, and may be invaded only upon a showing of a government interest. The Court could not have been clearer in Harper when it stated that "[t]he forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial interference with that person's liberty."
The same can be gleaned from Cruzan. If the common law right to informed consent is to mean anything, reasoned the Court, it must include "the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment."
Several defendants take issue with the district court's definition of the right, contending it deals in generality instead of specificity. See, e.g. , al-Kidd ,
*935Baynes ,
In providing a tainted life-necessity and falsely assuring the public about its potability, government officials "strip[ped] the very essence of personhood" from those who consumed the water. Doe ,
VII.
The final issue is Flint's claim that the district court erred in denying it sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the *936United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. It bars suits against a state by its own citizens, and by citizens of another state. See, e.g. , Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett ,
Flint, obviously, is not a state; it is a municipality incorporated under the laws of the State of Michigan. See People v. Pickett ,
Flint readily concedes municipalities do not enjoy sovereign immunity. That would normally end our analysis, but this is not a typical case. At the time of the crisis, Flint was so financially distressed that the State of Michigan had taken over its day-to-day local government operations by way of a statutory mechanism enacted to deal with municipal insolvency-gubernatorial-appointed individuals who "act for and in the place and stead of the governing body and the office of chief administrative officer of the local government."
A.
"The entity asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity has the burden to show that it is entitled to immunity, i.e. , that it is an arm of the state."
*937Lowe v. Hamilton Cty. Dep't of Job & Family Servs. ,
We have characterized the first factor-the state's potential liability for a judgment against the entity-as "the foremost,"
1.
Michigan's potential liability (or rather, lack thereof) weighs heavily against Flint. Michigan law provides that local property tax rolls account for judgments against cities or its officers, see
2.
As to the second factor-state law treatment of, and state control over, the entity-we start with a foundational aspect of Michigan law undisputed by the parties: Municipalities enjoy significant autonomy over local governmental functions. "Michigan is strongly committed to the concept of home rule, and constitutional and statutory provisions which grant power to municipalities are to be liberally construed." Bivens v. Grand Rapids ,
First, citing Curry v. City of Highland Park ,
Second, we are equally unconvinced that Flint's emergency-management status should weigh in Flint's favor. At first blush, Flint's argument here has some facial appeal-generally speaking, Public Act 436 can be a one-way ticket to state receivership. The governor, in consultation with several bodies, determines whether a financial emergency exists, and then provides the entity at issue with four options (one of which is emergency management). See Phillips ,
Once in receivership, the argument goes, Flint was essentially at the whim of its emergency managers. One need not look beyond Public Act 436's power-authorizing provision to appreciate its breadth:
Upon appointment, an emergency manager shall act for and in the place and stead of the governing body and the office of chief administrative officer of the local government . The emergency manager shall have broad powers in receivership to rectify the financial emergency and to assure the fiscal accountability of the local government and the local government's capacity to provide or cause to be provided necessary governmental services essential to the public health, safety, and welfare. Following appointment of an emergency manager and during the pendency of receivership, the governing body and the chief administrative officer of the local government shall not exercise any of the powers of those offices except as may be specifically authorized in writing by the emergency manager or as otherwise provided by this act and are subject to any conditions required by the emergency manager.
There is also a certain amount of control the state has over the emergency manager. Among other things, an emergency manager "is a creature of the Legislature with only the power and authority granted *940by statute"; is appointed by the governor; serves at the governor's pleasure, and may be removed by the governor or by impeachment by the Legislature; receives financial compensation from the state treasury; is subjected "to various codes of conduct otherwise applicable only to public servants, public officers and state officers"; and is statutorily obligated to submit certain plans and reports to state officials. See Mays ,
The problem with Flint's argument is that Michigan courts have rejected the notion that a city's emergency management status transforms a city into a state entity. In the words of the Michigan Court of Appeals:
As indicated in the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, "it is a valid public purpose for this state to take action and to assist a local government in a financial emergency so as to remedy the financial emergency." The primary purpose of the Act, then, was for the State of Michigan to assist local governments temporarily during a financial crisis. The emergency manager acts in the place of the chief administrative officer and governing body for and on behalf of the local government only. At all times, then, the City remained a municipality, albeit with a state employee temporarily overseeing the financial management of the municipality affairs. The City was at no time operating as "a means or agency through which a function of another entity i.e., the state is accomplished." No function or purpose of the state was accomplished in the emergency manager overseeing the City. The City was instead always operating as a means through which functions of its own entity were accomplished. The state simply engaged a state employee to temporarily assist the City in performing its functions and serving its local purposes for its citizens.
Boler v. Governor ,
Given this, we conclude the second factor tilts against Flint.
3.
The appointment factor weighs in Flint's favor. Public Act 436 expressly provides that the governor appoints an emergency manager.
4.
Whether the entity's functions fall within the traditional purview of state or local government weighs heavily against Flint. Under Public Act 436, an emergency manager takes the place of a local body; he, in other words, takes over the local government's functions. And as the State of Michigan rightly phrases it, "[t]he City of Flint's functions are 'within the traditional purview of local government' because the City of Flint is a local government."
Flint has no answer for this obvious point, and instead asks us to narrowly focus on the City's provision of waterworks. It underwhelmingly strings this argument together: Because Michigan's Safe Drinking Water Act provides the MDEQ with "power and control over public water supplies and suppliers of water" and criminalizes the failure to comply with MDEQ rules, see
B.
In sum, Flint has not met its burden to show that when under emergency management, it was an "arm of the state" protected by the Eleventh Amendment. The foremost consideration-the state's potential liability for judgment-counsels against a finding of Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the remaining factors do not "far outweigh" this factor. Pucci ,
VIII.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court in part, and reverse in part.
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
The Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Court of Claims construed the Due Process Clause of the Michigan Constitution and, following Michigan precedent, deemed it coextensive with its federal counterpart. See, e.g. , Mays ,
We have changed the docket to correct plaintiffs' misspelling of Shekter-Smith's name.
