Shabazz v. United States
912 F.3d 73
2d Cir.2019Background
- Shabazz was convicted in 2005 of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and sentenced under the ACCA to 235 months based on multiple prior Connecticut robbery convictions (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-133).
- ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum if a defendant has three prior "violent felony" convictions; the Force Clause defines a violent felony as one that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)).
- In Johnson v. United States (2010), the Supreme Court held "physical force" in the Force Clause means "violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury."
- The district court granted Shabazz's § 2255 petition, concluding Connecticut's basic robbery statute (§ 53a-133) can be violated by minimal force not capable of causing pain or injury, so such convictions are not categorically ACCA predicates; it vacated Shabazz's ACCA-based sentence and resentenced him to 120 months (time served).
- The government appealed, arguing § 53a-133 necessarily requires the use or threatened use of force capable of causing pain or injury and therefore each robbery conviction qualifies under the ACCA Force Clause.
- The Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the face-to-face nature of robbery under § 53a-133 inherently involves an implicit threat of escalation and is thus a crime that necessarily involves force capable of causing pain or injury; Shabazz therefore had three ACCA predicates and the original sentence is reinstated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Connecticut robbery (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-133) is a "violent felony" under ACCA's Force Clause | Shabazz: § 53a-133 can be violated by minimal force insufficient to cause pain or injury, so it does not categorically meet the Force Clause | Government: § 53a-133 requires the use or threat of force in a face-to-face taking, which is inherently capable of causing pain or injury, so it is a Force-Clause predicate | The Second Circuit held § 53a-133 qualifies categorically under the Force Clause because even minimal force in a person-to-person robbery inherently carries a realistic threat of causing pain or injury; district court judgment vacating sentence was reversed and original ACCA sentence reinstated |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (interpreting "physical force" in ACCA Force Clause as "force capable of causing physical pain or injury")
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishing categorical approach for ACCA predicate analysis)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (clarifying limits of categorical approach vs. modified categorical approach)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (discussing categorical approach and statute-elements analysis)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (striking down ACCA's Residual Clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- United States v. Acosta, 470 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.) (describing identification of minimum conduct for a statute in categorical analysis)
- United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51 (2d Cir.) (noting courts may not look behind statutory elements to underlying facts)
- United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (analyzing when state burglary statutes categorically qualify under ACCA by focusing on inherent risk of violent confrontation)