Seaport Studios, Inc. v. Russell W. Waldo v. Randall S. Saunders, 245 A.3d 1231

Seaport Studios sued JHRW and others in 2009 over parking-space, quiet-enjoyment, and deed issues; JHRW counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint naming Seaport officers Randall and Jean Saunders.
At a May 23, 2016 proceeding the parties signed a stipulation dismissing all claims; final judgment entered May 27, 2016 dismissing Seaport’s claims with prejudice.
On May 22, 2017 Randall Saunders filed a pro se Rule 60 motion seeking to vacate the judgment; the hearing justice later determined a corporation cannot appear pro se and denied that motion without prejudice.
On November 27, 2018 Seaport (through counsel) moved under Rule 60(b)(6) (alternatively (b)(5)) to vacate, alleging prior counsel exceeded authority and that the “with prejudice” dismissal was a mistake.
At a February 4, 2019 hearing the trial justice—who presided over the original proceedings and a related injunction hearing—found Seaport had notice of the judgment’s terms and that its two-and-a-half year delay was unreasonable, and denied the motion as untimely.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, holding the denial was within the trial justice’s discretionary authority and that Seaport’s timeliness excuses were insufficient.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of Seaport's Rule 60(b)(5)/(6) motion	Motion was timely because filed within a year after retaining new counsel and earlier pro se filing by Saunders showed Seaport discovered the issue sooner	2.5-year delay was unreasonable; Seaport had notice from related proceedings and the history of the dispute	Motion was not filed within a reasonable time; denial affirmed (trial justice acted within discretion)
Validity of Saunders' May 2017 pro se motion	Seaport points to earlier pro se filing to support timeliness/earlier discovery	Corporations cannot appear pro se; pro se filing on behalf of Seaport was invalid	Pro se motion by Saunders was invalid; cannot cure timeliness issue
Entitlement to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for counsel’s alleged excess of authority	Seaport asserted prior counsel acted beyond authority and entered stipulation contrary to client instructions, warranting extraordinary relief	The record (stipulation read in court, subsequent related hearings) shows Seaport had notice; the circumstances do not justify extraordinary relief	Court did not grant relief; judge found Seaport’s explanations unpersuasive and denied motion as untimely
Standard of review for Rule 60(b) denial	N/A	N/A	Denial reviewed for abuse of discretion; Supreme Court concluded no abuse of discretion

JHRW, LLC v. Seaport Studios, Inc., 212 A.3d 168 (R.I. 2019) (related decision setting out underlying facts and parties)
Allen v. South County Hospital, 945 A.2d 289 (R.I. 2008) (Rule 60(b) relief is discretionary and reviewed for abuse of discretion)
Keystone Elevator Co. v. Johnson & Wales University, 850 A.2d 912 (R.I. 2004) (same standard for appellate review of Rule 60(b) denials)
In re Quigley, 21 A.3d 393 (R.I. 2011) (factors for whether a Rule 60(b) motion was filed within a reasonable time)
Farm Credit Bank of Baltimore v. Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2003) (reasonableness inquiry for Rule 60(b) timing)
Mobile Homeowners Rights, Inc. v. Mobile Village, Inc., 736 A.2d 98 (R.I. 1999) (corporations may not appear pro se)