Schultz Ex Rel. Estate of Schultz v. Akzo Nobel Paints, LLC
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 13059
7th Cir.2013Background
- Donald Schultz worked as a painter for American Motors/Chrysler (1981–1989) and was diagnosed with acute myeloid leukemia (AML) in 2005; he died in 2006. His wife/estate sued paint manufacturers Akzo Nobel Paints (Akzo) and Durako, alleging benzene in workplace paints caused his AML.
- Plaintiff offered two experts: Dr. Stewart (industrial hygienist) used Monte Carlo analysis and MSDSs to reconstruct Schultz’s benzene exposure at ~24 ppm‑years; Dr. Gore (oncologist) opined benzene is a known cause of AML and that Schultz’s exposure was a substantial contributing cause.
- Akzo moved for summary judgment; the district court excluded Dr. Gore under Rule 702/Daubert reasoning (finding his ‘‘no safe threshold’’ remarks speculative and faulting him for not ruling out other causes), then granted summary judgment for Akzo; it also granted summary judgment for Durako.
- The Seventh Circuit reviewed admissibility de novo and summary judgment de novo as to the ultimate ruling, focusing on whether the district court properly performed its gatekeeping function under Rule 702/Daubert.
- The Seventh Circuit held the district court erred in excluding Dr. Gore: his methodology (differential diagnosis, reliance on epidemiologic studies) and application to Schultz’s 24 ppm‑years exposure were admissible; exclusion improperly attacked conclusions rather than methodology.
- The court affirmed summary judgment for Durako because plaintiff presented no admissible evidence showing Schultz was exposed to Durako products (unauthenticated list insufficient).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Dr. Gore's causation testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702/Daubert | Dr. Gore used accepted methods (differential diagnosis, literature) to link benzene exposure to Schultz’s AML, relying on Stewart's exposure estimate (~24 ppm‑years) and epidemiologic studies showing increased risk above ~10 ppm‑years | Akzo argued Gore’s ‘‘no threshold’’ remark was speculative, his conclusions conflicted with studies finding a 40 ppm‑year threshold, and he failed to rule out other causes (smoking) | Reversed exclusion: Gore’s methods and application were admissible; the district court improperly focused on conclusions and chose between competing studies at the gatekeeping stage |
| Whether plaintiff showed specific causation (benzene was a substantial factor) | Stewart’s exposure reconstruction + Gore’s opinion showed exposure above levels found hazardous in the literature, satisfying specific causation for trial | Akzo argued exposure below some studies’ threshold and long latency made causation unlikely | With Gore admissible, plaintiff presented enough to defeat Akzo’s summary judgment motion; case remanded for trial |
| Whether an expert must rule out all alternative causes | Gore considered and ‘‘ruled in’’ smoking as a contributing factor and explained why other factors were unlikely; differential diagnosis is a recognized method | Akzo argued Gore failed to exclude other causes and thus his opinion was unreliable | Held that experts need not exclude every alternative; Gore adequately considered alternatives under governing precedent |
| Durako’s liability based on record evidence of exposure | Plaintiff pointed to Chrysler document listing a Durako product possibly used at plants | Durako argued the document was unauthenticated and showed no timing/quantity/frequency of use | Affirmed summary judgment for Durako: plaintiff failed to provide admissible evidence that Schultz used Durako paint |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (gatekeeping standard for scientific expert testimony)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (scope of Daubert applies to non‑purely scientific expert testimony)
- Myers v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 629 F.3d 639 (differential etiology must meaningfully rule in/out causes to be reliable)
- Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713 (trial court should focus on methodology not ultimate correctness of expert conclusions)
- Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523 (district court must give reasoned explanation when excluding expert testimony)
- Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146 (expert should explain why alternatives are not sole cause)
- Zielinski v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 661 N.W.2d 491 (Wisconsin standard: product must be a cause or substantial factor)