Scott Everett Shine v. State
06-16-00088-CR
Tex. App.—WacoOct 18, 2016Background
- Scott Everett Shine was convicted in three consolidated indictments for engaging in organized criminal activity by delivering methamphetamine; his sentence (with enhancements) was life imprisonment.
- At trial Shine cross-examined DPS Special Agent Danny Kelly about the arrest warrants Kelly prepared for Shine.
- Shine sought to elicit that the arrest warrants charged only delivery of methamphetamine, not engaging in organized criminal activity.
- The trial court sustained the State’s objection and limited that line of cross-examination as confusing and not shown relevant; Shine made an offer of proof reflecting Kelly would testify the warrants listed delivery, not organizational allegations, though Kelly said the investigation did allege organization.
- Shine argued the limitation infringed his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights and that the warrant charge would show he was guilty only of the lesser offense; the court of appeals reviewed whether the limitation was an abuse of discretion or constitutional error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court erred in limiting cross-examination about the content of arrest warrants | Shine: Excluding testimony that warrants charged only delivery impaired his confrontation right and bore on guilt for organized criminal activity | State: The content of the warrants was not relevant to guilt for the charged offense and could confuse jury; prosecutor decides charges | Court: No abuse of discretion; limitation proper and not a constitutional deprivation |
Key Cases Cited
- Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (Confrontation Clause does not automatically override state evidentiary rules; trial judges have wide discretion)
- Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (trial courts may impose reasonable limits on cross‑examination for several concerns)
- Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (Confrontation Clause guarantees opportunity for effective cross‑examination, not limitless cross‑examination)
- Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (bias impeachment through cross‑examination can be constitutionally protected)
- Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (excluded impeachment evidence must go to the heart of the defense to trigger constitutional error)
- Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (trial court discretion to limit inappropriate cross‑examination)
- Cameron v. State, 241 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (admissibility reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Neal v. State, 150 S.W.3d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (prosecutorial discretion to decide charges)
- Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (prosecutor’s broad charging discretion)
- Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (denial to testify can implicate constitutional rights)
- Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (exclusion of reliable exculpatory hearsay can violate due process)
- Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (state evidentiary rules can implicate constitutional rights in extreme cases)
