Sessions v. Dimaya
138 S. Ct. 1204
| SCOTUS | 2018Background
- James Dimaya, a lawful permanent resident, had two California first-degree residential burglary convictions; the government sought his removal as an "aggravated felony" under the INA, which incorporates 18 U.S.C. §16's definition of a "crime of violence."
- Section 16 has two parts: (a) an elements clause (use/threatened use of physical force as an element) and (b) a residual clause (§16(b)) covering felonies that “by their nature” involve a “substantial risk” that physical force may be used "in the course of committing the offense."
- Courts apply a categorical, "ordinary case" inquiry under §16(b) to decide whether a prior conviction qualifies; the Ninth Circuit held §16(b) void for vagueness relying on this Court's decision invalidating the ACCA residual clause in Johnson v. United States.
- The Government argued §16(b) differs from ACCA’s residual clause (temporal limitation, focus on "physical force," lack of a problematic exemplars list) and urged either that a more permissive vagueness standard applies in immigration or that §16(b) survives Johnson.
- The Supreme Court (plurality by Kagan, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor; Gorsuch concurring in judgment) applied Johnson and held §16(b) unconstitutionally vague; Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito dissented in various parts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dimaya) | Defendant's Argument (Sessions) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §16(b)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague when incorporated into the INA | §16(b), like ACCA’s residual clause, requires imagining an offense’s "ordinary case" and applying an indeterminate "substantial risk" standard—resulting in impermissible vagueness | §16(b) is materially different from ACCA: it limits risk to acts "in the course of" the offense, focuses on "physical force" (not any injury), lacks ACCA’s confusing exemplar list; deportation is civil so a relaxed vagueness standard should apply | Held: §16(b) is unconstitutionally vague (Johnson controls); judgment affirming Ninth Circuit (plurality opinion) |
| Proper vagueness standard in immigration/removal context (civil vs. criminal) | Deportation is a severe, quasi-punitive consequence; Jordan v. De George requires application of the criminal vagueness standard | Government urged a more tolerant civil vagueness standard because removal is civil | Held: criminal-level vagueness scrutiny applies in removal (plurality) |
| Whether §16(b) requires the categorical/ordinary‑case approach or a conduct‑based inquiry | Dimaya: §16(b) has been interpreted categorically and thus suffers the same defects Johnson found | Gov't (and Roberts): §16(b) should be read categorically; Justice Thomas urged abandoning the categorical approach and endorsing a conduct-based reading to avoid vagueness | Held: §16(b) properly read categorically—but that very approach renders it void for vagueness; Court rejected adopting conduct-based saving construction here |
| Whether Dimaya’s burglary convictions are covered by §16(b) | Even if some burglaries are nonviolent in practice, §16(b) is vague across ordinary-case inquiry and cannot sustain removal | Gov't argued burglary falls within §16(b) or that §16(b) is sufficiently clear to permit removal | Held: Court did not resolve further as to Dimaya on merits beyond the vagueness ruling; §16(b) invalidated so convictions cannot be relied on under that clause for removal |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. (2015) (ACCA residual clause was void for vagueness; identified the two fatal features: ordinary‑case inquiry + indeterminate risk threshold)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (§16 interpreted to direct focus to the offense of conviction rather than particular facts)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (articulated the "ordinary case" categorical inquiry for residual‑clause analysis)
- Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (deportation’s severity warrants application of exacting vagueness scrutiny)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (adopted the categorical approach for comparing prior convictions to generic offenses)
- Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (INA aggravated‑felony provisions may require assessing underlying conduct where statutory language indicates)
- Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009) (interpreting ACCA residual clause; cautioned against relying on post‑offense possibilities)
- Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011) (further ACCA residual‑clause jurisprudence illustrating interpretive difficulties)