Service Employees Internat. Union v. Woods CA4/2
E073677
| Cal. Ct. App. | Jul 15, 2021Background
- SEIU and its president Dave Regan sued former organizer Njoki Woods for slander per se after Woods gave a reporter (PaydayReport.com) multiple interviews alleging Regan drank at work, engaged in sexual misconduct/favoritism, threatened retaliation, pressured staff to support certain candidates, instructed staff to work with employers to fire critics, and tolerated racism.
- Elk’s article quoted Woods as the only named, attributed source; SEIU terminated Woods days after the article and then filed the defamation suit.
- Woods moved to strike the complaint under California’s anti‑SLAPP statute (§ 425.16). The trial court denied the motion, finding plaintiffs produced evidence showing a probability of prevailing on at least some defamatory statements.
- On appeal the court assumed (without deciding) the statements constituted protected activity, but affirmed the denial because SEIU/Regan made a prima facie showing sufficient to sustain a defamation judgment as to some statements (e.g., allegations that Regan was frequently drunk at work and that the union pressured staff to silence or fire critics).
- The court also found plaintiffs produced evidence supporting an inference of actual malice (motive/retaliation, disciplinary history, and witness declarations denying the alleged conduct), which would satisfy the higher burden if plaintiffs are public figures.
- The court rejected Woods’s argument that Baral required parsing each alleged statement separately where the anti‑SLAPP motion sought to strike the entire defamation cause of action.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Woods’s statements arise from protected petition/speech under § 425.16 | SEIU/Regan assumed protected for appeal but argued plaintiffs still must show probability of prevailing | Woods argued all challenged statements were protected and thus subject to anti‑SLAPP | Court assumed protected but resolved appeal on second prong; protection need not be decided to affirm |
| Whether plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of defamation (slander per se) | Regan/SEIU argued certain statements (drinking at work; pressuring to fire critics) are provably false and injurious to reputation/occupation | Woods conceded she made statements and contended they were true or nonactionable opinion | Court held plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to show a probability of prevailing on defamation as to some statements |
| Whether plaintiffs met the heightened actual‑malice standard (if public figures) | Plaintiffs produced circumstantial evidence (disputed facts, motive to retaliate, disciplinary history) supporting inference of knowing falsity or reckless disregard | Woods argued her statements were based on personal observations and therefore not made with actual malice | Court found plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of actual malice sufficient to defeat anti‑SLAPP (if required) |
| Whether Baral required discrete analysis of each alleged statement | Woods argued Baral mandates separate analysis of each act of alleged protected activity | Plaintiffs argued Baral does not bar denying a strike where plaintiff shows probability of prevailing on any part of the cause of action | Court explained Baral does not require granular parsing here where Woods sought to strike the entire cause of action; plaintiffs’ showing on any defamatory statements defeats the motion |
Key Cases Cited
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (clarifies anti‑SLAPP treatment when protected and unprotected acts are pleaded together)
- Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299 (anti‑SLAPP review: accept plaintiff evidence, do not weigh credibility)
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (actual malice standard for public officials/figures)
- Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter, 7 Cal.5th 781 (plaintiff must show probability of success at second prong)
- Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal.4th 811 (if plaintiff shows probability of prevailing on any part, entire cause stands)
- Annette F. v. Sharon S., 119 Cal.App.4th 1146 (circumstantial factors may support inference of actual malice)
- Regalia v. The Nethercutt Collection, 172 Cal.App.4th 361 (scope of slander per se)
- Wong v. Jing, 189 Cal.App.4th 1354 (defamation elements and provably false factual assertions)