888 F.3d 549
1st Cir.2018Background
- Sepúlveda, a former Burger King assistant manager employed by Caribbean Restaurants, was assaulted in 2011 and diagnosed with PTSD and major depressive disorder.
- He requested a permanent fixed work schedule (no rotating shifts) and reassignment to a lower-crime location as ADA accommodations; Caribbean initially granted a temporary fixed schedule but later returned him to rotating shifts.
- Sepúlveda resigned in 2013 and sued under the ADA for (1) failure to reasonably accommodate and (2) retaliation/hostile work environment; Puerto Rico law claims were dismissed without prejudice below.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Caribbean, finding (a) rotating-shift ability was an essential function of the assistant manager job and (b) the alleged retaliatory acts were not materially adverse or pervasive.
- The First Circuit reviewed summary judgment de novo and affirmed the district court's dismissal of Sepúlveda’s ADA claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sepúlveda was a "qualified individual" under the ADA given his requested permanent fixed schedule | Sepúlveda: rotating shifts are not essential; permanent fixed scheduling was a reasonable accommodation that would allow him to perform essential functions | Caribbean: ability to work rotating shifts is essential for equal distribution of managerial coverage; job postings and application require scheduling flexibility | Held: Rotating-shift ability is an essential function; Sepúlveda was not a qualified individual for the position without the accommodation, so failure-to-accommodate claim fails |
| Whether Caribbean’s temporary grant of accommodation means rotating shifts were non-essential | Sepúlveda: granting the accommodation shows rotating shifts were non-essential | Caribbean: temporary accommodation does not concede non-essentiality and employers should not be penalized for exceeding ADA obligations | Held: Temporary accommodations do not negate an employer's position that a function is essential; Phelps logic applies, employer not punished for going beyond ADA |
| Whether Sepúlveda proved a prima facie ADA retaliation claim based on discrete acts (reprimands, insults, scheduling changes, forcing paid leave, being told to stay late, humiliation) | Sepúlveda: each incident (and cumulatively) was materially adverse and would deter a reasonable employee from making an ADA complaint | Caribbean: incidents were minor, routine supervisory actions, legitimate health/safety compliance, or inadequately supported and therefore not materially adverse | Held: Individual incidents were not materially adverse; collectively they did not amount to a severe or pervasive hostile work environment—retaliation claim fails |
| Whether there was an adverse employment action when Caribbean placed Sepúlveda on paid leave for an expired health certificate | Sepúlveda: placement on paid leave was retaliatory and adverse | Caribbean: leave was required by health regulations and non-punitive; employer compliance with safety rules justified action | Held: Placement on paid vacation for health-certificate reasons was not materially adverse given regulatory context |
Key Cases Cited
- Medina–Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132 (1st Cir. 2013) (courts must follow substantively correct law even when sympathy exists)
- Lang v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 813 F.3d 447 (1st Cir. 2016) (definition of "qualified individual" under ADA)
- Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002) (essential-function inquiry is fact-specific; courts defer to employer judgments)
- Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2001) (essential functions may include idiosyncratic job characteristics)
- Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (scheduling flexibility can be essential)
- Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 1998) (rotating shifts held essential for hospital staffing)
- Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001) (employers should not be penalized for providing accommodations beyond ADA requirements)
- Valle-Arce v. P.R. Ports Auth., 651 F.3d 190 (1st Cir. 2011) (retaliation claims may succeed even if discrimination claim fails)
- Freadman v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2007) (elements of prima facie retaliation)
- Carmona-Rivera v. Puerto Rico, 464 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2006) (retaliation requires materially adverse action under Burlington)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (retaliation standard: materially adverse actions deter reasonable employees)
- Colón-Fontánez v. Municipality of San Juan, 660 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2011) (petty slights and isolated incidents do not ordinarily establish adverse action)
