Scott v. Scott
2017 UT 66
| Utah | 2017Background
- Jillian Scott (Wife) and Bradley Scott (Husband) divorced in 2006. The decree provided alimony ($6,000/month for 25 years) and stated alimony terminates upon the former spouse’s remarriage or cohabitation.
- In 2011 Husband moved to terminate alimony, alleging Wife had cohabited with her ex-boyfriend J.O. from approximately February 2011; the relationship had ended months before Husband filed the motion.
- The district court found Wife and J.O. had cohabited and ordered Wife to repay alimony from December 22, 2010 onward.
- On appeal the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed, interpreting Utah Code § 30-3-5(10) to allow termination based on past cohabitation (reading “is cohabitating” to permit proof that the spouse had been cohabiting at an earlier time).
- The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the present-tense phrase "is cohabitating" requires ongoing cohabitation at the time the paying spouse files to terminate alimony, and to address preservation and attorney-fee issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Scott) | Defendant's Argument (Scott) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 30-3-5(10) requires ongoing cohabitation at time of filing | "Is cohabitating" is present tense; alimony terminates only if cohabitation exists at filing | Statute should be read in context to allow termination based on established past cohabitation; practical concerns justify reading "is" more broadly | Court held the statute requires present/ongoing cohabitation at time of filing; reversed lower court’s cohabitation-based termination because Husband did not meet that burden |
| Whether the Court of Appeals could resolve an arguably unpreserved statutory argument | Preservation preserved by prior briefing; plain-language issue was presented on appeal | Husband argued Wife failed to preserve the present-tense argument, so appeals court should not have reached it | Court explained appellees must meaningfully explain why review of an unpreserved issue should be declined; here it was not apparent the Court of Appeals erred in reaching the issue, so Supreme Court addressed the merits |
| Whether defending a motion to terminate alimony permits fee award under Utah Code § 30-3-3 | Fees statute applies only to actions to establish or enforce alimony orders, not to defend a termination motion | Husband sought no fees; statute doesn’t cover defense of termination actions | Court held § 30-3-3 does not authorize attorney fees for defending a petition to terminate alimony |
Key Cases Cited
- Patterson v. Patterson, 266 P.3d 828 (Utah 2011) (discussing when appellate courts may reach unpreserved statutory issues)
- Nichols v. Jacobsen Constr. Co., 374 P.3d 3 (Utah 2016) (standard of review for Court of Appeals decisions on certiorari)
- Bagley v. Bagley, 387 P.3d 1000 (Utah 2016) (primary rule to ascertain legislative intent from plain statutory language)
- Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010) (use of verb tense aids statutory temporal interpretation)
- Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (statutory tense indicates temporal reach)
- First Equity Fed., Inc. v. Phillips Dev., L.C., 52 P.3d 1137 (Utah 2002) (appellate courts may affirm on any ground apparent in the record)
