24 F.4th 508
6th Cir.2022Background
- Plaintiff Scott Tomei is deaf and uses ASL; after a fall he sought treatment at Parkwest Hospital and requested an interpreter, which Parkwest did not provide.
- Parkwest provided only a Video Remote Interpreting (VRI) device that failed due to connectivity; medical staff did not obtain effective interpretation during care, including after surgery for blood clots.
- Tomei later sought care at a different hospital that provided in-person interpreters; he underwent additional surgery and ultimately had nearly one-third of his leg amputated—told that earlier interpreter access might have avoided amputation.
- About 15 months after the initial denial, Tomei sued Parkwest and Covenant Health under §1557 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), alleging disability discrimination for failure to accommodate.
- Defendants moved to dismiss as time-barred, arguing that the Rehabilitation Act’s state-borrowed statute of limitations (Tennessee’s 1-year personal-injury bar) applies; the district court denied dismissal, applying the federal 4-year statute under 28 U.S.C. §1658(a), and certified the question for interlocutory appeal.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed: the claim “arises under” the ACA (enacted after 1990), and no ACA text or incorporated “enforcement mechanisms” supply a shorter limitations period, so the federal 4-year statute governs.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tomei's claim "arises under" the ACA §1557 or the pre-1990 Rehabilitation Act | Tomei: He sued under §1557 (ACA); the cause of action is created by the ACA, so it arises under the ACA | Parkwest: Because §1557 cross-references the Rehabilitation Act, and a similar claim could have been brought under the Rehab Act, the claim arises under the Rehabilitation Act | The court: Claim arises under the ACA—the suit is grounded in the statute that creates the cause of action, so §1658(a) may apply |
| Whether any federal law (ACA or its cross-reference to the Rehabilitation Act) provides a different statute of limitations (i.e., borrow state 1-year limit) | Tomei: ACA contains no stated limitations period and its reference to Rehab Act "enforcement mechanisms" imports remedies/processes, not state statutes of limitations; thus 28 U.S.C. §1658(a) four-year period applies | Parkwest: §1557 incorporates Rehabilitation Act enforcement, which courts have treated as borrowing state statutes of limitations (so Tennessee's 1-year rule applies) | The court: "Enforcement mechanisms" means means of compelling compliance (remedies/processes), not borrowing state statutes of limitations; no ACA limitations clause exists, so the federal four-year statute applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (establishing that a suit "arises under" the statute that creates the cause of action)
- Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (interpreting the "made possible" test for post-1990 statutory amendments and §1658 application)
- McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654 (Rehabilitation Act claims borrow state statutes of limitations)
- Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d 235 (defining "enforcement mechanisms" as tools for compelling compliance)
- Vega-Ruiz v. Northwell Health, 992 F.3d 61 (ACA imposes different/higher standards than the Rehabilitation Act; claims grounded in ACA)
- Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (recognizing private right of action and remedies under the Rehabilitation Act)
- Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Loc. No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (commentary on historical inquiry into pre-existing causes of action)