Sanford v. United States, 841 F.3d 578

Elijah Sanford pleaded guilty in 2007 to one count of Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and signed a plea agreement waiving the right to appeal or "otherwise challenge" his conviction or sentence if the court imposed a term of imprisonment of 210 months or less.
The district court accepted the plea and sentenced Sanford to 151 months’ imprisonment; he did not appeal directly.
Sanford filed a pro se § 2255 motion raising jurisdictional and ineffective-assistance claims; the district court denied relief and this Court denied a certificate of appealability, rendering that § 2255 final in 2010.
Sanford later sought leave to file a successive § 2255 motion arguing Johnson v. United States rendered his sentence unconstitutional because the Guidelines’ residual clause, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), is void for vagueness.
The Government opposed, arguing Sanford’s collateral-attack waiver bars the successive § 2255; the Second Circuit agreed and dismissed Sanford’s motion for leave to file.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Sanford can obtain leave to file a successive § 2255 based on Johnson challenge to the Guidelines residual clause	Johnson makes § 4B1.2(a)(2) unconstitutional, so Sanford’s sentence is invalid	Sanford’s plea agreement contains a knowing, voluntary collateral-attack waiver that bars this challenge	Denied — waiver is enforceable and bars the successive § 2255 request
Whether the collateral-attack waiver was knowing and voluntary	Waiver should not bar relief because Johnson changed law after plea	Waiver was knowingly and voluntarily entered and triggered by sentence ≤210 months	Waiver enforced: court found plea colloquy and signed agreement show waiver was knowing and voluntary
Whether a change in law (Johnson) excuses enforcement of an appeal/collateral-attack waiver	Post-plea legal developments justify relief despite waiver	A defendant’s inability to foresee change in law does not invalidate an appeal/collateral-attack waiver	Court: change-in-law risk does not nullify a valid waiver; waiver covers unforeseen favorable changes
Whether exceptions to waiver apply (e.g., sentence based on constitutionally impermissible factors or government breach)	Impliedly argues waiver should not apply given constitutional defect in Guidelines	No evidence of coercion, judicial abdication, governmental breach, or impermissible sentencing factors	No exception applies; waiver stands

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held residual clause of ACCA void for vagueness)
Blow v. United States, 829 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2016) (Johnson-based § 4B1.2 challenges considered on collateral review)
United States v. Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 2000) (appeal waivers are enforceable when knowing and voluntary)
Tellado v. United States, 745 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2014) (addressing enforceability of collateral-attack waivers)
United States v. Lee, 523 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008) (changes in law after a plea do not negate an appeal waiver)
United States v. Morgan, 406 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2005) (same principle regarding unforeseeable legal changes)
United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2001) (plea agreements construed narrowly and against the government)
United States v. Tang, 214 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2000) (same)
United States v. Yemitan, 70 F.3d 746 (2d Cir. 1995) (enforcing waiver despite claim sentence imposed illegally)