Some defendants contend actual and targeted physical force by a government actor is requisite for a bodily integrity invasion. But as set forth, the right to bodily integrity's anchor is control of one's own person by way of informed consent, and thus the method upon which the government enters the body is irrelevant. Boler , 865 F.3d at 408 n.4 ; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey ,
See, e.g. , Barrett v. United States ,
In dicta, we stated in Range that "[o]ur case law on substantive due process is somewhat conflicted as to whether an underlying constitutionally-protected right must be established in order for a government action to violate one's rights by shocking the conscience," and then cited EJS Properties for the proposition that in non-zoning decision contexts "we have held that 'government action may certainly shock the conscience or violate substantive due process without a liberty or property interest at stake.' "
Several defendants suggest we should depart from this line of authorities and instead reject plaintiffs' claim on the basis of the Supreme Court's pre-Lewis decision in Collins , where the Supreme Court rejected a substantive due process claim that "the Federal Constitution imposes a duty on the city to provide its employees with minimal levels of safety and security in the workplace" and the city's deliberate indifference to employee safety shocked the conscience.
See also Briscoe v. Potter ,
They also allege Lyon "participated in, directed, and/or oversaw the department's efforts to hide information to save face, and to obstruct and discredit the efforts of outside researchers. He knew as early as 2014 of problems with lead and legionella contamination in Flint's water and instead of fulfilling his duty to protect and notify the public, he participated in hiding this information." (Plaintiffs make the same general allegation against Wells.) But this is precisely the type of "chimerical," "bare assertion[ ]" Iqbal requires we set aside.
See also Wright v. City of Phila .,
Some defendants and the dissent direct us to dicta in a recent District of New Jersey case involving a bodily integrity claim arising out of the discovery of leaded water in the Newark, New Jersey's public-school buildings. See Branch v. Christie ,
We deny plaintiffs' pending motion to take judicial notice of pending but unproven criminal charges against some of the defendants and note that that the district court erred in doing so and using them to justify denying qualified immunity. First, although courts may consider judicially noticed facts when evaluating motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see, e.g. , Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. ,
Flint requests that we either certify the question of whether Public Act 436 transforms municipalities into arms of the state to the Michigan Supreme Court, or delay our opinion "until after Michigan courts have had an opportunity to answer it." Certification is not appropriate here-Flint did not make the same request to the district court and we have the appropriate data points to address the issue. See, e.g. , In re Amazon.com, Inc., Fulfillment Ctr. Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) & Wage & Hour Litig. ,
Citing Cash v. Granville County Board of Education ,
Michigan's Court of Claims Act grants the Michigan Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction "[t]o hear and determine any claim or demand, statutory or constitutional ... against the state or any of its departments or officers."
Concurrence in Part
The majority tells a story of intentional poisoning based on a grossly exaggerated version of plaintiffs' allegations. The complaint tells an entirely different story. It is a story of a series of discrete and discretionary decisions made by a variety of policy and regulatory officials who were acting on the best information available to them at the time. In retrospect, that information turned out to be grievously wrong. The result is what has become known as the Flint Water Crisis. The question this case presents is not whether the collective result of the officials' actions-the Water Crisis-caused any harm. It did. The question is, rather, whether any official's discrete *942decisions or statements, which in any way caused or contributed to the Crisis, violated a substantive due process right to bodily integrity. By answering that question with, "obviously, yes," the majority extends the protections of substantive due process into new and uncharted territory and holds government officials liable for conduct they could not possibly have known was prohibited by the Constitution. In doing so, the majority unfairly denies defendants protection from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
As in all cases dealing with the defense of qualified immunity, it is plaintiffs' burden to establish, first, that the defendants violated a constitutional right and, second, that the right was clearly established at the time the challenged conduct took place. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd ,
To place the qualified-immunity analysis on firmer footing, I begin with a recitation of the allegations as told by plaintiffs in their complaint. I then turn to qualified immunity's two prongs. As to the first, I doubt that plaintiffs allege that any defendant deprived them of a Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process right-both because the conduct actually alleged in the complaint does not appear to be conscience-shocking and because the Due Process Clause has never before been recognized as protecting against government conduct that in some way results in others being exposed to contaminated water. But even if plaintiffs have alleged the violation of a recognized due process right, their claim nonetheless fails at prong two of the qualified-immunity analysis, which asks whether the right was clearly established. The mere fact that no court of controlling authority has ever recognized the type of due process right that plaintiffs allege in this case is all we need to conclude the right is not clearly established. Accordingly, qualified immunity must shield each defendant from suit.
Before moving to the analysis, I note several points of agreement with the majority opinion. First, I join the majority in rejecting the City of Flint's argument that it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiffs' suit because the State of Michigan's takeover of the City of Flint, pursuant to Michigan's "Emergency Manager" law, transformed the City into an arm of the state. Additionally, I agree that plaintiffs fail to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) employees Nick Lyon, Eden Wells, Nancy Peeler, and Robert Scott; and Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) director Daniel Wyant. That is where my agreement ends, however. I respectfully dissent from the denial of qualified immunity for Flint Emergency Managers Darnell Earley and Gerald Ambrose; Flint's Director of Public Works Howard Croft; and MDEQ employees Liane Shekter-Smith, Stephen Busch, Michael Prysby, and Bradley Wurfel.
I
I begin with a review of the facts. Because this case comes before us on appeal from a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, I accept all factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Linkletter v. W. & S. Fin. Grp., Inc. ,
The Flint Water Crisis began when the City of Flint, undergoing extreme financial distress, came under the leadership of a *943succession of "Emergency Managers"-temporary city managers appointed by the governor to "act for and in the place and stead of the governing body and the office of chief administrative officer of the local government." M.C.L. § 141.1549(2). One of the City's Emergency Managers was Edward Kurtz. In 2013, Kurtz made a critical fiscal decision that set the City on a path toward the Flint Water Crisis. With the approval of the State of Michigan's treasurer, Kurtz terminated a decades-long contract for water services from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) and ordered Flint to join the newly-formed and more affordable Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA). The KWA was not yet functional, however. So Kurtz had to choose an interim source of Flint's drinking water. He determined that the best temporary source, from a budgetary standpoint, was the Flint River, treated at the City's own, and then-idle, water treatment plant. He notified the DWSD that Flint would soon cease receiving water from the DWSD.
