144 Conn. App. 62
Conn. App. Ct.2013Background
- Santos bought property at a tax auction and sued the Town of Stratford and its zoning board claiming a regulatory taking and unjust enrichment after being denied two minor variances.
- Trial occurred in December 2005; posttrial briefs were filed in February 2006.
- Parties executed a written consent in August 2007 extending the judge’s time to render judgment to November 12, 2007; the agreement expressly limited extension to that date and stated it was not a waiver of § 51-183b beyond that date.
- In January 2009 the parties executed a second, substantively identical extension to April 6, 2009.
- The trial court rendered judgment on May 27, 2009 (after the April 6 deadline). Santos moved two days later to set aside the judgment and for a new trial on timeliness grounds; the trial court denied relief, finding Santos waived § 51-183b by agreeing to multiple extensions.
- The appellate court reversed, concluding the trial court’s waiver finding was clearly erroneous and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Santos waived § 51-183b by executing multiple extensions | Santos argued the written extensions were limited to specific dates and expressly reserved § 51-183b rights, so he did not consent to a judgment after those dates | Defendants argued multiple extensions (delaying decision >900 days) amounted to waiver, implicitly consenting to a late judgment | Court held no waiver: the explicit, date-limited extensions (and timely objection) meant the late judgment was voidable and plaintiff did not consent to further extension |
Key Cases Cited
- Foote v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 296 (Conn. App. 2010) (late judgments are voidable; court retains jurisdiction until a party objects)
- Waterman v. United Caribbean, Inc., 215 Conn. 688 (Conn. 1990) (late judgment implicates trial court’s power to render a valid judgment)
- Cowles v. Cowles, 71 Conn. App. 24 (Conn. App. 2002) (parties’ date-limited extension did not constitute consent to a judgment rendered after the stipulated date; timely objection voided the late judgment)