808 S.E.2d 927
N.C. Ct. App.2018Background
- On December 29, 2015 Nathaniel and Kristin Sargent sued Bloom Construction and two employees (Austin Edwards and Shawn Stephenson) for assault, battery, negligence, negligent hiring/supervision, intentional/reckless infliction of emotional distress, punitive damages, and loss of consortium arising from a December 31, 2012 confrontation at the Sargents’ home.
- Bloom crews had been using the Sargents’ driveway as a turnaround; Mr. Sargent repeatedly complained to Edwards and others about property damage and driveway use.
- On the day in question Stephenson allegedly shouted obscenities, adopted a “fighting stance,” and moved toward Sargent; the parties scuffled on the ground. Sargent’s leg was later found to be fractured and required surgery.
- Sargent testified he blacked out and did not see Edwards stomp on his leg but inferred Edwards did so because Edwards later apologized; Plaintiffs forecast this as the likely cause of the fracture.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in full; the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assault (Stephenson) | Stephenson’s posture, angry approach and step toward Sargent created reasonable apprehension of imminent harm. | Posturing and stepping toward Sargent without threats or overt attempt to strike is not an assault as a matter of law. | Summary judgment for defendants affirmed — factual showing insufficient for assault. |
| Battery (Edwards) | Even though Sargent did not see the act, circumstantial evidence (Edwards’ proximity, apologies, and Sargent’s blackout) permits inference Edwards stomped on Sargent’s leg. | Plaintiff’s testimony about a foot on the leg is speculative and inadmissible; no direct observation of Edwards stomping. | Summary judgment for Edwards reversed as to battery — genuine issue of material fact exists. |
| Negligence (Edwards) | Edwards negligently stepped on Sargent or negligently separated the men, causing the fracture. | Edwards ordered Stephenson away and attempted to separate the fight; those acts were not negligent as a matter of law. | Summary judgment reversed on ordinary negligence — factual disputes (reasonable care, causation) for jury. |
| Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress | Conduct was extreme and outrageous and caused severe emotional harm. | Conduct (swearing, posture, scuffle) falls short of the high threshold for IIED. | Summary judgment for defendants affirmed — no extreme/outrageous conduct shown. |
| Vicarious Liability (Bloom) | Employer is liable for employees’ assault/battery committed in course of employment. | Employees’ actions were not in the scope of employment; no notice Bloom should have anticipated such acts. | Summary judgment for Bloom affirmed — plaintiffs failed to show conduct was within scope or Bloom had notice. |
| Punitive Damages | Aggravating conduct (malice/willful or wanton) supports punitive damages. | No evidence of malicious or aggravated conduct by either employee. | Summary judgment for defendants on punitive damages affirmed — plaintiffs failed to meet statutory standard. |
| Loss of Consortium (Mrs. Sargent) | Derivative claim based on husband’s successful claims for battery/negligence. | Dependent on outcome of husband’s claims. | Reversed as to Edwards — survives because husband's battery and negligence survive; consortium claim survives. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437 (1981) (elements and definition of assault; requirement of overt act creating reasonable apprehension)
- Wilkerson v. Duke Univ., 229 N.C. App. 670 (2013) (elements of assault summarized)
- City of Greenville v. Haywood, 130 N.C. App. 271 (1998) (definition of battery as offensive touching)
- Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419 (1983) (negligence claims ordinarily for jury; summary judgment rare)
- Moore v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 296 N.C. 467 (1979) (reasonable person standard and jury role in negligence)
- Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Mem. Hospital, 300 N.C. 295 (1980) (loss of consortium is derivative and single recovery rule)