Seed Company Limited v. Westerman, Hattori, Daniels & Adrian, LLP, 961 F.3d 1190

Seed Company filed U.S., PCT, and Japanese patent applications for a dispensing-tape device; the U.S. application was contested by Stevens.
Armstrong Westerman (the original firm) failed to file an English translation and an affidavit for the PCT application, leading to loss on appeal (Stevens) and rejection of Seed’s patent.
The original firm split into Westerman (continued representing Seed) and Kratz; James Armstrong (now at Kratz) advised Seed by email to sue Westerman and gave advice about the malpractice statute of limitations.
Seed sued both Westerman and Kratz for legal malpractice (Count I against both for failing to file the translation/affidavit; Count II against Westerman for post-decision advice; Counts III–IV alleged Armstrong’s advice caused loss of Count I against Kratz).
On prior appeal the D.C. Circuit held Count I time-barred as to Kratz but not Westerman, allowed Count I to proceed against Westerman, and remanded Counts II–IV for further consideration.
On remand the district court dismissed Count II as waived by Seed and granted summary judgment to Kratz on Counts III and IV; the D.C. Circuit affirms.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Seed waived damages asserted in Count II	Seed says it only waived damages tied to lost settlement opportunities, not damages for being "lulled" into losing claims vs. Kratz	Westerman says Seed broadly waived all Count II damages in district-court briefing	Waiver was broad and unqualified; district court did not abuse discretion in dismissing Count II
Whether Armstrong's advice was the but-for cause of losing Count I against Kratz (Counts III–IV)	Seed says Armstrong’s statute-of-limitations advice misled it about accrual and thus caused the late filing against Kratz	Kratz says Armstrong’s advice related only to Westerman and could not be the cause of losing claims vs. Kratz	A reasonable jury could find but-for causation (factual dispute exists)
Whether Armstrong’s advice was the proximate (foreseeable) cause of losing Count I against Kratz	Seed contends Armstrong should have foreseen that its advice would affect timing of suits against all defendants	Kratz argues loss as to Kratz was not a foreseeable result of advice about Westerman and later events (new counsel, tolling failures) were intervening	No reasonable jury could find proximate causation; loss to Kratz was not a foreseeable consequence and intervening acts break causation — summary judgment for Kratz affirmed

Seed Co. v. Westerman, 832 F.3d 325 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (prior panel decision addressing statute-of-limitations and remanding Counts III–IV)
Stevens v. Tamai, 366 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Federal Circuit decision rejecting Seed’s patent due to missing translation/affidavit)
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (U.S. 1993) (definition of waiver as intentional relinquishment)
Martin v. Ross, 6 A.3d 860 (D.C. 2010) (elements of legal malpractice claim)
Convit v. Wilson, 980 A.2d 1104 (D.C. 2009) (proximate cause requires foreseeability in malpractice)
Dalo v. Kivitz, 596 A.2d 35 (D.C. 1991) (intervening acts/superseding cause can break causation)
Majeska v. District of Columbia, 812 A.2d 948 (D.C. 2002) (proximate-cause can be resolved as a matter of law when evidence cannot support a rational finding)