SER Healthport Technologies and CAMC v. Hon. James C. Stucky, Judge
2017 WL 2332876
| W. Va. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Basil Crookshanks underwent treatment at CAMC and his counsel requested copies of his medical records from HealthPort (serving CAMC).
- HealthPort invoiced the law firm $4,463.43 (55¢/page plus tax/shipping); the law firm paid the invoice and did not seek immediate reimbursement from Crookshanks under their contingent-fee agreement.
- Crookshanks sued HealthPort and CAMC under the West Virginia Health Care Records Act alleging the per-page fee exceeded the statute’s cost-based limits and sought class certification.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing the claim was not ripe and Crookshanks lacked standing because he personally did not pay the invoice.
- The circuit court denied summary judgment; defendants petitioned the West Virginia Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction.
- The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding Crookshanks lacked standing (no injury-in-fact) because only his attorneys suffered the out-of-pocket expense; the case was ordered dismissed without prejudice. Justice Davis and Justice Workman dissented.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing — whether Crookshanks has an injury-in-fact to bring claim for allegedly excessive record fees | Crookshanks: he is the patient and his attorneys were his authorized agents; statutory enforcement is available to a patient so he may sue even though counsel paid the invoice | HealthPort/CAMC: Crookshanks did not pay and thus suffered no pocketbook injury; any liability to reimburse counsel is contingent and speculative | Held: No standing — Crookshanks suffered no concrete, particularized injury-in-fact; only his attorneys suffered an out-of-pocket loss |
| Ripeness — whether the claim is fit for adjudication now (raised by defendants below and in petition) | Crookshanks: records were requested, delivered, and a fee was charged and paid (by his counsel), so claim is ripe | HealthPort/CAMC: payment and liability are contingent; suit is premature | Court resolved case on standing (not ripeness), finding no justiciable controversy because plaintiff lacked injury-in-fact |
| Agency — whether an agent’s payment grants the principal standing to sue | Crookshanks: attorneys acted as authorized agents/representatives under the statutes and their payment should permit the patient to sue | HealthPort/CAMC: an agent’s payment does not create a concrete injury to the principal; agent’s injury does not transfer standing to plaintiff | Held: Agent’s payment does not confer standing on plaintiff absent a present, concrete injury to plaintiff |
| Statutory enforcement scope — who may enforce the Health Care Records Act | Crookshanks: statute permits enforcement by a patient or authorized agent/representative, so patient may sue even if agent paid | HealthPort/CAMC: statutory enforcement does not negate the constitutional standing requirement; a statutory right still requires a concrete injury | Held: Even though statute authorizes enforcement by a patient, constitutional standing requirements control; plaintiff lacked injury, so statute did not create jurisdiction here |
Key Cases Cited
- Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 213 W. Va. 80, 576 S.E.2d 807 (2002) (elements of standing in West Virginia)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (concrete injury requirement for Article III standing)
- Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296 (1998) (standing/ripeness principles cited)
- State ex rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W. Va. 314, 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977) (writ of prohibition standards)
- Kanawha County Pub. Library Bd. v. Bd. of Educ. of Cty. Of Kanawha, 231 W. Va. 386, 745 S.E.2d 424 (2013) (discussion of concrete adverseness and justiciability)