Before the switch was finalized, Darnell Earley took over as Emergency Manager, assuming the position in November 2013. The City officially switched to the Flint River in April 2014. For decades prior, the Flint water treatment plant was designated for emergency use only. A 2011 "feasibility report" concluded that it would take extensive upgrades to bring it in compliance with "applicable standards" for use as a permanent water source. Plaintiffs allege that Earley "rushed" the switch to meet a "self-imposed" and "aggressive" deadline, without ensuring that Flint's water treatment plant was ready to properly treat Flint River water, and that he did so for the purpose of cutting costs. But they also assert that, at some point before the April 2014 switch, Flint hired an engineering firm-Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman (Lockwood)-"to prepare Flint's water treatment plant for the treatment of new water sources, including both the KWA and the Flint River." Even though the Flint River water was highly corrosive, plaintiffs allege that Lockwood did not advise the City to set water quality standards or implement corrosion control at the water treatment plant prior to using the River as a drinking water source.
Neither did the MDEQ-the state agency primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with federal and state safe drinking water laws. Relevant here, the MDEQ was tasked with ensuring Flint complied with the federal Lead and Copper Rule. That Rule generally requires public water systems to monitor and treat lead and copper levels in drinking water.
Soon after the transition, however, problems emerged. Residents complained of oddly smelling and discolored water. In October 2014, General Motors stopped using the City water at its engine-manufacturing plant out of fear that high levels of chloride would cause corrosion. Then, after the City attempted to disinfect the water, it discovered trihalomethanes-a potentially toxic byproduct caused by attempting to disinfect the water. That discovery prompted the City to mail a notice to its customers explaining that the City was in *944violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act but that the water was safe to drink for most people with healthy immune systems. Additionally, plaintiffs say that "[a]s early as January of 2015, the State of Michigan provided purified water coolers at its Flint offices in response to concerns about the drinking water."
On January 9, 2015, the first apparent concerns of lead in Flint's drinking water began to emerge. On that day, The University of Michigan-Flint discovered lead in campus drinking fountains. It is unclear from the complaint whether that discovery was publicized and thus whether any City or State official involved in testing or distributing Flint's water knew about the discovery.
Also around January 2015, and largely in response to citizen complaints, Flint hired another engineering firm-Veolia North America, LLC (Veolia)-to review the City's water quality. Veolia completed a "160-hour assessment of the treatment plant, distribution system, customer services and communication programs, and capital plans and annual budget." The firm issued a final report in March, in which it concluded that Flint was in "compliance with State and Federal water quality regulations, and based on those standards, the water [was] considered to meet drinking water requirements." Additionally, it stated that discolorations in the water "raise[d] questions" but that the water remained safe to drink.
Around that time, another Emergency Manger, Gerald Ambrose, took over the City's operations. On January 12, 2015, the day before Ambrose assumed his Emergency Manager role, the DWSD offered to waive a 4-million-dollar reconnection fee if the City of Flint resumed using its services. Ambrose declined the offer. Then, in late March, Flint's City Council voted 7-1 to resume services with the DWSD. Ambrose rejected the vote, calling it "incomprehensible."
In the meantime, several MDEQ employees were having internal discussions about Flint's water problems. Liane Shekter-Smith, MDEQ's Chief of the Office of Drinking Water and Municipal Assistance, emailed other MDEQ employees to suggest that the Flint River water was "slough[ing] material off of pipes" in the distribution system rather than "depositing material or coating pipes[.]" She opined that "[t]his may continue for a while until things stabilize."
Soon, an EPA employee became involved in the discussion as well. Miguel Del Toral, the EPA's regional drinking water regulations manager, reached out to the MDEQ on February 27, 2015, to voice his concerns about the possibility of elevated lead levels. Del Toral informed Michael Prysby, an MDEQ engineer, that the MDEQ's specific method for testing lead levels in Flint residents' tap water may be producing test results that underestimated lead levels. He also asked whether the water treatment plant was using optimized corrosion control, which he noted was "required" to be in place. That same day, Stephen Busch, an MDEQ District Supervisor in Lansing, responded to Del Toral stating that the water treatment plant had an "optimized corrosion control program." Two months later, an unidentified individual from the MDEQ informed the EPA that it had no optimized corrosion control treatment in place.
In April 2015, Del Toral again reached out to the MDEQ, this time issuing a memorandum that expressed concern with the lack of corrosion control and Flint's water testing methods. He also told MDEQ employees Busch and Prysby that he believed the MDEQ's sampling procedures did not properly account for the presence of lead service lines. Therefore, *945Del Toral said he "worried that the whole town may have much higher lead levels than the compliance results indicated[.]" According to plaintiffs, the MDEQ "ignored and dismissed" Del Toral's concerns.
A few months later, plaintiffs say that Busch "claimed that 'almost all' homes in the pool sampled for lead in Flint had lead services lines," even though this was untrue. Plaintiffs do not indicate to whom Busch made that statement. Later in July, a reporter broke a story announcing that Flint's water was contaminated with lead, citing Del Toral's April 2015 memorandum. In response, Bradley Wurfel, MDEQ's Communications Director, publicly stated that "anyone who is concerned about lead in the drinking water in Flint can relax."
That same month, the EPA and the MDEQ had a conference call to discuss MDEQ's compliance with the Lead and Copper Rule. According to plaintiffs, the EPA pushed for Flint to use optimized corrosion control, but the MDEQ insisted that doing so was "unnecessary and premature." In a follow-up email, MDEQ employee Shekter-Smith asked the EPA to provide a written concurrence that the City was in compliance with the Lead and Copper Rule.
