Schunior, Victor Manuel Jr.
2016 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1330
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2016Background
- In Feb 2011 Schunior allegedly shot into a vehicle and struck another person with a firearm; he was indicted over two years later on four counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
- Schunior moved to dismiss and filed a pretrial habeas, arguing the statute of limitations had run.
- Trial court found aggravated assault governed by Art. 12.03(d) (the ‘‘primary crime’’ rule) and dismissed the indictment with prejudice as time-barred.
- The State appealed; the court of appeals affirmed, holding Art. 12.03(d) governs and yields a two-year limitation where the primary crime is misdemeanor assault.
- The State sought discretionary review asking whether aggravated assault is governed by Art. 12.01(7) (three-year catch‑all) or Art. 12.03(d) (mirrors primary crime), and whether the lesser‑included offense with the longer limitations period controls.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of appeals: Art. 12.03(d) governs; the primary crime is the base offense (assault), and the lesser‑included offense with the longer period does not control.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Schunior) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which provision governs the limitations period for aggravated assault? | Art. 12.01(7) applies (three‑year catch‑all) | Art. 12.03(d) controls; aggravated offenses take the limitation of the primary crime (two years if primary is misdemeanor assault) | Art. 12.03(d) governs; aggravated assault follows the primary crime's limitation period |
| If Art. 12.03(d) applies, what is the “primary crime” for aggravated assault? | Primary crime should be the most serious lesser‑included offense (to avoid shorter limit for greater offense) | Primary crime is the base offense (assault under §22.01) — the statute’s structure makes the base offense primary | "Primary crime" = the base offense (assault as defined in §22.01); the indictment’s facts here support misdemeanor assault as primary |
| Does the lesser‑included offense with the greater limitations period control? | Yes — to avoid the absurdity of a greater offense having a shorter period than a lesser‑included offense | No — "primary crime" is the base offense; statute’s text/structure does not select the most severe lesser‑included offense | No; the lesser‑included offense with the longer period does not control |
| Did legislative history or prior dicta require a three‑year rule? | Prior dicta and legislative inaction (Colyandro principle) ratified a three‑year understanding | Legislative amendments (1997) targeted child‑sexual‑offense limits and did not manifest intent to move aggravated assault into Art. 12.01(7) | Legislative history supports treating Art. 12.03(d) as controlling for aggravated assault; prior three‑year dicta were not dispositive |
Key Cases Cited
- Hunter v. State, 576 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (earlier dicta stating aggravated‑assault limitations were three years)
- Ex parte Salas, 724 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (referenced three‑year limitation for aggravated assault in dicta)
- Ex parte Matthews, 933 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (applied Art. 12.03(d) to aggravated perjury, resulting in two‑year limitation)
- State v. Bennett, 415 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (noted the issue was unsettled and produced multiple concurrences analyzing the conflict)
- State v. Colyandro, 233 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (presumption that legislative inaction can ratify a judicial interpretation)
- Fantich v. State, 420 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2013) (court interpreted Art. 12.03(d) as unambiguous and applicable to aggravated assault)