Segal v. State
2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 17441
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2012Background
- Appellant was convicted of grand theft for a contract to construct kitchen cabinets following a deposit from the homeowner.
- The contract, signed July 10, 2007, contemplated 30-inch cabinets; the homeowner paid $3,879 to appellant personally (endorsed to his mother’s account).
- Appellant failed to perform by not installing cabinets or removing the drop ceiling as promised; communication deteriorated after signing.
- The homeowner removed the drop ceiling and prepared the site; appellant later claimed health-related absence and claimed some cabinet modifications were rejected.
- Evidence showed funds moving from appellant’s mother’s account to rent and to appellant’s company; some checks were returned for insufficient funds; no cabinets were installed.
- On appeal, the court held the state failed to prove felonious intent at the time of taking and reversed, directing vacation of the conviction and sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the state proved felonious intent at taking | Segal argues the evidence shows a contractual undertaking with nonperformance rather than intent to steal | State contends it was continuing theft or misrepresentation to induce the deposit | No felonious intent proved; conviction vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. State, 453 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (distinguishes intent when some performance occurs vs. none)
- Martin v. State, 379 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (no felonious intent where deposit used civilly and some performance not undertaken)
- Brewer v. State, 413 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (conduct after taking indicates intent to steal; no performance evidenced)
- Yerrick v. State, 979 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (partial performance negates felonious intent)
- Adams v. State, 443 So.2d 1003 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (no felonious intent where ongoing business failed and no concealment)
- Stramaglia v. State, 603 So.2d 536 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (intent must exist at time of taking; future act promised may not suffice)