Also in July, MDEQ employees exchanged a series of internal emails discussing how water tests performed by outside sources, which showed that Flint's drinking water had impermissibly high lead levels, compared with the MDEQ's own water testing results, which showed lower lead levels. When a report by a Virginia Tech professor revealing high lead levels surfaced in September 2015, Wurfel made public statements challenging the report and asserting that Flint's drinking water remained in compliance with federal and state laws. During this time, other MDEQ employees maintained that Flint was not required to use corrosion control until unacceptably high levels of lead had already appeared in the water, which they believed was not yet the case.
Later in September, Croft emailed "numerous officials" to report that the City of Flint had "officially returned to compliance with the Michigan Safe Drinking Water Act" and that it had "received confirming documentation from the [M]DEQ" to that effect. He explained that "[a]t the onset of our plant design, optimization for lead was addressed and discussed with the engineering firm and with the [M]DEQ. It was determined that having more data was advisable prior to the commitment of a specific optimization method. ... We have performed over one hundred and sixty lead tests throughout the city since switching over to the Flint River and remain within EPA standards."
The MDHHS also began to take a closer look at the outside studies showing high lead levels in Flint's water. Though at least a few MDHHS employees became aware of an increase in blood lead levels in Flint's children in July, the increase was attributed to "seasonal variation"-a summer phenomenon in which children's blood lead levels naturally increase because of more frequent exposure to lead in soil and other seasonal factors. But in September, MDHHS employees began to take a closer look. They circulated a study conducted by a pediatrician at a Flint hospital, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, which showed elevated blood lead levels in children. The next day, one MDHHS employee attempted to recreate the study but came up with different numbers. The City of Flint also issued a health advisory telling residents to flush pipes and install filters to prevent lead *946poisoning. On October 1, 2015, the MDHHS officially confirmed Dr. Hanna-Attisha's results.
Finally, on October 16, 2015, Flint reconnected to the DWSD. Two days later, MDEQ Director Daniel Wyant admitted to Michigan's governor that MDEQ "staff made a mistake while working with the City of Flint. Simply stated, staff employed a federal (corrosion control) treatment protocol they believed was appropriate, and it was not." Several MDEQ employees subsequently resigned or were suspended without pay. On January 21, 2016, the EPA issued an Emergency Order identifying the primary cause of increased lead levels in Flint's water as being a lack of corrosion control treatment after the City's switch to the Flint River.
II
To make it past qualified immunity's first prong, a plaintiff must plead facts showing that a government official violated a constitutional right. al-Kidd ,
To demonstrate why, I turn back to the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint. The complaint is particularly important here, because substantive due process is an undefined area where "guideposts for responsible decisionmaking ... are scarce and open-ended" and "judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field." Collins v. City of Harker Heights ,
Plaintiffs' complaint specifically states: "In providing Plaintiffs with contaminated water, and/or causing Plaintiffs to consume that water, Defendants violated Plaintiffs' right to bodily integrity, insofar as Defendants failed to protect Plaintiffs from a foreseeable risk of harm from the exposure to lead contaminated water." That claim makes clear where defendants allegedly went wrong. It was not in knowingly introducing life-threatening substances *947into plaintiffs' bodies against their will; it was in allegedly "fail[ing] to protect plaintiffs from a foreseeable risk of harm from the exposure to lead contaminated water " (emphasis added).
And that claim, as framed by plaintiffs, immediately encounters two roadblocks to establishing a due process violation: (1) a policymaker's or regulator's unwise decisions and statements or failures to protect the public are typically not considered conscience-shocking conduct, and (2) the Due Process Clause does not generally guarantee a bodily integrity right against exposure to contaminated water or other types of environmental harms. These two roadblocks raise serious doubts about whether plaintiffs meet the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis. I review each of these problems with plaintiffs' claim in turn, starting first with whether defendants' alleged conduct rises to the conscience-shocking level.
A
The first roadblock to plaintiffs' due process claim is that the conduct alleged fails to meet the "high" conscience-shocking standard. Range ,
In all cases, we are required to perform an "exact analysis of the circumstances before" condemning "any abuse of power ... as conscience shocking." Lewis ,
A more exact, defendant-specific analysis shows otherwise. The following analysis reveals that plaintiffs do not allege the additional "callous disregard or intent to injure" element that applies to non-custodial deliberate-indifference claims. I review the allegations against Flint's Emergency Managers (Darnell Earley and Gerald Ambrose),
1
Flint Emergency Managers Darnell Earley and Gerald Ambrose. First, consider plaintiffs' allegations against Emergency Managers Earley and Ambrose. According to plaintiffs, Earley "rushed" the switch to the Flint River to meet a "self-imposed" and "aggressive" deadline as a cost-saving measure without ensuring the water treatment plant was adequately equipped to treat the water. Ambrose later rejected opportunities to return to the DWSD despite residents' complaints and other evidence pointing to the water's high corrosivity. The majority concludes that both Emergency Managers approved the initial and ongoing use of the Flint River as a water source despite knowing the City's water treatment plant was not equipped to treat the water. Not so.
Consider the Emergency Managers' decisions in context, starting with the initial switch under Earley's leadership. Recall that before the switch, the City consulted with the Lockwood engineering firm to ready its treatment plant. The engineering firm did not advise the City to implement corrosion control. Neither did the MDEQ. In fact, the MDEQ informed the City that it was "satisfied with the water treatment plant's ability to treat water from the Flint River." And although the MDEQ noted that the KWA was "a higher quality source [of] water" than the Flint River, it never indicated that use of the Flint River would place residents at risk of lead contamination. Fast-forward to early 2015, when Ambrose rejected two opportunities to reconnect to the DWSD. At that time, the City had hired the Veolia engineering firm to review its water quality and treatment procedures. After a 160-hour assessment, Veolia concluded that Flint's water complied with applicable laws and did not advise Flint to use corrosion control.
