Henry Simmons was convicted of second degree murder by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.
Simmons v. State,
Simmons, accused of murder, raised the defense of imperfect self-defense. His particular contentions before us arise from the decision of the trial judge to exclude the testimony of a proposed expert defense witness, Dr. Ellen McDaniel, a psychiatrist. Prior to the selection of the jury, the State made a motion in limine that the testimony of Dr. McDaniel be excluded from the trial. At that time, the trial judge postponed ruling on the motion until the jury had been selected but prior to opening statements.
The motion was subsequently addressed while the jury recessed for lunch. The State argued that the proposed testimony should be excluded because the defendant had abandoned the defense of insanity, and thus, Dr. McDaniel’s testimony was allegedly only relevant to diminished capaci *36 ty which is not a viable defense under Maryland common law. Further, the State argued that the admission of any expert testimony regarding the nature of Simmons’s subjective beliefs at the time of the alleged crime would impermissibly impinge on the jury’s function.
In response, Simmons argued that the State had misconstrued the nature of Dr. McDaniel’s testimony. Simmons emphasized that he was not offering Dr. McDaniel’s testimony to support a diminished capacity defense. Rather, the testimony was offered to aid the jury in deciding whether Simmons acted with the requisite state of mind to establish the defense of imperfect self-defense. Thus, Simmons proffered that he would testify that at the time of the homicide he believed that use of force was necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm; Dr. McDaniel would then take the stand and testify that her examination of Simmons revealed that he did in fact have such a subjective belief. The trial judge ruled that he would not allow Dr. McDaniel to testify in this manner because the function of the jury would be usurped.
At this point, Simmons made a second proffer that Dr. McDaniel would only testify that Simmons’s asserted subjective belief would be consistent with his psychiatric profile. The trial judge, however, reaffirmed his previous ruling, indicating that he would allow no one to testify as to what Simmons’s thought processes were at the time of the homicide.
Following this ruling, the trial proceeded and Simmons never called Dr. McDaniel as a witness. Nor did he raise the issue of the admissibility of Dr. McDaniel’s testimony during the trial. As a result, the State argues that the issue relating to the exclusion of Dr. McDaniel’s testimony was not properly preserved for appeal. In particular, the State argues that the grant or denial of a motion in limine does not, of itself, constitute reversible error, and that the trial judge can only make a final ruling as to the admission or exclusion of evidence after the trial has begun. *37 We address this issue before determining whether the trial judge properly excluded the testimony of Dr. McDaniel.
The Court of Special Appeals found that “Appellant proffered the testimony both in a motion
in limine
and after the jury was sworn,”
Simmons,
In
Prout v. State,
On appeal the State argued that a ruling on a motion
in limine
is insufficient to preserve an issue for appellate review. Rather, the State suggested that the attorney seeking the admission of evidence must proffer the evidence at the point at which such evidence would ordinarily be offered at trial. We agreed that “[i]f the trial judge admits the questionable evidence, the party who made the motion ordinarily must object at the time the evidence is actually offered to preserve his objection for appellate review.”
Id.
at 356,
*38
We noted, however, that the circumstances may be different when the trial judge grants the motion and excludes the proffered evidence. In particular, we ruled that Prout did not have to renew his offer of the evidence during the trial because the trial judge had intended that his ruling granting the motion
in limine
be the final word on the matter.
Id.
at 358,
We believe that the trial judge in the case sub judice also intended that his ruling on the motion in limine be final as to the admissibility of the proposed expert testimony. Defense counsel advised the court on the record as to the substance of the proposed testimony and its relevance. The State neither requested nor did the court require that defense counsel further particularize the proffer or produce Dr. McDaniel so that her proposed testimony could be elicited in question and answer form. Rather, the trial court apparently misperceived the thrust of the proffer, as the defense had modified it during colloquy, and understood the proffer to be that Dr. McDaniel would testify that Simmons in fact honestly held a certain subjective belief. But the court was “not prepared to let her make that ultimate finding.” The trial judge unconditionally ruled that he would not “let anybody tell this jury what this man’s thought processes are.”
To require defense counsel, under these circumstances, to make a more specific proffer or to offer the evidence again during the trial in order to preserve the issue for appellate review is unwarranted and would unduly interfere with the orderly progression of the trial. As we regard the trial judge’s ruling on the motion in limine to have been a final ruling, we conclude that the issue is properly preserved for review.
