Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
1:20-cv-01997
| E.D.N.Y | Aug 4, 2022Background:
- Plaintiffs Santander Consumer USA, Inc. and VW Credit, Inc. (lienholders) sued the Port Authority after the Port Authority Police Department towed and impounded four financed vehicles left in JFK and LGA parking facilities for 45–133 days.
- The Port Authority’s policy (and posted notices) treats vehicles left >30 days as abandoned, tows them, sends notice under N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1224, requires payment of towing/storage/parking fees for release, and will acquire title if unclaimed after ten days.
- Plaintiffs received the statutory notices; Santander paid to recover two vehicles; the Port Authority retained two vehicles (Santander’s Impala and VW Credit’s A7) and Plaintiffs sought damages and declaratory relief.
- Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment arguing (1) the impoundments were unreasonable warrantless seizures (Fourth Amendment) and (2) the system denied lienholders due process by failing to provide a hearing before forfeiture/acquisition (Fourteenth Amendment).
- The Court held the initial impoundments reasonable under the Fourth Amendment (community-caretaking/public convenience rationale) but found the post-seizure procedures constitutionally deficient: because the seizures arose from established policy, lienholders are entitled to meaningful process and at minimum a prompt hearing opportunity before the government acquires title.
- Remedy: summary judgment denied as to Fourth Amendment claims (retention treated as due-process issue), summary judgment granted on procedural-due-process claim; Court ordered the Port Authority to propose revised procedures and directed plaintiffs to re-submit damages applications consistent with the opinion.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Port Authority’s warrantless towing/impoundment of vehicles deemed abandoned violated the Fourth Amendment | Warrantless seizures of lienholders’ property were unreasonable and not justified by emergency or special needs | Impoundments were reasonable under community-caretaking/public-convenience interests and authorized by local policy and state abandonment law | Impoundments were reasonable; summary judgment for plaintiffs on Fourth Amendment denied |
| Whether continued retention and conditioning release on payment is a separate Fourth Amendment violation / de facto forfeiture | Continued indefinite retention without hearing is a de facto forfeiture requiring Fourth Amendment protections | Retention after a lawful seizure does not state a separate Fourth Amendment claim; improper retention is addressed under due process | Continued retention is primarily a procedural-due-process matter, not an independent Fourth Amendment violation |
| Whether lienholders were entitled to pre-deprivation or meaningful post-deprivation process under the Fourteenth Amendment | Lienholders have a protected property interest and the Port Authority’s procedure (notice + automatic title after 10 days + mandatory fees) provides no meaningful opportunity to contest seizure or fees | Statutory notice under §1224 and availability of Article 78 proceedings provide constitutionally adequate process; fees are authorized by statute | Because seizures arose from an established procedure, Article 78 is not sufficient; lienholders are entitled at minimum to a prompt, government-arranged hearing opportunity prior to government acquisition; SJ granted on due-process claim |
| Whether Port Authority is liable under Monell for its towing/impoundment policy | The Port Authority’s policy/custom directly caused the deprivation of lienholders’ constitutional rights | No showing of misapplication or misuse of §1224 and no direct causal link to constitutional deprivation | The Court finds a direct causal link between the Port Authority’s policy and the due-process deprivation and denies Port Authority’s Monell defense |
Key Cases Cited
- South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (police community-caretaking authority to impound vehicles)
- Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (community-caretaking doctrine background)
- Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2002) (post-seizure prompt hearing requirement to protect lienholders)
- Ford Motor Credit Co. v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 503 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2007) (security interests are protected property; procedures required when state retains vehicles)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (balancing test for what process is due)
- Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (pre-deprivation hearing principles; temporary deprivations implicate due process)
- Shaul v. Cherry Valley–Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2004) (retention-only Fourth Amendment claims are novel; procedural due process governs)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (definition of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment)
- Lyle v. City of..., 919 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 2019) (reasonableness of impoundment considered under totality of circumstances)
