Santiago-Ramos v. Autoridad De Energía Eléctrica De Puerto Rico
834 F.3d 103
1st Cir.2016Background
- PREPA charges a base rate plus monthly adjustment fees; Puerto Rico law requires PREPA to allocate 11% of overall revenue to subsidies, including municipal CILTs (post-2011/2014 amendments changed calculation rules).
- Plaintiffs (Santiago et al.) filed a class action on behalf of ~1.5 million PREPA customers, alleging PREPA used customer-paid revenue to subsidize municipal private use and seeking ~$360 million in just compensation.
- Plaintiffs asserted property interests in (a) electricity as a movable good and (b) the funds they paid to PREPA, and claimed both a Fifth Amendment taking and a procedural due process violation.
- The district court granted summary judgment for PREPA, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation that plaintiffs failed to identify a valid property interest and therefore lacked viable takings or due process claims.
- The First Circuit affirmed, holding plaintiffs lack standing because they did not establish a protected property interest in electricity or in funds once paid to PREPA; the court explained consumers paid only for the electricity they received and ownership of paid funds transferred to PREPA.
- Two concurring opinions: Chief Judge Howard would treat the property-interest issue as merits (not standing) and would affirm on the merits; Judge Lynch concurred in the judgment and noted standing questions were difficult and not fully briefed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Valid property interest in electricity (movable good) | Plaintiffs: PREPA regulations and PR law recognize electricity as movable property, creating a protected property interest. | PREPA: Regulations do not create a constitutional property interest; customers only have an interest in continued service, not in discrete units of electricity. | Held: No protected property interest established in electricity for purposes of takings; even if assumed, no actual physical taking occurred. |
| Property interest in funds paid to PREPA | Plaintiffs: Money paid for electricity remains their property and PREPA’s use to subsidize municipalities effects a taking. | PREPA: Once customers pay for service, ownership of those funds transfers to PREPA; fees do not implicate the Takings Clause. | Held: No property interest in funds after payment; fees do not trigger Takings Clause. |
| Whether PREPA’s subsidy practice effects a taking | Plaintiffs: PREPA redirects value paid by customers to municipalities (private use) without compensation or procedure. | PREPA: Consumers receive the electricity they pay for; subsidies are allocated from PREPA revenue, not by redirecting specific customer electricity. | Held: No taking—there is no diversion of identifiable electricity from plaintiffs or deprivation of a cognizable property interest. |
| Procedural due process claim | Plaintiffs: No adequate procedure exists to resolve disputes about the alleged taking of electricity/fees. | PREPA: Without a protected property interest, no due process claim exists; regulatory procedures apply to service suspension but not the alleged theory here. | Held: Because plaintiffs failed to identify a protected property interest, procedural due process claim fails. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires injury in fact, traceability, redressability)
- Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (utility customers may have property interest in continued service in limited circumstances)
- Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (fees generally do not implicate the Takings Clause)
- Bingham v. Massachusetts, 616 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (plaintiff must have a personal stake in alleged property rights for takings claims)
- Marrero-García v. Irizarry, 33 F.3d 117 (1st Cir.) (regulatory definitions ordinarily do not create constitutional property interests)
- Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129 (standard of review for summary judgment)
