Scrivener v. Clark College, 334 P.3d 541

Kathryn Scrivener, a 55‑year‑old long‑term instructor at Clark College, applied for two tenure‑track English positions in 2005–06; she met the advertised qualifications but was not hired.
Clark College hired two candidates under age 40; President Branch and interim VP Thornburg made final hiring decisions and ranked Scrivener last among finalists.
Scrivener sued under Washington’s Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), RCW 49.60, alleging age discrimination; the trial court granted summary judgment for Clark College and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Evidence offered by Scrivener included President Branch’s public statements favoring “younger talent,” advocacy of hiring candidates with no experience, a higher rate of hires under 40, and alleged mocking conduct toward Scrivener during the interview process.
Clark College relied on nondiscriminatory explanations: the selected candidates were a better “fit,” Scrivener’s teaching demonstration had weaknesses, and age was not discussed during deliberations.
The Washington Supreme Court reviewed whether Scrivener met the McDonnell Douglas pretext burden at summary judgment and whether the Court of Appeals applied the correct standard.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proper pretext standard at summary judgment under WLAD/McDonnell Douglas	Pretext can be shown either by proving the employer’s reasons are false or by showing discrimination was a substantial motivating factor	Court of Appeals required plaintiff to disprove that employer’s stated reasons were motivating factors, excluding the substantial‑factor route	The Court clarified plaintiff may meet pretext by (1) showing the employer’s reasons are pretextual or (2) showing discrimination was a substantial motivating factor; Court of Appeals erred by omitting the latter
Whether Scrivener created a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment	Circumstantial evidence (Branch’s public statements about needing younger talent, hiring patterns favoring <40, mocking/‘youthfulness’ remarks, ambiguous reasons for rejection) permits a reasonable jury to find age was a substantial factor	College’s proffered reasons (better fit of hires, observed weaknesses in Scrivener’s demo, leadership over‑40 majority) show legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons and no age‑based decisionmaking	Court held Scrivener presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact; reversed summary judgment and remanded for trial

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (establishes burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination claims)
Mackay v. Acorn Custom Cabinetry, Inc., 127 Wn.2d 302 (WLAD: plaintiff must prove age was a "substantial factor," not necessarily the sole or determining cause)
Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138 (summary judgment seldom appropriate in employment discrimination cases; burden of production standard)
Hume v. Am. Disposal Co., 124 Wn.2d 656 (applying McDonnell Douglas framework in Washington state law context)
Reid v. Google, Inc., 50 Cal.4th 512 (rejects categorical exclusion of "stray" remarks; such comments can be circumstantial evidence of intent)