The Emergency Managers' reliance on expert advice does not demonstrate a callous *949disregard for or intent to injure plaintiffs. Earley and Ambrose were budget specialists, not water treatment experts. They did not oversee the day-to-day operations of the water treatment plant, nor did they carry any responsibility for ensuring its compliance with federal or state laws. Accordingly, their reliance on the industry and regulatory experts who were tasked with preparing the water treatment and ensuring its compliance with safe drinking water laws does not demonstrate conscience-shocking behavior.
The majority, with the luxury of hindsight, believes that whether Earley or Ambrose reasonably relied on the opinions of the MDEQ or professional engineering firms is better left for summary judgment. But that belief suggests that the Due Process Clause may obligate managers of a municipal budget or other government officials to reject the advice of industry and regulatory experts based on the risk that those experts are wrong. Such a conclusion cuts against the "presumption that the administration of government programs is based on a rational decisionmaking process that takes account of competing social, political, and economic forces." Collins ,
Finally, the majority asserts that concluding that Ambrose and Earley were relying on experts places an inappropriately "benign construction on the factual allegations." Yet the majority cites no factual allegations supporting any other conclusion. Instead, it accepts plaintiffs' various "labels and conclusions"-for instance, that Ambrose and Earley "knew" about risks to Flint residents-as sufficient support for their claim. This cuts against the Supreme Court's directive that plaintiffs allege facts, not conclusions, to state entitlement to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly ,
2
MDEQ employees Liane Shekter-Smith, Stephen Busch, Michael Prysby, and Bradley Wurfel. Next consider the claims against the various MDEQ employees. Plaintiffs contend that every MDEQ employee misinterpreted the Lead and Copper Rule. Under the MDEQ's erroneous *950interpretation of the Rule, the City could begin distributing Flint River water to residents and then conduct two six-month rounds of lead testing before treating the water with corrosion control. Without immediate treatment, the water accumulated lead as it flowed through the City's pipes. And over time, plaintiffs' drinking water became contaminated with allegedly unhealthy levels of lead. Plaintiffs equate the MDEQ's misinterpretation of the Lead and Copper Rule's corrosion-control requirements with conscience-shocking behavior that caused plaintiffs' exposure to lead.
As gravely erroneous as the MDEQ's interpretation of the Rule appears in hindsight, however, there is no legal support for the conclusion that it amounted to conscience-shocking conduct. On the contrary, a mistake of law is the classic type of conduct that qualified immunity protects from suit. Pearson v. Callahan ,
The majority concludes, however, that the MDEQ's misinterpretation may have been intentional. According to the majority, plaintiffs' allegations present the "bleak[ ]" possibility that the MDEQ may have used Flint residents as "guinea pigs" to test lead-compliance theories unsupported by the law. None of plaintiffs' factual allegations make that inference a reasonable one. This is not a conspiracy case. Plaintiffs do not assert that the MDEQ employees maliciously agreed to a certain incorrect interpretation of the Lead and Copper Rule to exempt Flint from using corrosion control. And it is implausible that each MDEQ employee individually set out to advance the same incorrect interpretation of the Rule just to save the City money. Indeed, plaintiffs do not allege that any MDEQ employee intentionally misled Flint about the Rule's requirements. Instead, plaintiffs' allege that the MDEQ provided misguided advice rooted in mistaken interpretations of law-the type of conduct that, though it led to extremely unfortunate consequences here, is classically entitled to protection from suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
Still, the majority takes plaintiffs' allegations a step further, making the sweeping assertion that the MDEQ employees "created" the Flint Water Crisis by knowingly approving distribution of Flint River water with the use of an ill-prepared water treatment plant and then deceiving the public about the consequences of that decision. The allegations do not support that theory, however.
First, plaintiffs do not allege facts showing that Shekter-Smith, Busch, Prysby, or Wurfel personally approved the City's use of the Flint River and the Flint water treatment plant. Rather, plaintiffs say that the decision was made by Kurtz, Flint's 2013 Emergency Manager, with approval from the State's treasurer. Moreover, plaintiffs fail to allege that any of these MDEQ employees knew that the Flint water treatment plant was incapable of treating Flint River water. To be sure, plaintiffs allege that "all Defendants" were aware of a 2011 "feasibility report" rejecting the use of the Flint River at the time because of costs associated with bringing the treatment plant in compliance with "applicable standards." But plaintiffs provide no further context surrounding the report's creation and who knew about its contents. On the other hand, plaintiffs allege that, prior to the switch, Flint's Utilities Administrator told Prysby and Busch *951that the water treatment plant had "developed a system of redundant electrical systems, treatment processes and adequate finished water storage" after consulting with the MDEQ and an engineering firm. And after that, Busch informed Wurfel that the MDEQ was "satisfied with the City's ability to treat water from the Flint River[.]" These allegations thus do not suggest that any MDEQ employee knew the treatment plant was actually incapable of properly treating Flint River water and approved its use anyway.
Nor do the majority's "poignant examples" of a handful of plaintiffs' allegations show an attempt by any MDEQ employee to knowingly mislead the public about Flint's alleged noncompliance with drinking water laws or to falsely assure residents of the water's safety.
Prysby. Take Prysby, an MDEQ engineer, first. The majority latches on to a single email sent from Prysby to a couple other MDEQ employees in October 2014. In it, Prysby opines that the fact that a General Motors engine-manufacturing plant stopped using Flint River water because of its corrosive nature did not mean that the water should be labeled " 'corrosive' from a public health standpoint." According to the majority, that statement shows that Prysby was more interested in spinning the water's corrosive nature as unconnected to public health instead of investigating problems with the water. But a "[n]egligent failure to investigate ... does not violate due process." Wilson v. Lawrence Cty. ,
Busch. Nor do the allegations support such a finding when it comes to Busch. The complaint references a number of Busch-authored emails, but the majority references only two internal emails exchanged between MDEQ employees and between Busch and EPA employee Del Toral. The majority concludes that Busch lied in the latter email, when he informed Del Toral in February 2015 that Flint's water treatment plant "had an optimized corrosion control program" in place, which demonstrates conscience-shocking behavior. But the complaint contains no factual allegations supporting the conclusion that Busch's statement was a lie. Flint did have a corrosion control "program" in place-a program that permitted a two-round testing period after the plant became operational and before plant administrators chose a particular method of corrosion control treatment . The MDEQ believed the Lead and Copper Rule allowed for that type of program. Even though the MDEQ was wrong, that error does not support the allegation that Busch lied to the EPA about the existence of a corrosion control program. Moreover, plaintiffs do not allege that Busch personally knew that Flint was distributing water without corrosion control treatment until April 2015. So even if Busch meant "treatment" when he said "program" in the February email, the factual allegations do not support the conclusion that he knew the statement was false. In sum, neither that statement nor the various other internal emails in which Busch expressed support for the MDEQ's interpretation of the Lead and Copper Rule or his belief that the water treatment plant was capable of treating Flint River water plausibly demonstrate that Busch created the Flint Water Crisis and then attempted to deceive the public.
