550 S.W.3d 342
Tex. App.2018Background
- Denton County Cowboy Church bought adjacent SF-2 lots, built an open-air rodeo arena (original tract) and later began constructing a large enclosed arena on a newly purchased adjoining 12-acre tract (new tract) adjacent to plaintiffs' homes.
- The Church applied for a specific‑use permit and the Town posted public notices and held hearings; the council rezoned the new tract from SF-2 to AG and approved the special‑use permit after votes and an executive session under TOMA.
- Appellants (Schmitz, Pollock, Larry LaDuke, Becky LaDuke) sued the Church and the Town seeking UDJA declarations, injunctive relief, § 1983 claims, and nuisance damages; they also sought a temporary injunction; defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction.
- The trial court denied the temporary injunction and granted pleas to the jurisdiction, dismissing most claims; Appellants appealed. On rehearing the appellate court reconsidered and issued this memorandum opinion.
- The appellate court held (1) most UDJA, § 1983, nuisance and permanent‑injunctive claims against the Town were barred by governmental immunity except narrow UDJA and injunction claims based on alleged TOMA violations; (2) Appellants lacked standing to seek declaratory/injunctive enforcement of the Town’s zoning against the Church, but Schmitz had standing for a private‑nuisance claim against the Church; (3) the trial court did not abuse discretion in denying the temporary injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over Appellants' UDJA/declaratory claims against the Town | Town violated its ordinances and TOMA; UDJA relief appropriate | Town asserted governmental immunity; UDJA waiver limited to invalidity of ordinances | Most UDJA claims dismissed for immunity; narrow UDJA claims and injunctions based on alleged TOMA violations survive (TOMA waives immunity) |
| Whether § 1983/regulatory‑takings claim against the Town is viable | Town’s rezoning/permit decisions amounted to a taking or due‑process violation under § 1983 | Town argued immunity; takings claim invalid because it challenges enforcement/process, not affirmative government action | § 1983/takings claim dismissed for lack of viable takings theory; Town immune |
| Whether Appellants have standing to seek declaratory and permanent injunctive relief against the Church to enforce Town zoning | Plaintiffs may enforce zoning violations against Church | Church argued enforcement is exclusively the municipality’s prerogative (no private standing) | Plaintiffs lack standing to enforce Town zoning against Church; these declaratory/injunctive claims dismissed |
| Whether plaintiffs have standing / ripe private‑nuisance claims against Church | Plaintiffs will suffer or are suffering particularized interference (noise, light, dust, odors) | Church argued injuries speculative as new arena not yet used/complete | Schmitz established particularized, imminent injury and has standing for nuisance; LaDukes and Pollock did not show a material fact issue and lack standing |
| Whether Appellants were entitled to a temporary injunction | Construction/use will cause imminent, irreparable harm; showed probable right to relief | Defendants produced evidence opposing plaintiffs’ likelihood of success and disputed harms | Trial court did not abuse discretion in denying temporary injunction; denial affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Mission Consol. Independent School Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2012) (plea to the jurisdiction standard and burden on plaintiff)
- Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT‑Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002) (plea to the jurisdiction principles)
- Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) (plaintiff must affirmatively demonstrate jurisdiction)
- Tex. Department of Transportation v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2011) (UDJA does not itself confer jurisdiction and waiver limited to ordinance validity)
- City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) (limits on UDJA waiver of immunity)
- Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325 (Tex. 2006) (municipal waiver of immunity must be clear and unambiguous)
- Kirby Lake Development, Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Authority, 320 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 2010) (statute contemplating litigation does not clearly waive immunity)
- City of Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2011) (constitutional takings claim waives immunity but regulatory‑takings requires viable allegations of affirmative governmental action)
- Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002) (temporary injunction elements)
- Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1978) (deference to trial court in temporary‑injunction rulings)