We now direct our attention to whether the trial judge impermissibly excluded the psychiatric testimony of
*39
fered by Simmons in support of his claim of imperfect self-defense. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the exclusion of this evidence on the grounds that “[t]he evidence appellant sought to introduce went to his capacity or diminished capacity to act in an objectively reasonable manner. This evidence is not admissible in Maryland [under
Johnson v. State,
The defense of imperfect self-defense was first recognized by this Court in
State v. Faulkner, supra.
In that case we held that “when evidence is presented showing the defendant’s subjective belief that the use of force was necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm, the defendant is entitled to a proper instruction on imperfect self-defense.”
Id.
at 500,
In a case where the defendant is charged with murder, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the requisite malevolent state of mind in killing the victim, without justification, excuse, or mitigation.
See State v. Ward,
From our reading of the record, the trial judge excluded the proposed testimony on the grounds that the jury’s function would be usurped if the jury were to hear the psychiatrist testify that in her opinion Simmons acted under an honest belief that self-defense was necessary when he killed the victim. In light of defense counsel’s proffer that *41 the expert would only testify that such a subjective belief would be consistent with Simmons’s psychological profile we find the trial judge’s ruling too broad. A review of the principles relating to the admission of expert testimony is in order before we explain further.
The criminal defendant is generally permitted to introduce any evidence relevant to the asserted defense. This will be evidence which tends to establish or disprove a material fact.
See Johnson v. State,
A determination as to the admissibility of expert testimony is based on several findings. First, the trial court must determine whether the evidence to be presented is a proper subject for expert testimony. The standard for relevance under Maryland common law is whether the jury will receive appreciable help from the expert testimony in resolving the issues presented in the case.
See State v. Allewalt,
Before expert testimony is admitted the court must also determine whether the proposed expert is qualified to testify by virtue of education and experience.
See Crews v. Director,
Finally, the proposed expert testimony must be competent, that is, the expert’s conclusions must be based upon
*42
a legally sufficient factual foundation.
See State Health Dept. v. Walker,
Expert testimony is admissible notwithstanding that it is presented in the form of an opinion relating to an ultimate issue. This Court commented on the admissibility of this type of evidence long ago in
Balto. & Yorktown Turnpike Road Co. v. Leonhardt,
It is proper to lay before the jury all the facts, which are necessary to enable them to form a judgment on the matters in issue; and when the subject under investigation requires special skill and knowledge, they may be aided by the opinion of persons whose pursuits or studies or experience, have given them a familiarity with the matter in hand.
In
Leonhardt,
the Court upheld the decision of the lower court to exclude the testimony of a witness who would opine that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The Court agreed that the jury could adequately form a judgment on that issue from the evidence presented.
See also Belt R. Co. v. Sattler,
We observe that even though a trial judge has ruled to allow an expert to testify in general terms, the trial judge must engage in a separate evaluation of the admissibility of an expert opinion.
*43 Current Maryland case law ... states that the fact that a witness’ opinion addresses an ultimate issue as to which the judge or jury must reach a conclusion does not preclude automatically the witness’ testifying to it. Rather, the question, as with regard to any opinion testimony, will be whether the witness’ opinion is rationally based and would be helpful to the fact-finder. If both criteria are met, the opinion will be admissible. (Footnotes omitted).
L. McLain, 6
Maryland Practice
§ 704.1, at 246 (1987). The critical determination is
whether the jury will be aided by the opinion, Yudkin v. State,
As is obvious from the preceding discussion, a trial judge is given broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony. Seldom will the decision in this regard constitute grounds for reversal.
See Johnson,
An evidentiary ruling similar to the ruling which we confront in this case was reviewed in
Johnson,
The trial judge concluded that the psychiatrist could not precisely reconstruct the actions or emotions of a person on a specific date and rejected the proffered testimony. The trial judge did, however, allow the psychiatrist to testify as to the Johnson-Mayers relationship in general. The psychiatrist was also permitted to testify that Johnson had passively followed Mayers in the past and was manipulated by Mayers in many ways.
Id.
at 515,
Judge Close fairly limited what he felt was improper expert testimony and permitted the remainder. The testimony admitted, if believed, was sufficient for a jury to conclude that Mayer’s domination constituted a mitigating factor. The jury’s failure to so find does not prove reversible error.