*952Shekter-Smith. The allegations likewise fail to demonstrate that Shekter-Smith acted in a conscience-shocking manner. The majority focuses on two of Shekter-Smith's emails.
In the first, Shekter-Smith requested that an EPA official indicate his agreement "that the city [was] in compliance with the lead and copper rule." That, she explained, would help the MDEQ "distinguish between [its] goals to address important public health issues separately from the compliance requirements of the actual rule[.]" The majority's take on that email is that Shekter-Smith cared more about "technical compliance" with the Lead and Copper than addressing an urgent health crisis. Whatever weight Shekter-Smith actually assigned each of those concerns, all that her email exhibits is an attempt to address them separately. This is hardly conscience-shocking conduct.
In the second email, Shekter-Smith responded to a question from Jon Allan, Director of the Michigan Office of the Great Lakes, about the MDEQ's statewide goals related to health-based standards. Under those goals, "98 percent of population [sic] served by community water systems" and "90 percent of the non-community water systems" would be providing "drinking water that meets all health-based standards" by 2020. Allan asked why MDEQ had any goal less than "100 percent," saying, "How many Flints Do you intend to allow? ? ?" Shekter-Smith replied:
The balance here is between what is realistic and what is ideal. Of course, everyone wants 100 percent compliance. The reality, however is that it's impossible. It's not that we 'allow' a Flint to occur; circumstances happen. Water mains break, systems lose pressure, bacteria gets into the system, regulations change and systems that were in compliance no longer are, etc. Do we want to put goal [sic] in black and white that cannot be met but sounds good? Or do we want to establish a goal that challenges us but can actually be accomplished? Perhaps there's a middle ground?
This second email likewise shows nothing more than Shekter-Smith's concern with meeting agency goals-in this instance, goals related to the statewide administration of safe drinking water. The propriety of certain agency goals, however, falls outside the purview of the Due Process Clause. Indeed, we presume that agency goal-setting consistent with its regulatory duties takes into account "competing social, political, and economic forces" of which judges do not have full view. Collins ,
Wurfel. Of all the MDEQ employees, the majority's intentional-public-deception theory really implicates only one individual: Wurfel, the Department's Director of Communications. He is the only MDEQ employee alleged to have made public statements about Flint's drinking water. The majority characterizes Wurfel's statements as attempts to demean, belittle, and aggressively dampen challenges to the government's assertion that Flint's drinking water was safe. But however his statements may be characterized, they were not conscience-shocking.
His first statement came in July 2015, after a reporter broke a story claiming that there was lead in Flint's drinking water. Wurfel publicly responded by saying *953that "anyone who is concerned about lead in the drinking water in Flint can relax." Then, in September 2015, after two doctors released separate reports about studies showing unsafe levels of lead in Flint residents' water, Wurfel placed the blame for the lead on the service lines in residents' homes even though there was, according to plaintiffs, evidence that at least some residents' service lines were plastic. Wurfel later called the doctors' testing results "perplex[ing]," explaining that they did not match the City's testing results, which he asserted were "done according to state and federal sampling guidelines and analyzed by certified labs." On two other occasions in September, Wurfel asserted the doctors' studies were inaccurate.
Though plaintiffs assert Wurfel's statements were knowing lies, their factual allegations do not support that conclusion. See Twombly ,
The allegations against the MDEQ employees, in sum, do not plausibly demonstrate a callous disregard for or intent to injure plaintiffs, let alone any effort to "systematically contaminate" the Flint community. What they show instead is a series of internal emails and a handful of public statements regarding the requirements of the Lead and Copper Rule and the water's safety. Even if the MDEQ employees made mistakes in interpreting the Rule, those mistakes are not conscience-shocking.
3
Flint Director of Department of Public Works, Howard Croft. Next, I turn to the allegations against Croft, which come nowhere near the high conscience-shocking standard. Plaintiffs assert that Croft "caused and allowed unsafe water to be delivered to Flint's residents," but they fail *954to allege that Croft was actually involved in the City's decision to use to the Flint River as a water source or that he played any part in determining whether and when the treatment plant would use corrosion control. The majority finds that single, conclusory allegation sufficient to make the plausible inference that Croft played an affirmative role in approving the transition to the Flint River. What makes that conclusion especially confounding is the majority's simultaneous rejection of allegations against other defendants that are just as conclusory as this one. For example, the majority finds that plaintiffs' allegation that MDHHS executive Nick Lyon "participated in, directed, and/or oversaw the department's efforts to hide information to save face, and to obstruct and discredit the efforts of outside researchers" as the kind of "bare" and "chimerical" assertions Iqbal mandates be set aside. But the allegation that Croft "caused and allowed unsafe water to be delivered to Flint's residents" is not any more detailed than the "chimerical" assertion against Lyon. There are only two other allegations against Croft. The first is that, at an unidentified point in time, he said in a press release that the City's water was "of the high quality that Flint customers have come to expect." The second is that in September 2015, he emailed "numerous officials" to inform them that the MDEQ had confirmed Flint's compliance with "EPA standards." These allegations do not demonstrate that Croft engaged in any behavior that may fairly be construed as conscience-shocking.
