Schlumberger Limited and Schlumberger Technology Corporation v. Charlotte Rutherford
01-14-00776-CV
| Tex. App. | Jan 20, 2015Background
- Rutherford was an in-house senior IP attorney at Schlumberger for ~7 years; she left to join Acacia and subsequently Acacia subsidiary Dynamic 3D sued Schlumberger for patent infringement.
- Schlumberger filed a retaliatory suit against Rutherford alleging breach of fiduciary duty, trade-secret misappropriation, conversion, civil theft, and breach of contract, asserting Rutherford had taken electronic storage devices and confidential files.
- Schlumberger obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order based on affidavits that were later undermined by depositions; the TRO was soon dissolved and media accusations followed.
- Rutherford filed a motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens’ Participation Act (TCPA), arguing Schlumberger’s claims were based on/prosecuted in response to her protected petitioning and association activities; she sought dismissal, fees, and sanctions.
- The trial court granted the TCPA motion as to fiduciary duty, trade-secret, conversion, and theft claims but denied it as to breach of contract, and awarded Rutherford $350,000 in attorney’s fees and $250,000 in sanctions.
- Schlumberger appealed the partial dismissal; Rutherford (appellee/cross-appellant) argues (1) this court lacks interlocutory jurisdiction over grants of TCPA motions, (2) the TCPA covers Schlumberger’s claims, (3) Schlumberger failed to produce the statutory “clear and specific” evidence, and (4) fees and sanctions were appropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Schlumberger) | Defendant's Argument (Rutherford) | Held (trial-court determination / Rutherford's position on appeal) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory TCPA grant | Appeal is permissible from partial interlocutory rulings on TCPA motions | Section 51.014(a)(12) authorizes interlocutory appeal only from denials of TCPA motions; grant-only portions are not immediately appealable | Rutherford: dismiss Schlumberger's interlocutory appeal for lack of statutory jurisdiction (court should construe 51.014 narrowly) |
| Applicability of the TCPA to Schlumberger’s claims | TCPA should not apply broadly to torts that do not require communications (conversion, theft, fiduciary duty) or only protect public-speech matters | TCPA expressly covers actions "based on, related to, or in response to" petitioning or association; Schlumberger’s pleadings concede the suit was triggered by Rutherford’s role in the Dynamic 3D litigation and her association with Acacia | Trial court: TCPA applies to the dismissed claims because Schlumberger sued in response to petition/association activity |
| Evidentiary standard: "clear and specific evidence" and constitutionality | The TCPA’s requirement prevents plaintiffs from reaching a jury and improperly excludes inference-based proof | "Clear and specific" modifies prima facie to require unambiguous evidence unaided by stacked inferences; that standard does not violate open-courts clause and is satisfied by discovery opportunities | Trial court: Schlumberger failed to present clear and specific evidence establishing essential elements of the dismissed claims; dismissal appropriate |
| Fees and sanctions (including segregation) | Fees must be segregated because a contract claim survived; sanctions excessive given surviving claim | TCPA mandates fee award to successful movant and allows court discretion; segregation not required where fees are non-segregable and arise from common facts; sanctions appropriate to deter abusive litigation and supported by false affidavits and pattern of suits | Trial court: awarded $350,000 fees and $250,000 sanctions as justified and proportionate given record; segregation unnecessary or remand remedy if required |
Key Cases Cited
- Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001) (defines final-judgment rule and interlocutory nature of orders)
- CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2011) (statutes conferring interlocutory appellate jurisdiction must be strictly construed)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (framework for evaluating circumstantial evidence and competing inferences)
- Tony Gullo Motors, I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2006) (principles on fee segregation where claims arise from common facts)
- Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703 (Cal. 2002) (California anti-SLAPP precedent addressing when a later suit "arises from" protected petitioning activity)