Santiago v. O'BRIEN
628 F.3d 30
1st Cir.2010Background
- Santiago was tried in Massachusetts for trafficking cocaine found in his apartment after a 1997 police raid.
- Santiago claimed the drugs and paraphernalia belonged to Oley Saradeth, an acquaintance who stayed at his apartment and died before trial.
- Santiago testified the drugs were Oley's, attempting to shift blame; a purported December 1997 confession by Oley to his brother was proffered but excluded as hearsay.
- At a voir dire, Fanta Saradeth testified about the private confession and an April 1998 apology; both were excluded by the trial court.
- Santiago was convicted and sentenced to 15 years; state appellate courts affirmed, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied review.
- Santiago then sought federal habeas relief alleging a Sixth Amendment violation from the exclusion of the exculpatory testimony.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did excluding Oley's confession violate the Sixth Amendment? | Santiago asserts the exclusion deprived him of a key exculpatory witness. | Oley's statements were not trustworthy or properly admissible as against penal interest under state law. | No constitutional error; state ruling reasonable under due process and reliability standards. |
| Was the state court's application of the Massachusetts penal-interest rule reasonable under federal due process? | The private confession should be admissible as exculpatory against penal interest. | The declaration to a brother, private and uncorroborated, was not sufficiently against penal interest or trustworthy. | Yes; the state court properly applied the rule and did not violate due process. |
| Would the alleged error be reversible under the harmless error standard? | Exclusion could have influenced the verdict in light of the exculpatory value. | The strong independent evidence tied to Santiago's guilt lessens any potential prejudice. | Prejudice not shown; impact on the verdict was not substantial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (U.S. 1973) (due process and fairness when essential exculpatory evidence is excluded)
- Scheffer v. United States, 523 U.S. 303 (U.S. 1998) (not every exclusion of hearsay violates the Sixth Amendment)
- Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1996) (limits on interpreting rules for mental state in evidentiary context)
- United States v. Millan, 230 F.3d 431 (1st Cir. 2000) (considerations of reliability and trustworthiness in evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. 65 (Mass. 1986) (requirements for statements against penal interest)
- Commonwealth v. Carr, 373 Mass. 617 (Mass. 1977) (conditions for admissibility of statements against penal interest)
- United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976) (private statements and exceptions to hearsay rules)
