Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411

Petitioner Leon Santos‑Zacaria (a noncitizen) sought withholding of removal; an Immigration Judge reinstated a prior removal order and denied relief.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed in part, finding past persecution but concluding the resulting presumption of future persecution was rebutted — a determination Santos‑Zacaria claimed involved unlawful factfinding by the BIA.
Santos‑Zacaria petitioned for review in the Fifth Circuit under 8 U.S.C. §1252; the government did not raise exhaustion, but the court sua sponte dismissed part of her petition for failure to exhaust under §1252(d)(1).
The Fifth Circuit treated §1252(d)(1) as jurisdictional and held that Santos‑Zacaria should have filed a motion for reconsideration with the BIA before seeking judicial review.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve (1) whether §1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and (2) whether it requires seeking discretionary administrative review (e.g., BIA reconsideration).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §1252(d)(1) is jurisdictional	Santos‑Zacaria: §1252(d)(1) is an exhaustion/claim‑processing rule, not jurisdictional	Government: language limits court review and should be read as jurisdictional	The Court: Not jurisdictional; exhaustion here is a nonjurisdictional claim‑processing rule (Arbaugh clear‑statement required).
Whether §1252(d)(1) requires pursuing discretionary BIA reconsideration	Santos‑Zacaria: §1252(d)(1) requires exhausting remedies available “as of right,” so discretionary reconsideration is not required	Government: Filing a motion to reconsider is a right to request agency review and thus must be exhausted	The Court: Reconsideration is discretionary under regulation and not “available as of right”; §1252(d)(1) does not require it.
Whether reconsideration must be sought sometimes (when issue not previously presented)	Santos‑Zacaria: Reconsideration is never required because it is discretionary	Government: Reconsideration should be required when the issue was not presented to the agency earlier	The Court: Rejects the ‘‘sometimes’’ rule; requiring reconsideration in some cases creates incoherence and administrability problems; it is not required.

Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (distinguishing jurisdictional limits from claim‑processing rules)
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (statutory rules are jurisdictional only with a clear statement from Congress)
Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U.S. _ (clear‑statement rule for jurisdictional treatment)
Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. _ (exhaustion as a nonjurisdictional claim‑processing requirement)
Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (claim‑processing rules promote orderly litigation; jurisdictional label has harsh consequences)
Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386 (discussed predecessor INA provisions but not dispositive on modern jurisdictional meaning)
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (contextual discussion of jurisdictional language in immigration statutes)
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (distinguishing discretionary statutory authority from other review obligations)
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (treating exhaustion and similar prerequisites as nonjurisdictional)