Schlumberger Limited and Schlumberger Technology Corporation v. Charlotte Rutherford, 472 S.W.3d 881

Background

Rutherford was Schlumberger’s in-house IP counsel (2006–2013) and signed a Patent and Confidential Information Agreement restricting removal/disclosure of company property, confidential information, and post‑employment competition.
On exit, Rutherford turned in one USB drive but Schlumberger could not account for an external hard drive and forensic analysis showed multiple USB drives were connected to her Schlumberger computer and that numerous files (many referencing "IP Strategy" and Petrel) were deleted prior to departure.
After leaving, Rutherford joined Acacia, participated in recommending acquisition of a patent later asserted against Schlumberger (suit brought by Acacia’s subsidiary Dynamic 3D), prompting Schlumberger’s investigation and suit.
Schlumberger sued Rutherford for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and Texas Theft Liability Act violations; Rutherford moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizen’s Participation Act (TCPA).
The trial court granted Rutherford’s TCPA motion as to the non‑contract claims but denied dismissal of Schlumberger’s breach‑of‑contract claim; Schlumberger appealed the partial grant and Rutherford cross‑appealed the denial as to the contract claim.
The court considered (1) whether an interlocutory appeal lies from a partial grant of a TCPA dismissal, and (2) whether Schlumberger produced clear and specific evidence to establish a prima facie breach‑of‑contract claim under the TCPA.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Schlumberger)	Defendant's Argument (Rutherford)	Held
1. Is Schlumberger entitled to an interlocutory appeal from the portion of the order granting Rutherford’s TCPA motion?	Appealable because the trial court’s written interlocutory order both granted and denied the motion so the whole document is reviewable under §51.014(a)(12).	No statutory authorization exists to appeal interlocutory grants of TCPA motions; §51.014(a)(12) permits appeal only from orders that deny a motion to dismiss.	Dismissed Schlumberger’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction; §51.014(a)(12) does not authorize interlocutory appeals from orders granting TCPA motions.
2. Does legislative history or §27.008(b) permit appeals from grants?	Sponsor materials and §27.008(b) show intent to allow appeals from both grants and denials.	Legislative history cannot override the clear statutory text; §27.008(b) only requires expedition of appeals, it does not create interlocutory jurisdiction.	Rejected Schlumberger’s legislative‑history argument; courts must follow enacted text rather than sponsor statements.
3. Does a partial denial of a TCPA motion make all parts of the written order interlocutorily appealable?	Yes; a single written interlocutory order that both grants and denies should be wholly appealable under the denial prong.	No; the statute should be read narrowly and an "interlocutory order" refers to a specific ruling—only the denial portion is appealable.	Held appealable only as to the denial portion; the grant portion cannot be reviewed interlocutorily and Schlumberger’s challenge to the grant is dismissed.
4. Did Schlumberger present clear and specific evidence to support a prima facie breach‑of‑contract claim under the TCPA?	Schlumberger produced the signed confidentiality agreement, proof of employment/performance, forensic evidence of copied/deleted files and missing devices, and testimony of confidentiality and damages.	Even if TCPA applies, Schlumberger failed to produce clear and specific evidence on each contract element.	Affirmed trial court’s denial of dismissal as to breach of contract: Schlumberger established a prima facie case (valid contract, performance, breach evidence, and damages/specific performance).

Key Cases Cited

Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. 2012) (general rule that appellate jurisdiction is limited to final judgments)
CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2011) (statutory interlocutory‑appeal provisions construed narrowly)
Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 355 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011) (discussion of interlocutory appeal principles)
Paulsen v. Yarrell, 455 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) (rejecting reliance on sponsor statements inconsistent with enacted TCPA text)
Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407 (Tex. 2011) (supreme court admonition against overreliance on legislative history)
In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) (defining the TCPA’s "clear and specific" prima facie standard)