Sears v. Humphrey, 294 Ga. 117

Sears was convicted in 1993 of kidnapping with bodily injury and armed robbery related to the Wilbur killing, and sentenced to death for kidnapping and a life term for armed robbery.
The kidnapping sentence was based on aggravating circumstances, including commission during the capital felony of murder; Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence.
Sears filed a 2000 habeas petition; a 2006 evidentiary hearing occurred and a 2008 order denied relief, which the U.S. Supreme Court later vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
On remand, a new habeas judge conducted proceedings culminating in an August 16, 2011 order adopting parts of the 2008 order but denying relief on ineffective assistance claims, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.
Sears challenges trial counsel’s sentencing-phase performance, arguing deficient investigation into mitigation and prejudice under Strickland; the habeas court and the Georgia Supreme Court rejected these claims.
The Georgia Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the denial of relief, holding no reasonable probability that any additional mitigating evidence would have changed the death verdict.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Mandate scope and effect on review	Sears contends the habeas court violated the Supreme Court's mandate by reanalyzing trial counsel's performance.	State contends no binding mandate prevented reweighing and analysis on remand.	Mandate not binding to foreclose reweighing and review.
Prejudice under Strickland in the sentencing phase	Sears claims trial counsel's mitigation investigation and testimony were deficient and prejudicial.	State argues any deficiency did not prejudice the outcome given the record evidence.	Sears failed to show a reasonable probability that death would be avoided if counsel acted differently.
Reasonableness of trial counsel's mitigation strategy	Mitigating evidence from Sears' background and potential experts would have changed the jury's view.	Counsel's strategy was reasonable given evidence and risks, including Sabel rule considerations.	Counsel's strategy was reasonable and did not prejudice the outcome.
Weight and admissibility of habeas-affidavit evidence	New habeas evidence should be weighed as mitigating; affidavits should be credited.	Affidavits contain hearsay and speculation; reliability and record support matter.	New evidence weighed and found not to establish prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. (1984)) (two-prong test: deficient performance and prejudice)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (U.S. (2003)) ( Strickland prejudice analysis in mitigating evidence context)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. (2000)) (foundational Strickland prejudice framework and review standards)
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (U.S. (2009)) (mitigating evidence and prejudice considerations in capital cases)
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (U.S. (2005)) (omitted mitigating evidence; limits and prejudice evaluation)
Sochor v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 685 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2012) (indicates complexity of weighing mitigation on prejudice)
Porter v. McCollum, in-text citation present above (11th Cir. 2010) (see above)
Humphrey v. Nance, 293 Ga. 189 (Ga. 2013) (state habeas evidence standards and mitigation considerations)
DeYoung v. Schofield, 609 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2010) (mitigating evidence evaluation in capital cases)