Santiago Alvarez v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
818 F.3d 1194
11th Cir.2016Background
- Santiago Alvarez, a Cuban national and long‑time U.S. resident, was taken into ICE custody near the end of a federal prison term after an immigration detainer; he remained detained about 11 months although removal to Cuba was not possible.
- Alvarez was ordered removed after an immigration hearing; ICE did not remove him within the 90‑day statutory post‑order period and issued administrative "decisions to continue detention" relying on asserted prospects of removal to Spain.
- Alvarez alleged ICE officials (and DOJ attorneys who litigated on ICE’s behalf) knowingly made false statements (e.g., about Spanish citizenship eligibility) and issued sham custody determinations to prolong his detention, and brought Bivens claims for Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations and conspiracy.
- The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. §1252(g) and on multiple alternative grounds (statute of limitations, Heck, lack of Bivens relief, qualified/absolute immunity).
- The Eleventh Circuit panel held §1252(g) did not bar consideration of Alvarez’s post‑removal‑period detention claims, but affirmed dismissal because no Bivens remedy should be recognized: INA’s remedial scheme (including habeas relief) and multiple "special factors" counsel against implying damages against federal officials for prolonged immigration detention.
- Judge Pryor concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing a Bivens remedy should be available against the HQPDU reviewer (Munoz) because Alvarez plausibly alleged a sham 180‑day review; she would have reversed dismissal of that claim (and found Heck, qualified immunity, and statute‑of‑limitations dismissals erroneous as to Munoz).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 8 U.S.C. §1252(g) strips federal courts of jurisdiction over Alvarez’s claims | Alvarez: §1252(g) does not bar claims that challenge post‑removal conduct that was meant to indefinitely detain him rather than to execute removal | Defendants: §1252(g) bars judicial review of claims "arising from" decisions to commence, adjudicate, or execute removal | Court: §1252(g) does not bar jurisdiction over Alvarez’s allegations that post‑removal actions were aimed at prolonging detention rather than executing removal, but it does bar challenges to decisions to commence proceedings (e.g., pre‑removal detainer choice) |
| Whether a Bivens damages remedy is available for constitutional violations that prolonged immigration detention | Alvarez: Bivens should be extended because officials allegedly violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights and there is no adequate damages remedy | Defendants: INA and regulatory scheme plus habeas provide adequate alternatives; special factors (foreign policy, separation of powers, administrative complexity) counsel against Bivens expansion | Court: No Bivens remedy; INA’s remedial framework and special factors counsel hesitation — decline to create a new damages action |
| Whether INA/regulatory procedures and habeas corpus provide adequate alternative remedies | Alvarez: INA/regulatory processes failed here (alleged sham 180‑day review) and Congress’ silence on damages is not dispositive | Defendants: The INA is an elaborate remedial scheme and habeas is available; Congress repeatedly amended the INA evidencing intent to preclude damages suits | Court: INA + habeas are adequate alternatives for purposes of Bivens analysis; Congress’ comprehensive regime and availability of review weigh against implying damages |
| Whether alternative defenses (Heck, qualified immunity, statute of limitations) bar Alvarez’s claims | Alvarez: Claims are plausible and timely; habeas relief was mooted by release so Heck should not preclude remedy; qualified immunity not established for knowingly false sham review | Defendants: Heck, qualified immunity, and limitations apply | Court: Majority affirmed dismissal on Bivens ground and did not need to resolve all alternative defenses; concurrence would reject Heck/timebar/immunity as to Munoz and allow that narrow claim to proceed |
Key Cases Cited
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (recognition of implied damages remedy against federal officers for Fourth Amendment violations)
- Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (post‑removal‑period detention limited by "reasonably foreseeable" removal; six months presumptively reasonable)
- Reno v. American‑Arab Anti‑Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (narrow reading of 8 U.S.C. §1252(g); provision applies only to three discrete actions)
- Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (Bivens extended where alternative remedies were absent)
- Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (existence of alternative remedial scheme can preclude Bivens even if it lacks damages)
- Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (courts should refrain from creating damages remedies where administrative scheme indicates congressional intent)
- Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (court declined further expansion of Bivens)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (favorable‑termination rule for damages claims that would imply invalidity of conviction or sentence)