107 F. Supp. 3d 1212
N.D. Ala.2015Background
- Plaintiff Karen Savage sued Secure First Credit Union alleging race discrimination (Count One), retaliation (Count Two), age discrimination under the ADEA (Count Three), and disability discrimination under the ADA/ADAAA (Count Four); an FMLA claim (Count Five) was previously dismissed with prejudice.
- Secure First moved to dismiss Counts Two (retaliation), Three (ADEA), and Four (ADA), arguing each requires pleading "but-for" causation and Savage pleaded multiple, inconsistent motives.
- The court framed the dispute around the Supreme Court’s "but-for" causation jurisprudence (Gross, Nassar, Burrage) and whether that standard applies to ADEA, Title VII retaliation, and ADA claims.
- Savage’s complaint alleged multiple prohibited motives across counts (age, retaliation, disability, and race as a motivating factor), rather than alleging any single claim was the sole/"but-for" cause of the adverse employment actions.
- The court concluded that ADEA, Title VII retaliation, and ADA discrimination each require but-for causation for liability, and Savage failed to plead but-for causation for Counts Two, Three, and Four.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ADEA requires but-for causation | Savage alleges age motivated adverse actions | Secure First: ADEA requires but-for causation (no mixed-motive) | Court: ADEA requires but-for; dismissal for failure to plead it |
| Whether Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation | Savage alleges retaliation contributed to adverse actions | Secure First: Nassar requires but-for causation for retaliation claims | Court: Retaliation claims require but-for; dismissal for failure to plead it |
| Whether ADA discrimination requires but-for causation | Savage alleges disability motivated adverse actions | Secure First: ADA uses same "because of" language and requires but-for causation | Court: ADA requires but-for; dismissal for failure to plead it |
| Pleading inconsistent/multiple motives | Savage contends she may plead alternative theories | Secure First: multiple proscribed motives contradict but-for requirement | Court: Plaintiff must elect and plead that one theory was the but-for cause; otherwise dismissal of Counts 2–4 (leave to amend to elect one and plead but-for causation) |
Key Cases Cited
- Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (Sup. Ct.) (explaining but-for causation principle and its application across contexts)
- Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (Sup. Ct.) (ADEA requires but-for causation)
- Univ. of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (Sup. Ct.) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation)
- Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467 (11th Cir.) (lower-court precedent may be abrogated by Supreme Court holdings)
- McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir.) (prior Eleventh Circuit discussion of causation under the ADA)
- Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir.) (ADA requires but-for causation following Gross)
- Mora v. Jackson Memorial Foundation, 597 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir.) (discussion that no "same decision" defense exists where but-for causation is required)