Sewell v. State
197 A.3d 607
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2018Background
- Kelvin Sewell, former Pocomoke City Police Chief (Dec 2011–Jul 2015), was indicted for misconduct in office and conspiracy after he directed subordinates how to handle a 2014 late-night crash involving Douglas Matthews. The State alleged Sewell acted corruptly to benefit a fellow Mason.
- Sewell had pending EEOC and civil claims alleging race discrimination and retaliatory termination by local authorities; he argued the prosecution was retaliatory and influenced by the Worcester County State’s Attorney.
- At the Matthews scene Sewell (in plain clothes) arrived late, reassigned the investigation to Officer Barnes, answered questions on Matthews’ behalf, and instructed Barnes to record the event as an "accident;" no citation was issued.
- The grand jury indicted Sewell for official misconduct (common-law misdemeanor) and conspiracy; at trial the jury convicted on misconduct but acquitted on conspiracy.
- Sewell proffered two experts to testify about the scope and exercise of a police chief’s discretion; the trial court excluded the experts. He also moved to dismiss for retaliatory prosecution without an evidentiary hearing; the motion was denied without a hearing.
- The Court of Special Appeals: affirmed sufficiency of evidence to send misconduct to jury but held exclusion of Sewell’s expert testimony was legal error and prejudicial; denied requirement for evidentiary hearing on prosecutorial-misconduct claim; reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Sewell's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for misconduct in office | State failed to show corrupt intent or any motive (Mason link unproven); evidence insufficient. | Circumstantial evidence (series of "unusual" acts + accident facts) permitted inference of corrupt intent. | Jury verdict supported by circumstantial evidence; sufficiency upheld. |
| Exclusion of defense expert testimony on police discretion | Experts would explain lawful scope and norms of chief-level discretion—relevant to rebut corrupt-intent inference. | Testimony would mislead by turning case into whether discretion was abused rather than whether defendant corruptly interfered. | Exclusion was error: expert testimony was relevant and would appreciably help jury; abuse of discretion and prejudicial; new trial ordered. |
| Motion to dismiss for retaliatory/prosecutorial misconduct (pretrial evidentiary hearing) | Timing, State’s Attorney involvement, and EEOC history created verifiable facts raising reasonable doubt about prosecutor’s motive—hearing required. | No verifiable facts showing State Prosecutor acted in bad faith or was manipulated; allegations speculative. | Denial without hearing affirmed: defendant failed to proffer verifiable facts creating reasonable doubt about prosecutor’s motive (McNeil standard). |
| Admission of lay opinion (Officer Barnes) re: right/wrong of Sewell's instruction | (Defense challenged admission) Lay testimony on "right/wrong" was improper opinion on legal standard. | Testimony described perceptions of unusual conduct and was admissible lay testimony about events. | Majority did not find reversible error on this point; its core holding concerned expert exclusion. |
Key Cases Cited
- McNeil v. State, 112 Md. App. 434 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.) (defendant must proffer verifiable facts amounting to some evidence tending to show prosecutorial bad faith to obtain an evidentiary hearing)
- State v. Carter, 200 Md. 255 (Md. 1952) (official misconduct covers misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance; intent inference in malfeasance)
- Duncan v. State, 282 Md. 385 (Md. 1978) (official misconduct defined as corrupt behavior by a public officer)
- Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33 (Md. 1988) (standards for admitting defense expert testimony relevant to the defendant’s mental state or perceptions)
- Smith v. State, 423 Md. 573 (Md. 2011) (relevance/materiality of proffered testimony; probative value in context of other defense evidence)
- Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219 (Md. 1993) (circumstantial evidence review; cumulative strength of multiple inferences)
- Jones v. State, 440 Md. 450 (Md. 2014) (State may prove intent through direct or circumstantial evidence)
- Pointer v. U.S., 151 U.S. 396 (U.S. 1894) (absence of motive is favorable to accused but motive not indispensable to conviction)