Schrader v. Holder
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147717
D.D.C.2011Background
- 1968: Schrader, a Navy member, was convicted in Maryland for common law assault and battery, a non-codified misdemeanor with no statutory cap on punishment; he paid a $100 fine.
- 2009–2010: Schrader denied firearms purchases based on a NICS check tied to the 1968 common-law conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 921(a)(20)(B).
- Schrader challenges § 922(g)(1) as applied to uncodified common-law misdemeanors and asserts a Second Amendment right to purchase firearms.
- Court treats the denial as a concrete injury-in-fact, not pre-enforcement, and addresses standing and justiciability.
- Court analyzes whether uncodified common-law offenses fall within § 922(g)(1)’s “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” and whether such application violates the Second Amendment.
- Defendants move to dismiss; Schrader cross-moves for summary judgment.
- Court ultimately grants Defendants’ dismissal and denies Schrader’s summary-judgment request.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Schrader have standing to challenge §922(g)(1) as applied? | Schrader has an imminent, concrete injury from NICS denial. | Standing lacks an imminent injury; future purchase plans are uncertain. | Schrader has standing; injury-in-fact shown. |
| Does §922(g)(1) apply to uncodified common-law misdemeanors like Schrader’s? | Uncodified offenses lack statutory penalty and should be outside §922(g)(1). | §922(g)(1) covers crimes punishable by more than one year, including uncodified crimes; no reliance on statutory coding needed. | Yes; common-law offense punished by more than two years falls within §922(g)(1). |
| Does applying §922(g)(1) to Schrader violate the Second Amendment as interpreted in Heller? | Broad application affects individual right to keep and bear arms. | Regulatory measures that disarm dangerous individuals are consistent with Heller. | No constitutional violation; several presumptively lawful regulatory measures remain permissible. |
| Is Maryland’s legislative silence on codification a limiting factor for federal §922(g)(1) in this case? | Silence implies no federal reach over uncodified offenses. | Federal law governs; silence does not immunize from §922(g)(1). | Federal law cannot hinge on state legislative silence; §922(g)(1) applies. |
| Should the Second Amendment Foundation’s standing be decided separately? | SAF has independent standing to challenge §922(g)(1). | SAF’s standing mirrors Schrader’s and needs no separate adjudication. | Court does not need to decide SAF’s standing; Schrader’s standing suffices. |
Key Cases Cited
- Parker v. District of Columbia, 370 F.3d 376 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (license denial supports Article III injury; Heller acknowledged individual right framework)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (S. Ct. 2008) (recognizes individual right and permissible restrictions; identifies presumptively lawful measures)
- Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (standing when plaintiff seeks to purchase/store firearms; pre-enforcement)
- United States v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc; discusses scope of §922(g) and common-law offenses)
- United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 1993) (relevant discussion on gun restrictions and standards)
- Parker cited Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1979) (supports notion that felon-in-possession concept is broader than literal felon status)
- United States v. Hill, 539 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2008) (teaches that maximum possible sentence matters for §922(g)(1))
- United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 1999) (max possible sentence governs status under §922(g)(1))
- United States v. Qualls, 108 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasizes focus on punishment potential, not actual sentence)