Id.
Unlike the trial judge in Johnson, the trial judge in this case did not exclude the proffered psychiatric testimony on the grounds that the psychiatrist could not reconstruct the actions or emotions of a person on a specific date. Rather, the trial judge was more concerned that the psychiatrist’s opinion might usurp the jury's function. Moreover, the psychiatrist in the case sub judice was precluded from testifying as to any conclusions she had reached regarding the defendant’s conduct by virtue of the trial judge’s ruling.
The Court of Special Appeals has also reviewed evidentiary rulings relating to the admissibility of expert opinion testimony.
See Kanaras v. State,
*45
In
Kanaras,
the defendant admitted that he was present when two murders took place. He asserted, however, that any involvement on his part was
coerced
by an accomplice. To support this defense, the defendant sought to have a psychiatrist express an opinion as to whether the defendant’s psychological profile was consistent or inconsistent with voluntary participation in the acts of violence.
Kanaras,
The
Kanaras
court relied on
Waine v. State
as a basis for its holding. Like
Kanaras,
the defendant in
Waine
was charged with first degree murder. The defendant in
Waine,
however, denied any knowledge of the homicides and described himself as a “total passivist” incapable of violence. Psychiatric testimony was also offered to support this defense. In particular, the psychiatrist proposed to testify that violence on the part of the defendant was very unlikely and that there was a very low probability, in his opinion, that the defendant was capable of committing the homicides.
Waine,
Johnson, Kanaras, and Waine demonstrate that the Court of Special Appeals holds admissible psychiatric testimony when it is limited to a discussion of the psychological profile of the defendant. We agree that such evidence is admissible. To the extent that the trial court’s ruling precluded Dr. McDaniel from discussing the conclusions she had reached regarding Simmons’s psychological profile the ruling was in error.
Our ruling is not unprecedented. A case of particular note is
People v. Wells,
Under the circumstances the materiality of this evidence in defendant’s case is patent. If he acted only under the influence of fear of bodily harm, in the belief, honest though unreasonable, that he was defending himself from such harm by the use of a necessary amount of force, then defendant, although he would not be guiltless of crime, would not have committed that particular aggravated offense with which he is charged, for the essential element of “malice aforethought” would be lacking. In *47 resolving this question in a close case the jury could well be materially aided by the knowledge that, in the opinion of qualified experts, the defendant’s condition was such that he might readily have acted from genuine fear rather than from a desire for vengeance or from any other malicious purpose.
Id.
at 345,
In addition, expert testimony frequently is offered as to a defendant’s subjective beliefs when the defendant seeks complete justification for a homicide by asserting self-defense. In some instances, the courts have suggested that the experts be permitted to testify that the defendant in fact believed that self-defense was necessary.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Light,
In light of the preceding discussion we find that the conviction in the case
sub judice
must be reversed. Our ruling is limited, however. While experts are permitted to testify as to the ultimate issue of fact in Maryland, we are not prepared to suggest that Dr. McDaniel should have been permitted to testify that the defendant was
in fact
acting under an honest belief that self-defense was necessary at the time of the homicide. There were no witnesses to the start of the violent altercation and psychiatric testi
*48
mony to the effect that Simmons was
in fact
acting under a belief that he was in mortal danger would impermissibly suggest that the victim was the aggressor. Moreover, we concur with the trial court in
Johnson,
On the other hand, the proffered testimony has some relevance in that consistency between the specific subjective belief testified to by Simmons and Simmons’s psychological profile tends to make it more likely that Simmons in fact held that subjective belief. Had the trial judge appreciated that the second proffer fell within the limitation described in the preceding paragraph, the judge might well have exercised his discretion to admit the evidence.
See Allewalt,
As the evidence sought to be admitted may have been sufficient to convince the jury that the defendant, if guilty, was guilty of a crime less than murder, its exclusion constitutes reversible error. Accordingly, Simmons must be granted a new trial.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AND REMAND TO THAT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.
Notes
.
See also Watson v. State,
. At trial Simmons testified that the victim had been the aggressor. Specifically, the victim stabbed Simmons with his own knife. Simmons also testified that he was afraid of the victim and that he had been stabbed in the past by another individual. The trial judge evidently was satisfied that Simmons had met his burden of producing evidence since the jury was instructed on the law relating to imperfect self-defense.
. In
Hoey v. State,