4
MDHHS executives Nick Lyon and Eden Wells; MDHHS employees Nancy Peeler and Robert Scott; and MDEQ Director Daniel Wyant. Finally, a brief word about the MDHHS executives, the MDHHS employees, and MDEQ Director Wyant, all of whom the majority correctly dismisses from this case. I agree with the majority that most of the allegations against the MDHHS executives and employees have to do with negligence (i.e., failing to timely notify the public of the possibility of increased lead in the water) rather than any affirmative action involving them in the decision to use the Flint River as a water source without simultaneously implementing corrosion control treatment. I agree as well that once those allegations are discarded, plaintiffs' remaining allegations-going to these defendants' attempts to "discredit" studies from outside sources-are too sparse to demonstrate conduct rising to the level of conscience-shocking.
And as to MDEQ Director Wyant, I concur with the majority's conclusion that none of plaintiffs' allegations show that he was personally involved with the decision to use the Flint River as a water source or otherwise engaged in any conscience-shocking behavior.
Accordingly, I join the majority in concluding that plaintiffs fail to allege that these defendants engaged in conscience-shocking behavior or otherwise infringed on plaintiffs' due process rights.
For all of these reasons, I do not believe plaintiffs' allegations suggest that any individual defendant's actions or failures to act shock the conscience. This presents a significant roadblock that seems to prevent plaintiffs from establishing a violation of substantive due process and thus proceeding past the first prong of the qualified-immunity analysis.
B
The second roadblock to plaintiffs' substantive-due-process claim-which also suggests they cannot proceed past qualified immunity's first prong-is that their claim does not appear to arise from the deprivation of a recognized fundamental right to bodily integrity. As should be clear *955by now, the right reconstructed by the majority is entirely distinct from the one asserted in plaintiffs' complaint and is thus, unsurprisingly, devoid of support from plaintiffs' factual allegations.
So what is the bodily integrity right plaintiffs allege? According to the complaint, defendants' alleged conduct amounted to a failure to protect from exposure to lead-contaminated water. But although plaintiffs frame the claim that way in their complaint, they insist their claim does not flow from a right to receive clean water. Plaintiffs are right to avoid advancing that theory because the Due Process Clause guarantees neither a right to live in a contaminant-free environment, Collins ,
The majority avoids grappling with that issue by turning, inappropriately, to abstract concepts of personal autonomy and informed consent that it divines from several inapposite cases. In so doing, the majority's analysis runs contrary to the "restrained methodology" outlined by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg ,
In Glucksberg , the Court showed us how to use that "restrained methodology." There, the Supreme Court dismissed a claim by state physicians that the Due Process Clause guaranteed a right to physician-assisted suicide.
Likewise, no concrete examples arising from the established bodily integrity jurisprudence *956or from our Nation's history or traditions support the right asserted here-protection from policy or regulatory decisions or public statements that, somewhere down the line, result in exposure to contaminated water.
We have previously interpreted the bodily integrity right as "the right against forcible physical intrusions of the body by the government." Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. DeWine ,
In the medical context, too, the Court has underscored the right's guarantee against direct, physical intrusions into an individual's body at the hands of a government official. In Washington v. Harper , for instance, the Court emphasized the significance of an inmate's "liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs."
These cases delineate the contours of the right to bodily integrity in terms of intrusive searches or forced medication. None of them is compatible with the "careful description" of the right at issue here: protection from exposure to lead-contaminated water allegedly caused by policy or regulatory decisions or statements.
In sum, because the conduct alleged does not appear to rise to the level of conscience-shocking, and because I believe it does not demonstrate the deprivation of a recognized fundamental right, I have serious doubts about whether plaintiffs state a substantive due process claim sufficient to carry them past prong one of the qualified-immunity analysis.
III
The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis looks to whether the alleged constitutional right was "clearly established" at the time the government official acted. al-Kidd ,
For a right to be clearly established, its contours must be "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right[.]" Mullenix v. Luna , --- U.S. ----,
Here, that means plaintiffs must be able to point to controlling cases extending substantive due process protections to the following individuals:
• A high-level government executive who makes a decision (or proceeds with a project) while relying on expert opinions that the decision or project is lawful and safe (Earley and Ambrose).
• A regulator who misinterprets environmental laws and provides bad advice to government policymakers (MDEQ employees).
• A city or state regulator who, based on the erroneous advice of other regulators, publicly announces that a government-provided resource is safe for consumption when it is not (Wurfel, Croft, or others who made public statements).
As the majority acknowledges, plaintiffs point to no factually similar controlling case in which a court found that such conduct violated a constitutional right to bodily integrity. "This alone should have been an important indication to the majority that [the defendants'] conduct did not violate [plaintiffs'] 'clearly established' right." White ,
In fact, in case after case around the country, courts have consistently rejected substantive-due-process claims based on the type of conduct alleged here. Branch v. Christie is one such case.
Here, as in Branch , government officials allegedly exposed others to water contaminated with lead. And here, as in Branch , certain government officials allegedly attempted to hide the lead contamination. The Branch court could find no authority indicating that such conduct violated a substantive due process right-not even the Supreme Court's bodily integrity cases were close to on point. That court's conclusion shows how unclear it would have been for the regulators and policymakers in this case to have anticipated that their actions might have violated an established bodily integrity right.
Coshow v. City of Escondido , a state court case, also sheds light on the novelty of plaintiffs' asserted right.
Just as in Coshow , the novelty of plaintiffs' claim here shows that it is not clearly established. The majority attempts to draw a disingenuous distinction between this case and Coshow . It reasons that, in Coshow , adding fluoride to drinking water served the beneficial purpose of preventing tooth decay while, in this case, adding lead to water served no countervailing governmental interest. I certainly do not quibble with the premise that adding lead to water furthers no discernable beneficial purpose. But that is not what happened here. No government official made a conscious decision to introduce lead into Flint's water. Instead, the Emergency Managers made a conscious and legitimate policy decision to switch to the Flint River as a water source to cut costs-and they did so in reliance on guidance from engineering firms and the MDEQ. That hardly demonstrates that the decision to switch to the Flint River was made with no countervailing governmental interest in mind. The government officials' resource-allocation decisions during a budgetary crisis did not constitute obvious violations of the right to bodily integrity because of the grave health consequences they allegedly caused in hindsight.
