Schneider v. Regency Heights of Windham, LLC, 3:14-cv-00217

Plaintiff John Schneider, age 63, worked as Maintenance Supervisor/Director at Regency Heights (a skilled nursing facility) from 1998 until termination on November 9, 2012. He was replaced by substantially younger employees.
Regency Heights operated the facility; Regency Healthcare and Ciena provided management and HR support. Decisionmakers from all three entities participated in the termination process.
Two performance incidents motivated discipline/termination: (1) Schneider’s delayed or nonresponsive handling of weekend maintenance calls (July 21–22, 2012) that led to a final written warning; (2) alleged lack of urgency in arranging propane for the generator before Hurricane Sandy (October 2012).
Harris (Facility Administrator) proposed termination by email to Vera (Regional Director), Halsey (Ciena COO) and Erwin (Ciena HR), and included Schneider’s age; the recipients agreed and termination followed.
Schneider claimed Defendants violated the ADEA and CFEPA; Defendants moved for summary judgment. The court found triable issues (joint-employer liability, pretext, comparators, and admissibility of “me too” evidence) and denied summary judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were the three corporate defendants joint employers for discrimination liability?	The entities jointly controlled employment decisions; decisionmakers from all three consulted and knew Schneider’s age.	The entities are formally separate; Regency Heights was plaintiff’s employer.	Denied dismissal; court treats them as joint employers at summary judgment stage.
Did Schneider make a prima facie ADEA/CFEPA case?	Schneider was >40, qualified, terminated, and replaced by younger workers; age was communicated to decisionmakers.	Defendants argue termination was for legitimate poor performance.	Court: prima facie case established.
Did defendants articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason?	— (concedes performance reason can be legitimate)	Termination based on poor performance: weekend unavailability and failure to secure fuel before Hurricane Sandy.	Court: defendants met burden of production.
Is there sufficient evidence of pretext / that age was the but-for cause?	Points to age notation in termination email, inconsistencies in Harris’s explanations, alleged ageist remarks by Vera, disparate treatment (comparators, denial of PIP), and “me too” evidence.	Argues proffered reasons are non-discriminatory; some evidence is hearsay or inadmissible; PIP use was discretionary.	Court: genuine issues of material fact exist (pretext, comparators, admissibility of "me too" evidence); summary judgment denied on ADEA and CFEPA claims.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard and genuine dispute requirement)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93 (applying McDonnell Douglas to ADEA claims)
Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69 (joint-employer and employer awareness of age in replacement context)
Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235 (four-factor integrated-employer test)
Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140 (centralized control over labor relations is key for joint-employer analysis)
Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (but-for causation explanation)
Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332 (pretext may be shown by circumstantial evidence)
Danzer v. Norden Sys., 151 F.3d 50 (stray remarks and when they bear on discriminatory intent)
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (admissibility of "me too" evidence)