Scott Hitch v. State of Indiana
2016 Ind. LEXIS 263
| Ind. | 2016Background
- Hitch and Bruce cohabited Jan–Aug 2013; Bruce briefly moved back in temporarily in Oct. 2013 and an altercation occurred during which Bruce alleged Hitch grabbed her neck and pushed on top of her. Bruce sought medical attention for neck pain.
- State charged Hitch with strangulation (felony), intimidation (dismissed pretrial), and battery (misdemeanor); jury convicted only of battery. Trial court sentenced to 365 days (12 executed, 353 suspended) and, under I.C. § 35-38-1-7.7, determined Hitch committed a "crime of domestic violence," triggering a state firearm-possession prohibition.
- Hitch appealed, arguing (1) the firearm prohibition is punitive and, under Apprendi/Blakely, the facts supporting the prohibition had to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt (Sixth Amendment); and (2) insufficient evidence supported the domestic-violence finding.
- The Court reviewed the Sixth Amendment claim for fundamental error (Hitch failed to object below) and applied the intent-effects (Mendoza‑Martinez) test to decide whether the firearm prohibition is punitive in effect.
- After weighing Mendoza‑Martinez factors, the Court concluded the statute is non‑punitively regulatory (public safety purpose, five‑year petition for restoration) and therefore not subject to Apprendi-type jury factfinding; the Court also held the evidence was sufficient to support a domestic‑violence determination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the firearm‑possession prohibition following a judge’s domestic‑violence finding is a "punishment" requiring jury factfinding under Apprendi/Blakely | Hitch: The firearm ban is punitive; facts triggering it must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt | State: The ban is regulatory (to comply with federal GCA) and civil in effect, not subject to Apprendi | Court: No fundamental error; applying Mendoza‑Martinez factors the statute is non‑punitively regulatory, so Apprendi does not apply |
| Whether the issue is preserved for appeal (failure to object at trial) | Hitch: Raises Sixth Amendment claim on appeal despite no trial objection | State: Claim waived; review only for fundamental error | Court: Claim reviewed only for fundamental error and rejected (no blatant due process violation) |
| Sufficiency of evidence for "crime of domestic violence" determination | Hitch: Bruce’s later stay was temporary/for convenience; cohabitation element not satisfied like Johnson v. State | State: Parties had prior months-long romantic cohabitation and statute includes former cohabitants | Court: Evidence sufficient — prior months of romantic cohabitation met the statute’s definition |
| Whether the firearm prohibition is excessive relative to its regulatory purpose | Hitch: Statute bans firearms irrespective of firearm involvement, suggesting punitive effect | State: Statute advances public safety and includes a five‑year restoration procedure | Court: Factor analysis favors non‑punitive result overall; restoration process and regulatory purpose mitigate excessiveness |
Key Cases Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (1999) (facts increasing maximum penalty must be found by a jury)
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (Apprendi principle applied to sentencing enhancements)
- Mendoza‑Martinez v. United States, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (seven‑factor intent‑effects test for punitive character)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (use of Mendoza‑Martinez factors and presumption of non‑punitive application in certain contexts)
- United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (congressional purpose to keep firearms from domestic abusers)
- Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980) (federal firearms disability characterized as civil in purpose/effect)
- Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009) (adopting intent‑effects framework under Indiana law)