Santos-Reyes v. Attorney General of the United States, 660 F.3d 196

Santos-Reyes, a Dominican Republic citizen, entered the U.S. in 1991 as a conditional permanent resident.
In 2007 DHS charged her with inadmissibility for a crime of moral turpitude based on a 1999 conviction for receiving stolen property, conspiracy, and solicitation.
She sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), arguing seven years of continuous residence.
The BIA and IJ applied the stop-time rule at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1), concluding her conduct began August 18, 1998 and thus ended continuous residence before seven years.
Santos-Reyes argued there was ambiguity in the date triggering stop-time and proposed using October 31, 1998 (arrest date) as the terminal date; the government contended the commission date fixed the stopping point.
The Third Circuit denied the petition, holding the stop-time rule is tied to the date of criminal conduct, not arrest, and that it lacks jurisdiction to review underlying factual determinations.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether stop-time is triggered by the offense date (Aug. 18, 1998) rather than arrest date.	Santos-Reyes	Government	Stop-time tied to offense date; August 18, 1998 controlling
Whether the present-perfect tense 'has committed' creates ambiguity affecting the terminal date.	Santos-Reyes	Government	No ambiguity; term meaning clear; stop-time not disrupted
Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the underlying factual date of commission.	Santos-Reyes	Government	No jurisdiction to review the factual date; record-supported date upheld

Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994) (ambiguity arises from statutory context, not mere definitions)
Alli v. Decker, 650 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2011) (statutory interpretation in immigration context)
Kaplun v. Attorney General of the United States, 602 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2010) (de novo review with Chevron framework)
Sandie v. Attorney General, 562 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2009) (review of BIA/immigration judge decisions)