Scott v. State
299 Ga. 568
| Ga. | 2016Background
- Jack Scott was indicted (Jan. 2015) on two counts under OCGA § 16-12-100.2(e) for allegedly sexually explicit online communications with a person he knew or believed to be under 16 (late 2013).
- Scott filed a general demurrer arguing subsection (e) is facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment; trial court denied demurrer but granted certificate of immediate review for interlocutory appeal.
- Georgia Supreme Court granted interlocutory review solely on the First Amendment overbreadth question.
- Subsection (e)(1) criminalizes online "contact" with a known/believed child (under 16) involving "explicit verbal descriptions or narrative accounts" of four defined categories (sexually explicit nudity; sexual conduct; sexual excitement; sadomasochistic abuse) "that is intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of either the child or the person."
- Court construed the statute to require (1) contact via Internet/computer with someone known/believed to be <16 involving the listed verbal descriptions and (2) a specific intent that the contact be intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of either the accused or the child.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether OCGA § 16-12-100.2(e)(1) is facially overbroad under the First Amendment | Scott: statute criminalizes a substantial amount of protected speech (overbroad) and chills expression | State: statute targets unprotected child-exploitative speech and can be construed to avoid overbreadth | Held: Not facially overbroad when read to require specific intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desire of accused or child; demurrer denied |
| Proper construction of the clause "that is intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of either the child or the person" | Scott: clause ambiguous and could be read broadly to apply to content rather than contact | State: clause should limit statute to sexually motivated contact with minors | Held: Clause modifies the prohibited "contact" (mens rea), narrowing the statute to require specific intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desire |
| Whether statute sweeps into protected adult-to-adult communications incidentally accessible to minors (Reno concern) | Scott: statute could chill constitutionally protected adult speech exposed to minors | State: specific intent and knowledge/belief about victim's age prevent such overreach | Held: Specific intent and knowledge requirement prevent substantial chill of protected speech akin to Reno |
| Whether innocent or socially valuable speech could be criminalized (e.g., educational or parental communications) | Scott: text could catch innocuous communications because categories are broad | State: specific intent element excludes innocuous communications | Held: Specific intent requirement forecloses prosecution of innocuous or socially valuable speech in a real and substantial way |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564 (First Amendment content‑based restrictions require exacting scrutiny)
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (overbreadth doctrine; upholding child‑pornography pandering statute with mens rea limits)
- Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (invalidating overbroad prohibitions on virtual child pornography and pandering)
- Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (Internet speech restrictions invalid where they suppress large amounts of adult protected speech)
- Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (obscenity definition and standards)
- New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (government may categorically prohibit child pornography)
- Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (state interest in protecting children from sexual materials)
- Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (overbreadth doctrine and its limited application)
- Stevens v. United States, 559 U.S. 460 (overbreadth requires substantial number of unconstitutional applications relative to legitimate sweep)