Seneca Resources Corp. v. Township of Highland
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12716
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Seneca Resources sought to convert a natural gas well in Highland Township, PA into a Class II injection well to store fracking waste; Highland had enacted a 2013 ordinance later amended by a 2015 "Community Bill of Rights" banning such waste disposal and recognizing rights for ecosystems.
- Seneca sued the Township and Board of Supervisors challenging the ordinance; the Township was represented by CELDF; CELDF-drafted ordinance recognized ecosystem rights and attempted to strip corporate personhood and preemption defenses.
- Appellants (Crystal Spring Ecosystem, Highland Township Municipal Authority, and CACHE), represented by CELDF, moved to intervene to defend the ordinance; the District Court denied intervention for failure to show inadequate representation.
- After a Board vacancy and settlement negotiations, the Board repealed the Community Bill of Rights and entered a consent decree with Seneca; the District Court adopted stipulated findings that major portions of the ordinance were invalid/unconstitutional.
- Appellants moved for reconsideration of the denial of intervention and of the consent decree adoption; the District Court denied relief. Appellants appealed four orders. The Third Circuit held the intervention claim moot, affirmed denial of reconsideration as not an abuse of discretion, and dismissed remaining appeals for lack of jurisdiction because Appellants were nonparties without standing to appeal the consent decree.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether proposed intervenors could intervene to defend the repealed ordinance | Appellants: they have a protectable interest in defending the Community Bill of Rights and therefore intervention as of right is warranted | Township/Seneca: ordinance repeal moots intervention; Township adequately represented their interests earlier | Moot: intervention to defend ordinance is moot after repeal; Appellants cannot revive it |
| Whether changed Board composition made Township inadequate representative for intervention | Appellants: new supervisor opposed defending the ordinance, creating inadequate representation | Township: settlement/repeal permissible; prior defense adequate and settlement does not ipso facto make representation inadequate | Denial of reconsideration not an abuse of discretion; Appellants failed to show inadequate representation |
| Whether Appellants could intervene to challenge District Court’s adoption of portions of the Consent Decree | Appellants: adoption of stipulated findings (¶13(a)-(g)) effectively decides legality of their claimed rights and binds them, so they must be allowed to intervene | Defendants: Appellants are nonparties; the consent decree does not bind or prejudice nonparties; no estoppel/stare decisis/contractual or contempt consequences | Denied: Consent decree does not impair Appellants’ legal interests; no sufficient protectable interest to justify intervention |
| Whether Appellants may appeal the Consent Decree adoption | Appellants: denial of intervention was improper, so they should be able to appeal the consent decree | Defendants: because Appellants are nonparties, they lack standing to appeal a consent decree that does not bind them | Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: Appellants are nonparties and lack Article III standing to appeal the consent decree |
Key Cases Cited
- Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964 (3d Cir. 1998) (standard for intervention as of right: significantly protectable interest and inadequate representation)
- Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992) (settling party may choose consent decree; settlement alone does not establish inadequate representation)
- Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986) (intervenor’s ability to continue suit depends on Article III standing if original party does not appeal)
- Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011) (district court opinions are not binding precedent on other courts)
- Brown v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 350 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2003) (mootness requires an ongoing case or controversy at all stages of review)