Sellars v. Evans, 293 Ga. 346

Background

In Feb. 1998 Evans and two others assaulted Aretha Perkins in a residence; Evans had and used a handgun during the beating.
After beating her inside, the assailants dragged or carried Perkins out the front door and continued to beat her on the ground outside, then left in a car.
Evans was convicted by jury of kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated assault, and related offenses; convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
Evans filed a second habeas petition in 2009 relying on Garza v. State, which set four factors to evaluate whether movement met the asportation element for kidnapping (movement must be more than "merely incidental").
The habeas court granted relief as to the kidnapping with bodily injury conviction, finding the movement was short, incidental to the assault, an inherent part of the assault, and did not place Perkins in greater danger.
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the habeas court, concluding the movement was merely incidental to the aggravated assault and did not satisfy Garza asportation factors.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the victim's movement satisfied the asportation element of kidnapping under Garza	Evans (via petitioner) argued Garza requires consideration of four factors and that the facts showed movement was more than merely incidental	Warden (State) argued movement was part of the aggravated assault, not separate asportation that increased isolation or danger	Court held movement was merely incidental to the aggravated assault and did not meet Garza asportation requirements; kidnapping conviction set aside
Whether movement presented independent danger or isolated the victim	Evans argued the dragging/transportation created independent danger and isolation	State argued victim was never isolated or exposed to additional danger beyond the ongoing assault	Held that the movement did not significantly increase danger or isolate the victim from rescue
Whether movement was an inherent part of the separate offense (aggravated assault)	Evans argued movement could be independent from the assault	State argued movement occurred as part of a continuous beating inside and outside, i.e., inherent to the assault	Held movement was an inherent part of the aggravated assault
Whether Garza applies retroactively to offenses before 2009	Evans relied on Garza to challenge pre-2009 conviction	State acknowledged Garza was retroactively applicable because it was a substantive change	Held Garza applied retroactively; court analyzed other factors under Garza and still found no asportation

Key Cases Cited

Garza v. State, 284 Ga. 696 (establishing four-factor test for asportation; movement must be more than "merely incidental")
Evans v. State, 240 Ga. App. 215 (direct appeal of convictions)
Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 902 (noting satisfaction of all four Garza factors is not required)
Henderson v. State, 285 Ga. 240 (kidnapping statute aimed at movement that substantially isolates victim)
In the Interest of A. B., 296 Ga. App. 350 (movement held inherent to robbery and aggravated assault)
Hammond v. State, 289 Ga. 142 (substantive changes in case law can be retroactive)