Martin v. StateMartin v. State
Appellant appeals his conviction by a jury of the offense of grand theft. We reverse.
The information charged an offense under
“JOHN LEE MARTIN, on the 25th day of July, 1978 in the state and county aforesaid did unlawfully and feloniously obtain and use $200.00 cash of D.M. Brooks with the intent to deprive D.M. Brooks of a right to the cash or a benefit therefrom and to appropriate the cash to defendant‘s own use, contrary to
Florida Statutes 812.014 .”
Appellant agreed to partially construct a small building for P.M. Brooks on property owned by Brooks. The agreement called for a down payment of $200.00, and payment of the sum of $150.00, plus delivery to appellant of a steam pressure washer on completion of the building. All materials to be used in the partial construction were to be furnished by appellant. A written memorandum briefly setting out the terms was signed by the parties on July 15, 1978, and Brooks’ son gave appellant a check for $200.00 on that date, which appellant promptly took and cashed at a nearby store. Although Brooks and his son testified the $200.00 was advanced to appellant to buy materials, both the written agreement and the check referred to the sum of $200.00 as a down payment.
The written agreement made no mention of the time for commencement of construction or completion of the building. Appellant had no materials delivered to the job site, never began construction, nor has he returned the $200.00 down payment. Testimony of Brooks and his son established that appellant was to begin construction one or two days after the payment of $200.00 and signing of the memorandum. Toward the middle or latter part of August 1978, Brooks had a telephone conversation with appellant in which appellant renewed his promise to start and complete the building within the next ten days or so, which was agreeable to Brooks. However, before appellant made any move to begin construction, and without any further contact from Brooks or demand for return of the down payment, a warrant for arrest of appellant on charge of grand theft was issued, and this prosecution began.
Appellant testified in his own defense that Brooks understood that he was working on another job at the time he made the agreement which would prevent him from starting immediately; that he fully intended to perform the contract, but had remained otherwise occupied on other business; that contrary to the testimony of
Appellant relies for reversal upon his contention that his motions for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State‘s case, and at the conclusion of all testimony, should have been granted, relying primarily upon Ricard v. State, 181 So.2d 677 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1966), and Edwards v. State, 226 So.2d 140 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1969). In Ricard the State proved that the victim gave the defendant money to open an account in Jamaica for the purpose of aiding the victim‘s Cuban husband in his attempt to obtain a visa to that island. The victim later discovered the money was not needed and demanded its return. The money had not been deposited in the bank in Jamaica, but defendant concealed this fact from her, and even prepared in her presence a “fake” cablegram for transmission to the Jamaica bank, although there was no equipment for sending cables in defendant‘s office at that time. No money was ever sent to a bank in Jamaica. Defendant testified that it was impossible to send money to Jamaica, and that he instead used a correspondent in Mexico City, to whom he sent the money. Later it developed that he was unable to contact his correspondent in Mexico City. In reversing Ricard‘s conviction, the court determined that since the evidence upon which the State relied proved only that the defendant received the money, and that no bank account was ever opened, the evidence was insufficient to establish defendant‘s guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, there being no proof that the defendant appropriated the money to his own use, or that of another person other than the true owner.
Similarly, in Edwards v. State, supra, several persons gave the defendant money for the purpose of acquiring a radio station. A corporation was to be formed and the monies were to be deposited into a corporate bank account by the defendant. The State proved that the money was given to the defendant, and that no bank account was ever opened. However, there was no proof that defendant had expended any of the money. It was held that the State failed to establish a prima facie case of grand larceny, and the court therefore reversed the conviction, holding that the lower court should have granted the motion for directed verdict at the close of the State‘s case.
Although the proof in the instant case may be said to suffer from the same deficiency as in the Ricard and Edwards cases, we find other authorities upon which to base reversal of the conviction. We first note that under the amendments to the larceny statute,
As in Youngker v. State, 215 So.2d 318 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), the evidence here
We also find the evidence insufficient to constitute a crime under the theory of “conversion“, or “embezzlement“, or crimes of a like nature. In Berney v. State, 38 So.2d 55 (Fla. 1948), a case factually similar to this one, the evidence proved that defendant entered into a written contract to supply all materials and labor to erect a completed building according to certain plans and specifications. Under the contract, an initial payment of $2,500.00 became due on the date of signing. Pursuant to the contract the contracting party paid to defendant the sum of $1,135.00 as a part of the initial payment, upon the representation that defendant would use the money for the purpose of purchasing steel to be used in the building. Instead of purchasing the steel, the defendant pocketed the sum advanced and disappeared without returning the money, furnishing materials to or commencing work on the building. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed defendant‘s conviction of embezzlement, stating, among other things:
“The State has failed to prove that the money was property belonging to the prosecuting witness, because under the facts of the case the money paid over did not retain its character as property of the prosecuting witness after it had been placed in the hands of the appellant, but became, in law, the property of the appellant as partial payment on the contract; ...” (opinion page 57)
In view of the insufficiency of the proof, under the foregoing authorities, we reverse appellant‘s conviction of grand theft. It becomes unnecessary for us to consider the remaining point on appeal.
The judgment of conviction and sentence appealed from are hereby reversed, and appellant is ordered discharged.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
Notes
“A person is guilty of theft if he knowingly obtains or uses or endeavors to obtain or use the property of another with intent,
A. To deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit therefrom, or
B. To appropriate the property to his own use or to the use of any other person not entitled thereto.
* * * * * *
“The intention to commit grand theft, that is to feloniously appropriate another‘s property to his own use or to deprive the owner permanently of his property, is a question of fact to be determined by the jury and is an essential element in the crime of grand theft.”