delivered the opinion of the .court.
This is a suit begun in a state court, removed to the United States Court, and then, on motion to remand by the plaintiff, dismissed by the latter court, on the ground that the cause of action arose undеr the patent laws of the United States, that the state court had no jurisdiction, and that therefore the one to which it was removed had none. There is a proper certificate and the case comes here direct from the District Court.
Of course the questiоn depends upon the plaintiff’s declaration.
The Fair
v.
Kohler Die Co.,
It is evident that the claim for damages is bаsed upon conduct, or, more specifically, language, tending to persuade the public to withdraw its custom from the plaintiff and having that effect to its damage. Such .conduct having such effect is equally actionable whether it produces the result by persuasiоn, by threats or by falsehood, Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Massachusetts, 485, 487, and it is enough to allege and prove the conduct and effect, leaving the defendant to justify if he can. If the conduct complained of is persuasion, it may be justified by the fact that the defendant is a competitor, or by good faith and reasonable grounds. If it is a statement of fact, it may be justified, absolutely or with qualifications, by proof that the statement is true. But all such justifications are defences and raise issues that are no part of the. plaintiff’s case. In the present instancе it is part of the plaintiff’s case that it had a business to be damaged; whether built up by patеnts or without them does not matter. It is no part of it to prove anything concerning the defendants’ patent or that the plaintiff did not infringe the same — still less to prove anything concerning any patent of its own. The material statement complained of is that the- plaintiff infringes — which may be true notwithstanding the plaintiff’s patent. That is merely a piece of evidence. Furthermore, the damage alleged presumably is rather the consequence of the threat to sue than of the statement that the plaintiff’s pump infringed the defendants’ rights.
A suit for damages to business caused by a threat to sue under the patent law is not itself a suit under the рatent law. And the same is true when the damage is caused by a statement of fact — that the defendant has a *260 patent which is infringed. What makes the defendants’ act a wrong is its manifest tendency to injure the plaintiff’s business and the wrong is the same whatever the means by which it is accomplished. But whether it is a wrong or not depends upon the law of the State where the аct is done, not upon the patent law, and therefore the suit arises under the law of thе State. A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action. The fact that the justification may involve the validity and infringement of a patent is no more material tо the question under what law the suit is brought than it would be in an action of contract. If the State аdopted for civil proceedings the saying of the old criminal law: the greater the truth thе greater the libel, the validity of the patent would not come in question at all. In Massachusetts the truth would not be a defence if the statement was made from disinterested malevоlence. Rev. Laws, c. 173, § 91. The State is master of the whole matter, and if it saw fit to do away with аctions of this type altogether, no one, we imagine, would suppose that they still could be maintained under the patent laws of the United States.
Judgment reversed.