Moreover, that some governmental officials made public statements about the *960safety of Flint's water does not make the unlawfulness of any defendant's conduct any more obvious. As the Second Circuit put it, "no court has ever held a government official liable for denying substantive due process by issuing press releases or making public statements"-regardless of whether the public statements were true or false. Benzman v. Whitman ,
This case implicates similar, albeit not identical, concerns to those invoked in Lombardi and Benzman . As the majority points out, there is no allegation that any defendant here intended to harm a Flint resident. And like the EPA regulators in Lombardi and Benzman , Wurfel made public statements pursuant to his official role as MDEQ's Director of Communications. To be sure, those statements countered evidence about Flint water's lead levels presented in two separate outside studies. But they were also consistent with information provided to Wurfel by officials from his own department. That information was, in retrospect, misguided. Plaintiffs do not assert, however, that Wurfel made any knowingly false statements for the purpose of causing harm. The same goes for Croft. When he issued a press release asserting that Flint's water was of a "high quality," at least one engineering firm and the MDEQ had concluded that the water treatment plant was capable of adequately treating Flint's water. In other words, the allegations do not show that Croft made a knowingly false public statement for the purpose of causing harm. Given the absence of any such allegation, and because no court has ever concluded that the Due Process Clause covers the public statements of government officials, it can hardly have been apparent to Wurfel or Croft that their statements clearly violated plaintiffs' due process right to bodily integrity.
Due to the lack of controlling precedent and the many cases suggesting substantive due process does not protect plaintiffs' asserted right, the majority again falls back on its exaggerated characterization of defendant's actions and statements, likening them to the "systematic" poisoning of an entire community. Advancing that narrative, the majority concludes that this case is one of the "easy" ones that should never have arisen in the first place. See *961United Statesv. Lanier ,
The proper framing of the factual narrative exposes how far off base are the bodily integrity cases relied upon by the majority. How could those cases have provided any practical guidance to government officials like Earley, Ambrose, Croft, or the MDEQ employees? For instance, how should Rochin 's prohibition against induced vomiting to obtain evidence have informed Earley's oversight of the switch from the DWSD to the Flint River and what professional opinions he was entitled to rely upon when the City made the switch? And how should it have informed Ambrose's decision to continue using the Flint River as a water source and what professional opinions he was entitled to rely upon in doing so? What about the MDEQ employees? How should Riggins 's limits on the state's ability to administer antipsychotic drugs to pretrial detainees have changed what kind of advice the MDEQ employees gave the City about federal corrosion-control requirements? Or what about the fact that Cruzan allows a state to demand clear and convincing evidence that an incompetent patient no longer desires life support before cutting it off? How should that have influenced the content of Wurfel's (or any other defendant's) public statements about the water's quality? The answer to these questions is-clearly-not established.
And although the right plaintiffs allege is not established, various courts have certainly considered it-and rejected it. See Branch,
In sum, the majority's opinion is a broad expansion of substantive due process, which contradicts the traditional understanding that due process does not "supplant traditional tort law" or impose a duty on the government to ensure environmental safety. Collins ,
IV
The majority's conclusion that the defendants violated plaintiffs' clearly established right to bodily integrity has some facial appeal, of course, because we sympathize with the Flint residents' plight. It is wrong, however, on both the facts and the law. For all of the above reasons, I join the majority in its denial of sovereign immunity to the City of Flint and in dismissing various defendants from the case. But I dissent from its denial of qualified immunity *963to Earley, Ambrose, Croft, Shekter-Smith, Busch, Prysby, and Wurfel.
It is unclear whether the "one hundred and sixty lead tests" were part of the "160-hour assessment" that Veolia conducted in early 2015 as part of its review of the City's water treatment plant.
Plaintiffs also bring a claim against the City of Flint, which necessarily rises and falls with their claim against the Emergency Managers. Because the Emergency Managers were acting on behalf of the City, their policy decisions concerning the source of the City's water were also policy decisions of the City. Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim implicates the City only to the extent the Emergency Managers' decisions were unconstitutional.
Rather than viewing plaintiffs' allegations in a light most favorable to defendants, all this conclusion does is hold plaintiffs to their burden of presenting factual allegations that provide a plausible basis for their claim. Twombly ,
Even In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation ,
Barrett v. United States ,
Bounds v. Hanneman ,
What is more, the majority's exaggerated narrative runs contrary to what is publicly known in the aftermath of the Flint Water Crisis. For instance, plaintiffs point out that the state has brought criminal charges against various defendants and ask us to take judicial notice of those charges as providing context for their bodily integrity claim. Of course, I agree with the majority that it is inappropriate to consider those charges for the purpose of deciding plaintiffs' constitutional claim. But I note that even if it were appropriate to consider them, the charges would not support plaintiffs' assertion that defendants' conduct is so obviously unlawful that qualified immunity does not shield them from plaintiffs § 1983 suit. In fact, they prove just the opposite. If the defendants' actions are obviously unlawful, then one would expect relatively speedy probable-cause determinations. Reality suggests otherwise. Consider this: the state issued its complaint against Lyon on June 14, 2017, but the court did not find probable cause to bind him over for trial until August 24, 2018. In the meantime, the trial judge spent around 11 months on preliminary examinations just to find probable cause existed. Other defendants, such as MDEQ Employee Shekter-Smith and MDHHS Executive Peeler, have not even been bound over yet, despite the state filing complaints against them as early as July 2016. These cases have languished unusually long in probable cause proceedings. That alone suggests that the egregiousness of defendants' actions is not so apparent as the majority makes it out to be.
The number of cases rejecting similar environmentally based claims is significant. See Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks ,
