Sarah Weeden v. Deborah Johnson, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 6996

Background

At 14, Sarah Weeden was convicted in California of first‑degree felony murder and attempted robbery based on her role in planning/facilitating a robbery; she was not at the scene and was sentenced to 29 years‑to‑life.
Prosecution relied on phone records, witness testimony about planning, and texts; defense at trial presented only four character witnesses and argued youth/manipulability in closing, but presented no psychological expert or evaluation.
Trial counsel acknowledged he considered but declined a psychological evaluation because he feared the results could be used against Weeden or would conflict with his chosen defense strategy.
Post‑verdict, a psychologist (Dr. Perrine) evaluated Weeden and reported she was passive, vulnerable to manipulation, had cognitive/language deficits, and it was "extremely unlikely" she would intend or knowingly participate in a robbery.
California courts (trial court and Court of Appeal) found counsel’s choice not to pursue psychological testing a reasonable tactical decision; the state supreme court denied review. The federal district court denied habeas relief; Ninth Circuit majority reversed and ordered the writ unless retried.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Weeden)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
1) Was counsel’s failure to obtain a psychological evaluation constitutionally deficient?	Counsel had a duty to investigate youth/psychological issues that were central to mens rea; refusal based on fear of results was unreasonable.	Trial counsel made a reasonable tactical decision to avoid an evaluation that might undercut defense or be used by prosecution.	Held for Weeden: counsel’s failure to investigate was deficient under Strickland; state court unreasonably applied federal law.
2) Did the deficient performance prejudice the defense (reasonable probability of different outcome)?	Dr. Perrine’s uncontradicted opinions on immaturity and manipulability would likely have undermined the prosecution’s mens rea proof and could have produced reasonable doubt.	Psychological evidence was weak/incomplete and might have invited rebuttal or harmed the defense; jury already knew Weeden’s age and could weigh that without an expert.	Held for Weeden: on de novo review (state court did not adequately assess prejudice) the omitted expert testimony created a reasonable probability of a different result.
3) Does AEDPA deference bar relief because the state court reasonably applied Strickland?	The Court of Appeal’s reliance on counsel’s pre‑selected strategy (fear that evaluation “might” undermine defense) conflicts with Supreme Court precedents requiring counsel to investigate before rejecting avenues.	State court’s decision is within the range of reasonable application of Strickland and counsel’s tactical choices are entitled to deference.	Held for Weeden: AEDPA deference does not save the state decision because it was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law.
4) (Dissent) Does this decision create a per se rule requiring psychological evaluations in juvenile cases?	N/A (majority rejects per se rule but emphasizes narrow facts).	The majority effectively creates a near‑per‑se requirement and undervalues trial counsel/state court deference.	Majority: not per se — relief limited to the specific circumstances (14‑year‑old, mens rea central, counsel refused investigation due to fear of findings, uncontradicted post‑verdict expert opinion). Dissent disagrees.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (attorney performance and prejudice standards for ineffective assistance)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (counsel’s duty to investigate mitigating/defensive evidence)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (AEDPA deference; limited instances where expert consultation is required)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (state court unreasonable application of federal law; counsel investigation obligations)
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (failure to investigate mental health mitigating evidence prejudicial)
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (de novo review of prejudice when state court does not resolve it)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (adolescents’ diminished culpability and developmental differences)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (adolescents’ diminished culpability and brain development)
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (recognition that youth affects judgment and perceptions)
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (double deference in Strickland/AEDPA review)