Santiago v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
134 Conn. App. 668
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2012Background
- Santiago, Jr. appealed a DMV suspension: 10-month operator license and lifetime CDL, challenging evidentiary admission, BAC timing, and CDL suspension length.
- Plaintiff had prior DUI history: 2005 refusal to submit to chemical test led to operator license suspension, later restored; CDL obtained in 2009.
- On March 28, 2010, Santiago was arrested after an accident; two breath tests at 8:33 p.m. and 8:50 p.m. yielded BACs of 0.182 and 0.176.
- At the April 26, 2010 license suspension hearing, the officer’s testimony and documents (A-44 form and accompanying report) were admitted over objection.
- The hearing officer found probable cause, that Santiago operated a motor vehicle, and that BAC was 0.16% or higher, leading to the suspension; the Superior Court dismissed the administrative appeal; the articulation addressed four issues.
- The appellate court affirmed, upholding the administrative decision and the lifetime CDL suspension.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of A-44 form and attached report | Santiago argued the A-44 was stale and did not reflect CDL consequences. | Narciso testified to the form’s truth and accuracy; evidence reliable and probative. | Admission not an abuse of discretion; testimony supported reliability. |
| BAC timing within two hours of operation | Argues the first breath test was not within two hours of driving. | Testimony and report placed the first test within two hours. | Substantial evidence supports within two hours; proper under statute. |
| Lifetime CDL suspension under § 14-44k(h) | Contends § 14-44k(h) doesn’t apply because first suspension occurred before CDL was held. | Statute applies to two or more refusals/failures arising from two or more incidents; no retroactivity. | Statute unambiguous; applies to two incidents, regardless of when CDL obtained; affirmed. |
| Overall statutory construction and retroactivity concerns | Argues reinterpretation would create absurd results (late reframing of §14-44k(h)). | Statute should be read as written to advance public safety. | Plain meaning governs; no rewrite to achieve a preferred result. |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1 (1986) (license suspension hearing limited to four statutory issues)
- Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507 (1987) (no warning requirement for refusals at license suspension hearing)
- Pizzo v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 62 Conn.App. 571 (2001) (informal hearings; evidence must be reliable and probative)
- Winsor v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 101 Conn.App. 674 (2007) (substantial evidence review of administrative findings)
- Cormier v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 105 Conn.App. 558 (2008) (statutory interpretation; §14-44k(h) application to two incidents)
- State v. Custer, 110 Conn.App. 836 (2008) (ambiguity analysis in statute interpretation)
- Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 279 Conn. 207 (2006) (interpretation of remedial statutes; legislature intent)
- Ames v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 267 Conn. 524 (2004) (plain meaning and statutory interpretation principle)